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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST SITUATION REPORT

DECEMBER 1980

1-80-1 ARMENIAN TERRORISM

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SECRET

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST SITUATION REPORT

DECEMBER 1980

1-80-1 ARMENIAN TERRORISM

1. There is every indication that the murder of the Turkish Consul-General and his bodyguard in Sydney on 17 December 1980 was carried out, or arranged for, by one of the many known Armenian terrorist groups. Attached as Annex A is a review of Armenian terrorist activity.

2. Currently, there are only two possible Armenian terrorist targets in New Zealand. The first is the Swiss diplomatic establishment in Wellington, its staff and residencies. The second is the Turkish Consul-General in Auckland, who is a New Zealand national.

3. No Armenian anti-Turkish or Anti-Swiss activist group or individual has been identified in New Zealand and, given the extremely small number of ethnic Armenians in New Zealand, it is considered highly unlikely that attacks against the targets mentioned would emanate from permanent residents.

4. There is a distinct danger of Armenian terrorists entering New Zealand undetected. In addition to Australian residents of Armenian descent travelling to this country under the trans-tasman travel arrangement, Armenians who are citizens or nationals of the USA, certain old Commonwealth countries and countries with which New Zealand has visa abolition agreements, may also gain entry without any form of prior security check.

5. In view of the Sydney killings and worldwide activity by Armenian terrorist groups in recent years, the current threat to the Swiss diplomatic establishment in Wellington and the Turkish Consul-General in Auckland is considered to be high. Armenian attacks against Swiss interests in the past have generally taken the form of damage against property and not against Swiss personnel. There is no record of attack against foreign nationals involved with Turkish interests. It is possible, therefore, that attacks against either target could take the form of bombings - including letter bombs - rather than attacks using firearms.

6. Armenian terrorist actions against Swiss interests results from the jailing in Switzerland of two Armenians involved in terrorist activities. If the Sydney killers are apprehended there is every possibility of retaliatory action by Armenian terrorist groups against Australian diplomatic establishments throughout the world.

ARMENIAN TERRORISM

Origin

1. The various groups comprising the Armenian nation lived in the area consisting of Eastern TURKEY, Southern RUSSIA and the west of PERSIA. During the first World War TURKEY allied herself with GERMANY and AUSTRIA. The Armenian population of TURKEY who had close ties with their kinsmen in RUSSIA were suspected of favouring the Allied cause. As a racial and religious minority in Ottoman TURKEY they were already subject to persecution which was greatly increased during the War. In 1915 an estimated 1,500,000 Armenians were massacred and a further 1,000,000 deported by the Turkish Government. The geographical area formerly occupied by the Armenians is now divided between TURKEY, the Southern States of the Soviet Union and IRAN. The Armenians in TURKEY have always suffered from discrimination and have emigrated in large numbers to Europe, Australia and America to seek prosperity.

Armenian Terrorists

2. The intensity of feeling amongst these emigre groups and those Armenians who remained in TURKEY has led since 1915 to the formation of exile terrorist groups which have developed two notable characteristics. Firstly they are extraordinarily persistent. The call of Patria has remainded undimmed even after decades of exile and repression. Their second major characteristic is a form of intransigent fanatacism which makes them particularly difficult and ruthless opponents to deal with. A ready reservoir of sympathy and support exists amongst many Armenian emigre communities in many "Western" countries enabling these terrorist groups to exist and operate with a measure of security and confidence. The aim of these terrorist groups can best be summarised by a message delivered by the New Armenian Resistance in June 1978 to Agence France Presse -

> "To show the Turkish facist state and Western imperialism that the Armenian people have a right to exist. The New Armenian Resistance calls on all Armenians to take up arms for a reunified independant and socialist Armenia."

This statement is an example of how claims to national self determination and a crude Neo Marxist terminology have merged in these Armenian organisations.

Armenian Terrorist Groups

3. The largest of these Armenian terrorist groups and probably the one which conducts and co-ordinates the majority of such terrorist activity is the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). Other prominent Armenian terrorist organisations which probably owe some allegiance to ASALA are the New Armenian Resistance (NAR), the Justice Commandos for Armenian Genocide, (JCAG) the 28th May Organisation, the

3rd October Group and the Armenian Organisation for Armed Struggle (AOAS). A sharp increase during the last quarter of 1980 in the number of attacks against Turkish and other targets reflects not only an increased determination by Armenian terrorists to publicise their cause but also a significant capability to react swiftly and efficiently in different countries in response to a particular situation or event. The intensification of Armenian terrorist activities directed against Turkish targets in the late seventies may well have been prompted by the growing political instability and economic weakness which has occurred in TURKEY during the last three years and finally led to a Military coup in September 1980. The Military Government appears to have restored some stability to the country and reduced the high level of internal terrorism caused by the activities of both Left and Right wing groups. The majority of Armenian terrorist groups appear however, to be based outside TURKEY and appear immune to internal action taken by the Turkish Government. Armenian terrorists will probably continue to give priority to attacks on Turkish officials and Turkish Government installations abroad but will remain prepared to stage incidents directed against any democratic governmentwhich attempts to curb their activities. Retaliatory action is often indulged in by Armenian groups.

4. An example of such action against a democratic government is the recent wave of Armenian terrorist activities directed against the Swiss Government, which was brought about by the arrest of two confirmed ASALA terrorists on 3 October 1980 in Geneva by the Swiss Police. The ASALA have demanded their release but the SWISS Government have refused. The 3rd October group was named after these two'martyrs'.

5. The extent, intensity and efficiency of the various Armenian terrorist groups and their operations are well illustrated by the incidents listed in Appendix 1 to the Annex.

SECRET

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A OF SITREP
1-80-1 OF DECEMBER 1980

DATE	INCIDENT	CLAIMED BY
17 Dec 80	Assassination of Turkish Consul-General and bodyguard in Sydney	JCAG
21 Nov 80	Bomb explosion outside Turkish Airlines office, Rome	ASALA
12 Nov 80	Two bombs explode outside Swiss Air and Swiss Tourist Office in Rome	Oct 3rd Group
10 Nov 80	Bomb explodes outside Turkish Consulate in Strasbourg	?
Nov 80	Bomb explosion Plaza Espana, Madrid	ASALA
4 Nov 80	Bomb explosion Palace of Justice, Geneva	Oct 3rd Group
12 Oct 80	Bomb explosion Turkish Mission to UN	JCAG
12 Oct 80	Bomb explosion Turkish Representative Office in Los Angeles	JCAG
12 Oct 80	Bomb explosion near Turkish Tourist Office, London	ASALA
12 Oct 80	Bomb explosion near Swiss Centre, London	ASALA
10 Oct 80	Bomb explosion Swiss Ambassadors apartment, Beirut	? Oct 3rd Group
10 Oct 80	Bomb explosion Danish Ambassadors car, Beirut	? Oct 3rd Group
28 Sep 80	Turkish Press Attache assassinated in Paris	ASALA
Aug 80	Turkish Embassy, Athens, fired on	ASALA
6 Aug 80	Gunmen shot and wounded workmen in Turkish Consulate, Lyons	ASALA
5 Aug 80	Turkish Consulate at Lyons bombed	ASALA
31 Jul 80	Turkish diplomat and daughter assassinated in Rome	ASALA
17 Apr 80	Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador to Vatican	ASALA
10 Mar 80	Two explosions at Turkish Airlines Office and Turkish Tourist Office, Rome	ASALA
22 Feb 80	Turkish diplomat assassinated in Cairo, suspect arrested.	?

18 Feb 80	Bombs exploded in Rome outside offices of Swiss Air, El Al, and Lufthansa	ASALA
6 Feb 80	Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador in Berne, Switzerland.	ASALA
2 Feb 80	Bomb exploded outside USSR office of Information, Paris	NAR
2 Feb 80	Two bombs exploded at Brussels offices of the Soviet and Turkish Airlines	NAR
19 Jan 80	Bombs explode in offices of TWA, British Airways and Swiss Air in Madrid	JCAG
24 Dec 79	Bomb explodes near Central Railway Station Rome	ASALA
23 Dec 79	Two bombs explode outside offices of Air France and TWA, Rome	ASALA
22 Dec 79	Bomb explodes Turkish Airlines office, Amsterdam	?
22 Dec 79	Press Attache, assassinated in Paris	Commando of Armenian Avengers
17 Dec 79	Bomb explodes Turkish Airlines office, London	ASALA
9 Dec 79	Bombs explode outside offices of British Airways, El Al and Pan Am in Rome, 9 injured.	Armenian Resistance Group
8 Dec 79	Bomb explodes Turkish Airlines office, Rome	ASALA
8 Dec 79	Bomb explodes Turkish Airlines office, Milan	ASALA
26 Nov 79	Bombs explode outside offices of British Airways, Al Italia and TWA, Madrid	ASALA
19 Nov 79	Three airline offices bombed in Paris, Turkish Airlines, KLM and Lufthansa	ASALA
12 Oct 79	Turkish Ambassador to Netherlands son killed in the Hague	JCAG
4 Oct 79	Bomb explodes outside Turkish Airlines Office, Copenhagen	ASALA
29 Sep 79	Two bombs deactivated at Ankara Airport	ASALA
27 Aug 79	Turkish Airlines Office, West Germany bombed	Revolutionary Organisation
22 Aug 79	Bomb blasts outside Turkish Consulate, Geneva	ASALA

8 Jul 79	Three bombs explode outside Turkish Airlines Office, Labor Attache Office and Turkish Tourist Information Office, Paris	JCAG
6 May 79	Two bombs explode airport terminal, Istanbul	ASALA
17 Dec 78	Turkish Airlines Office bombed in Geneva	ASALA
6 Dec 78	Bombs explode outside Turkish Consulate in Geneva	No claim?
2 Jun 78	Turkish Ambassadors wife and brother assassinated in Madrid	JCAG
3 Jan 78	Turkish bank in North London damaged by explosion	NAR
3 Jan 78	Explosion outside Turkish Embassy, Brussels	NAR
7 Jun 77	Turkish Ambassador to Holy See assassinated in Rome	JCAG

REVIEW OF THE
VOCATIONAL TRAINING COUNCIL

NOTE

The views and recommendations contained in this report are those of the Review Team and are not necessarily endorsed by the respective Departments or the Council.

November 1980

REVIEW OF THE
VOCATIONAL TRAINING COUNCIL

November 1980

PREFACE

This review of the Vocational Training Council emerged from two related concerns. First, rapid changes in the labour market including structural shifts in skill requirements and rising unemployment moved the New Zealand Planning Council to prepare a detailed study of employment policy. Second, a prior review by the State Services Commission of advisory services to industry proposed that, after eleven years of operation, the role of the VTC ought to be examined. In essence, the report is about the institutional arrangements needed to ensure an effective vocational training response to changing labour market requirements.

The report has been prepared by a Review Team co-ordinated by the State Services Commission at the direction of the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure.

On behalf of the Review Team I wish to thank those organisations and individuals who responded to our request for written comments on our Terms of Reference at relatively short notice and who offered their views in the course of discussion. The Review Team consulted widely and although time was limited we are satisfied a fair representation of views was obtained. The Planning Council's report also provided a comprehensive background to discussion of relevant issues.

I would also like to thank especially the Chairman, The Director of the VTC (who was a member of the Review Team), and VTC secretariat staff for the valuable contribution they made to the Review in terms of information, opinion and servicing of many of our meetings.

The views expressed in the report are not necessarily those of the Council or the departments whose representatives comprised the Review Team. With two exceptions the following report reflects the unanimous views of members of the Review Team. The proposals for transferring the responsibility for the VTC to the Minister of Labour and for detailed manpower forecasting have majority support. In each instance one member of the Review Team has reserved his position.

The Report will be submitted to the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure where it will provide the basis for comment from Departments and firm recommendations for action. Some aspects will be be taken up by the VTC in the normal course of its business.

Finally, I would like to record my personal appreciation of the work of all members of the Review Team.



Murdoch Taylor
Chairman, Review Team

REVIEW OF THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING COUNCIL

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

The following is a list of abbreviations which occur in the text, shown in alphabetical order.

ABBREVIATION	NAME
AAVA	Authority for Advanced Vocational Awards
ATTI	Association of Teachers in Technical Institutes
CSU	Combined State Unions
ETO	Executive Training Officer
ILO	International Labour Organisation
ITB	Industrial Training Board
LMAB	Labour Market Advisory Board
MTCB	Motor Trade Certification Board
NDC	National Development Council
NZCER	New Zealand Council for Educational Research
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPTA	Post Primary Teachers' Association
SCORITE	Standing Committee on Relationships in Tertiary Education
SSCC	State Services Co-ordinating Committee
TCB	Trades Certification Board
TIA	Technical Institutes Association
UGC	University Grants Committee
VTC	Vocational Training Council
YPTP	Young Persons Training Programme

SUMMARY OF REPORT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1 The Review Team was required by its Terms of Reference to review the functions, objectives, achievements and administration of the Vocational Training Council and its role in the formulation of a labour market strategy.

2 Imprecise objectives have made it difficult to measure the achievements of the Vocational Training Council. Bearing in mind, however, that the Council has been working in a field where previously no single organisation had responsibility and that, lacking executive powers, it has had to operate by a process of recommendation, encouragement and persuasion, there is much for which it can take credit. It has provided a tripartite forum where the mutually beneficial results of more organised training have fostered co-operation and understanding among employer organisations, trade unions and Government departments; it has raised the level of general awareness of the need for organised training; and through its advisory committees it has heightened appreciation of the needs of special groups and developed important initiatives in training which span all industries. Perhaps the least developed function is manpower forecasting.

3 The Council is equipped with advisory and recommendatory powers but it has no executive responsibilities. This has meant that it has had to adopt a voluntary approach which has made it difficult to secure commitments to organised training. Nevertheless, the Review Team is convinced that the voluntary approach is more effective in the longer term.

4 A major problem the Council has experienced is in recruiting to the secretariat, people with appropriate background and experience.

5 Twenty-nine industrial training boards have been established, covering the greater part of the labour force, and although the achievements of the boards vary the system itself is sound. The Review Team considers, however, that the procedures established by the VTC to review the objectives and guide the activities of the Boards need strengthening. Some boards have

experienced difficulties in collecting the industry contribution towards their administration costs, and the system of annual grants makes it difficult for boards to plan ahead.

6 There is a large number of agencies in the vocational training field. The Review Team found that some co-ordination is achieved by cross and reciprocal membership, but a degree of overlap remains. Indeed, in the VTC network itself the roles of the Council, its advisory committees and the ITBs have become blurred over time, and some tensions are now apparent. This suggests that in general there is a need to clarify the objectives, functions and responsibilities of the various agencies and to develop formal relationships in appropriate cases, both nationally and regionally.

7 The social and economic changes that are currently taking place made the attainment of coherent employment policy a cental issue. There is a parallel need to develop positive training and education programmes to facilitate adjustment to rapidly changing skill requirements arising from technological change. Such programmes should also reduce the economic and social costs of high unemployment, especially among new entrants to the labour force. At the same time it is necessary to enhance opportunities for vocational choice. The role of the Vocational Training Council network is to provide a central link between employment and training, employer to employer, and policy and provision.

8 To fulfil this important role the VTC must continue to be responsive to the training needs of industry, nationally and regionally and to the training requirements of individuals, especially minority or disadvantaged groups in the community. It also needs to co-ordinate programmes such as management training which span all sectors, including the State sector. The Review Team therefore proposes a number of adjustments designed to achieve several related purposes.

9 In this section of the report the Review Team propose various changes in some of the institutional arrangements for vocational training. These are designed to achieve several related purposes.

10 Firstly, we propose closer links between vocational training and active employment policy. In particular, we recommend that the Minister of Labour take primary responsibility for the VTC administration and the extension of Labour Department representation on industrial training boards. We also propose more systematic attempts to obtain from industry projections of labour requirements. We do not go so far as to support establishment of a single statutory agency responsible for active employment policy, such as that proposed by the Planning Council. We do support initiatives to reorganise and upgrade the Department of Labour and favour the retention of the present consultative committee on employment policy, which has the confidence of its members and appears to be working well.

11 Secondly, we propose stronger co-ordination of the provision of vocational training and education. This will require the relationship already established with the Minister of Education and his Department to be maintained. Co-ordination can be enhanced by cross-representation among ITBs and relevant apprenticeship committees; amalgamation of statutory trades and technicians examining authorities, strengthened syllabus construction services with VTC and ITBs having a greater role in syllabus revision, provision for VTC to comment on all new publicly-financed vocational training and, finally, a stronger regional organisation of the VTC linked to existing employment, education and counselling services.

12 Thirdly, we propose changes in the prescribed objectives of the VTC to enhance their usefulness as operating goals, and changes in the respective role and functions of the VTC and the ITB to ensure greater accountability in relation to these goals.

13 Fourthly, we considered and rejected the suggestion of a compulsory across-the-board levy on payroll to fund industrial training. We consider that assistance for training can be provided from general government revenues and industry's own resources without such a levy. The essence of our funding proposals is that a base level of ITB operating costs should be met by a government grant while any growth, other than general price movements, is met by industry from voluntary levies or fees for ITB services. The recently revised system of training incentives should be allowed to work before any further changes are made.

14 Various other recommendations have been made to ensure that the VTC and its staff are able to respond effectively to these changed objectives and functions. In particular, it is proposed that more flexible methods of appointment be adopted to allow senior and advisory staff to be recruited from industry or on secondment from departments.

15 In total, these changes will enable the Council and ITBs, to take a more active role in assisting the Government to meet the employment and training challenges of the next decade and also ensure that policies are developed after appropriate consultations between the responsible major partners.

16 The linkage of training, education and employment policies is a major policy issue which requires a constructive approach from many organisations and agencies that contribute to changes of policy in education and employment and the interface between them. The responsibilities of the various organisations have become blurred and require redefinition. Tensions have developed and refinements are required to the current institutional arrangements. The Review Team believes that the proposals we have made in this report address themselves to these issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Review Team recommends:

1 That the objectives of the Vocational Training Council might be (para 125):

(i) To identify the contribution which effective vocational training can made to personal development, increased productivity, and faster economic growth, and in particular to recommend action which:

(a) avoids training-related skill shortages, and especially shortages of newly emerging skills or skills which are crucial to economic growth;

(b) secures better perception by firms of how training can improve employee satisfaction and productivity; and

(c) maintains investment in skills notwithstanding fluctuations in the level of economic activity;

(ii) to identify those aspects of vocational training which require public intervention and support;

(iii) to identify and recommend action to overcome deficiencies in basic education and training which limit the employment prospects of new entrants to the labour market;

(iv) to identify and recommend action to increase opportunities for adults to update, upgrade or broaden their skills through retraining; and

(v) generally to promote the introduction and development of efficient and cost-effective methods of training, both nationally and regionally.

2. That the Council's objectives be submitted to the Ministers of Labour and Education in April each year as a basis for discussion with the Chairman of the VTC (para 126).

3. That the functions of the Vocational Training Council should be as follows: (para 130):

(i) <u>Mandatory Functions of the VTC</u>:

(a) co-ordinate the activities of and provide overall guidance to ITBs;

(b) co-ordinate manpower forecasting exercises by the boards (see paras 132-144), in association with the Department of Labour;

(c) undertake or arrange for research into aspects of vocational training;

(d) collect and disseminate information on vocational training developments, both in New Zealand and elsewhere;

(e) make recommendations to the Government on any vocational training activities supported by public funds;

(f) co-ordinate the development and revision of prescriptions and syllabuses for qualifications issued by the proposed vocational awards authority;

(g) evaluate the effectiveness of the Council itself and of the ITBs; and

(h) undertake any activities specifically requested by the Ministers.

(ii) Discretionary Functions of the VTC

make recommendations on such matters as:

(a) the number of trainees and the quality of training needed to satisfy specific skill requirements;

(b) planning and co-ordinating training schemes, especially for cross-sector training and for smoothing out trainee intakes;

(c) promoting the training needs of special groups;

(d) encouraging improvements in on-job training within industry;

(e) the financing of training;

(f) initiating pilot vocational training schemes capable of general application; and

(g) the award of travelling scholarships for vocational training purposes.

4. That the functions of the industrial training boards should be:

(iii) Mandatory Functions of the ITBs:

(a) undertake industry-based manpower forecasting, under the general direction of the VTC;

(b) undertake any other activities specifically requested by the VTC;

(c) promote the benefits of organised training to firms and individuals; and

(d) recommend on the development of organised training programmes, both on-job and off-job.

(iv) Discretionary Functions of the ITBs

(a) recommend on the development of induction training programmes for new entrants;

(b) recommend on programmes of retraining; and

(c) develop on-job training manuals and other suitable materials to improve training performance.

5. That the Department of Labour, the VTC and the ITBs establish a programme of consultative manpower forecasting involving (para 136):

(i) regular, general sample surveys of industry for trends in the requrements for skills which demand long-term training;

(ii) more detailed studies in specific skills triggered by the general surveys; and

(iii) more flexible training programmes.

6. That the Council should be reconstituted to comprise 14 full members as follows (para 153):

- a full-time independent Chairman;
- representatives of Manufacturers' Federation (1);
  Employers' Federation (2);
  Federation of Labour (2);
  Technical Institute/Association (1);
  Vice-Chancellors Committee (1);
- the Chairman of the proposed vocational awards authority;
- Director-General of Education;
- Secretary of Labour;
- Up to three members representing special interests, appointed by the two ministers.

7. That the Act should be amended to provide for the Council to have primary responsibility to the Minister of Labour, and to retain a special relationship with the Minister of Education. * (para 154)

8. That the Council's staff ceiling be increased by three to cater for the increased regional involvement (para 157).

9. That (para 165):

(i) the Director and Assistant Directors be appointed directly by the Council;

(ii) liaison and advisory staff be appointed by a mixture of contract and secondment from employer groups, unions and departments, with appointments in either case being for set terms and with salaries fixed in agreement with the SSC;

(iii) the administrative staff remain officers of the Public Service as at present, attached to the Department with responsibility for administration of the Act.

10. That the boundaries of the ITBs be specified in terms of the Department of Labour's Standard Industrial Classifications and that any realignment of coverage necessary for this to be done be negotiated by the VTC with the boards concerned. (para 166).

11. That the coverage and objectives of each ITB be set out in its Gazette Notice. (para 166).

12. That the Department of Labour representation on ITBs be substantially extended. (para 169).

13. That when ITBs submit their annual accounts to the VTC, they be required to submit a report outlining precise achievement over the past year and specific objectives for the current year in relation to the resources sought. (para 170).

14. That (para 190):

(i) ITBs no longer be required to find a minimum of 10 percent of their operating expenses from industry;

(ii) differential flat grants be introduced

(a) for the first approved ETO of each ITB, at a higher rate to cover overhead expenses;

(b) for each subsequent aproved ETO of each ITB, at an appropriate lower rate;

(iii) the grants, on average, be fixed at the 1980/81 level of $22,410 per ETO plus 10 percent, indexed for price increases in following years;

(iv) ITBs be advised of their three-year planning levels in the context of the annual reviews of expenditure forecasts;

(v) additional industry support for ITB programmes be encouraged;

(vi) the VTC discretionary fund be retained at a level equivalent to 10 percent of the sum of the grants for ETOs;

(vii) the Council examine the possibility of introducing a functional classification of expenditure with effect from 1 April 1982;

(viii) requests for additional Government funding for ITBs and the VTC continue to be dealt with in the annual new policy review. (para 197).

16. That (para 197):

(i) NZ Apprenticeship Committees (currently an equal number of worker and employer representatives - usually four each - a person familiar with technical education and the Commissioner of Apprenticeship as chairman) should be expanded to include one representative of the relevant ITB or the VTC as appropriate. Several apprenticeship committees already offer observer status to their ITB: this should become standard for all, informally at this stage but by amendment to the Apprentices Act in due course.

(ii) Conversely, when ITBs are discussing apprenticeship matters (for example, when prescriptions are reviewed) they should invite a representative from the relevant NZ apprenticeship committee to participate.

(iii) Employer and union groups should be encouraged to include among their nominations to NZ apprenticeship committees at least one person each who is also a member of the relevant ITB.

17 (i) The amalgamation of the TCB and the AAVA into one vocational awards authority with responsibility for certificate level examinations. The authority should house a specialist resource unit, the personnel of which would (para 213):

(a) have expertise in curriculum design, test construction evaluation and analysis;

(b) be employed either on contract (3-5 years) or by secondment from Department of Education Curriculum Development Unit, universities, NZCER, or elsewhere;

(c) be included on ITB syllabus committees;

(ii) the transfer of responsibility of syllabus construction to the VTC network and that (para 213):

(a) the VTC Chairman be a member of the vocational awards authority;

(b) the VTC advisory committees and ITBs establish syllabus committees to be responsible for;

- supplying educational institutions with course syllabuses;
- providing the authority with prescriptions for certificate level examinations;
- moderating examination papers for the authority; and
- providing NZ apprenticeship committees with syllabuses and lists of skills.

(iii) the proposed amalgamated examining authority have statutory authority as do the present TCB and AAVA. (para 213).

17. That if, after the proposed review of the organisation of Department of Labour, the Industrial Training Service remains with the department, its annual training programmes and any new proposals the Service may wish to undertake be submitted to the VTC for recommendation and comment to ensure closer articulation with other national training priorities. (para 215).

18. That the Department of Education, as matter of priority, examine the effectiveness and the co-ordination of the inter-relationships that exists within the educational community, in close consultation with the VTC. (para 220).

19. That all new vocational course developments proposed for technical institutes should be referred to the VTC for comment before approval. (para 221).

20. That SCORITE be empowered to prevent the undesirable development or duplication of vocational courses in universities. (para 228).

21. That the universities be requested to consult with the VTC before proceeding with the introduction of new vocational courses or learning programmes. (para 228).

22. That a Cabinet directive be issued that no proposal for public expenditure on vocational training, other than departmental staff training, be approved unless the proposal has first been referred to the VTC for recommendation and comment. (para 233).

23. That existing employment advisory committees, vocational guidance liaison committees, work exploration committees and similar groups at the regional level be combined to form regional Employment and Training Councils, serviced by the Department of Labour. (paras 238-241).

24. That the VTC, as a matter of urgency, conduct a consultative review of the respective responsibilities and the nature of its relationships with the employment, education and training agencies not dealt with specifically in this report.

* The representative of the Treasury reserves his position on Recommendation 5, as does the representative of the Department of Education on Recommendation 7.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

25 If the recommendations contained in this report are accepted some consequential changes will be required to the following Acts:

Trades Certification Act 1966
Vocational Training Council Act 1968
Apprentices Act 1968
Vocational Awards Act 1979

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

26 Additional resources would be required to give effect to some of the Review Team's recommendations. Those proposals which would have significant costs are set out below together with an estimate of their annual cost. The Review Team has no proposals for the funding of these additional costs, but noted that insofar as the proposals are considered in the context of the Government's annual review of new policies, some compensatory savings may be required in terms of conditions of that review.

	Estimated Annual Cost ($000)
Three additional regional staff	90
Establishment of new base grants for ITBs	150
Increased Emolument of full-time chairman	30
Provision of personnel for expert syllabus revision	60
	330

27 There is also likely to be some additional cost arising from more flexible staffing arrangements including recruitment from outside the Public Service. It is envisaged that resources to undertake and interpret regular surveys of industry manpower projections would be provided largely within the present resources of the Department of Labour, ITBs and the VTC secretariat.

28 Against these additional costs, the Review Team would expect some savings in the administration of examining authorities as a

result of their amalgamation. Furthermore, a major aim of the recommendations is that improved co-ordination of the provision of institutional vocational training should realise some gains over the longer term.

REVIEW OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING COUNCIL

PART I

INTRODUCTION

1 On 10 June 1980, the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure:

(a) noted the terms of reference ..... for the review of the Vocational Training Council;

(b) agreed that:

(i) the review should be completed by 30 September, 1980;

(ii) Labour and Education representatives should be on the review team;

(c) noted that this review was to be co-ordinated with and parallel to the work of the New Zealand Planning Council on employment strategy for the 1980s to enable the review report and the Planning Council document to be considered together before any major decisions are made.

CM X (80) M26 Pt III refers.

2 Subsequently, on 5 August 1980, the Committee agreed that the period in which the review would be undertaken, referred to in b (i) above, should be extended to 31st October, 1980 (CM X(80) M34 Part 1 refers).

Background to the Review

3 This review arose out of the recent review of advisory services to industry. In its final report, dated 5 December 1979, to the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure the Review Team which conducted that inquiry commented that since it was now ten years since the Vocational Training Council was set up the Cabinet Committee may feel it appropriate that the Council and its Secretariat be reviewed after appropriate consultations with the Minister of Education and the Chairman of the Council.

4 This was accepted by the Cabinet Committee, and led to the instruction referred to in Paragraph 1.

The Review Team

5 The members of the Review Team were:

M W Taylor (Chairman)	-	Assistant Commissioner State Services Commission
P S Bevin	-	Senior Investigating Officer Treasury
F C Cotton	-	Senior Education Officer Department of Education
M G Kerr	-	Director of Training, Department of Labour
R C Stuart	-	Director Vocational Training Council
B J Rush	-	Senior Advisory Officer State Services Commission

Terms of Reference

6 The Terms of Reference agreed to in CM X(80) M26 Pt III were:

To review the functions, objectives, achievements and administration of the Vocational Training Council and its secretariat, and its role in the formulation of a labour market strategy with particular reference to:

(i) an assessment of the Council's effectiveness in achieving the objectives of the Vocational Training Council Act 1968;

(ii) the appropriateness of the present functions and objectives of the Council and its associated industrial training boards as set out in the Vocational Training Council Act 1968 and the Council's Five Year Plan;

(iii) the administration, staffing and financing of the Council and its secretariat, including the appropriateness of the present method of funding industry training boards;

(iv) the inter-relationships between the Council and other agencies involved in vocational training, education and employment;

(v) the co-ordination of the activities of the Vocational Training Council with other organisations in the public and private sectors, and the identification of any unnecessary duplication.

Conduct of the Review

7 The Review Team consulted widely. Written comments were invited from 70 interested organisations at the commencement of the inquiry, and 31 of these took the opportunity to comment. Discussions were held with all members of the Vocational Training Council (VTC), staff members, advisory committees, 16 of the 29 industrial training boards (ITBs), and a number of other organisations involved in vocational training, education and employment. (Full details are given in Appendix 1.)

Report of the New Zealand Planning Council

8 CM X (80) M26 Pt III noted that the review was to be co-ordinated with the report on employment strategy by the New Zealand Planning Council. The Review Team held early discussions with the Planning Council secretariat, and has borne the Planning Council's recommendations in mind in drafting this report.

The Vocational Training Council

9 Historically, the policy and administrative needs of technical and vocational training in New Zealand were discussed in the forum provided by the New Zealand Council for Technical Education which was established under Ministerial authority. In December 1964 the Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Vocational

Training in New Zealand (the Tyndall Commission) which reported in October 1965. Whilst finding much cause for satisfaction in the existing situation, the report saw a need for better co-ordination in forecasting training needs and in recommending and devising programmes to meet them. The report recommended that apprenticeship training should be progressively studied and improved, and trade examinations encouraged. There should, it said, be greater emphasis on retraining and the training of operatives, and on training for commerce. The report underlined the need to achieve greater effectiveness in training by improved methods of identification and forecasting. To meet these requirements the report proposed the establishment of a Vocational Training Council.

10 The Vocational Training Council was set up under the Vocational Training Council Act 1968 and was first convened in August 1969. Its membership covers:

An independent Chairman
The Director-General of Education or his deputy
The Secretary of Labour or his deputy
Two persons nominated by the Employers' Federation
Two persons nominated by the Federation of Labour
One person nominated by the Manufacturers' Federation
One person nominated by the Technical Institutes' Association
One person nominated by the Authority for Advanced Vocational Awards.

11 Appointments are made by the Ministers of Education and Labour acting jointly. In addition, the Ministers may appoint up to five additional members. There are currently three Ministerial appointments, one representing Polynesians, a second representing women, and the third representing the Trades Certification Board. The Act also provides for three associate members, without voting powers, representing the State Services Co-ordinating Committee, the Combined State Unions, and the Chairman of the University Grants Committee.

12 An amendment to the Act in 1972 empowered the Minister of Education by Gazette notice to establish industrial training boards on the Council's recommendation. The Council delegates to those boards all the functions, powers and duties which it may delegate to its own advisory committees.

PART II
WHAT WE FOUND

OBJECTIVES OF THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING COUNCIL

13 There is no explicit statement of objectives set out in the Vocational Training Council Act. There is, however, a brief statement in the Five Year Plan that the Council's objectives are to:

> "Encourage the implementation of systematic training and development schemes to ensure that New Zealand has the people at all levels of employment, with the requisite knowledge and technical skills to perform their tasks efficiently;
>
> Ensure that people as individuals have the opportunity to continue to develop;
>
> Raise the standards of knowledge, skill and effectiveness;
>
> Encourage those directly responsible for achieving the foregoing objectives".

This is a non-specific statement which does not indicate any sense of priority. It is too general to allow quantitative measures of achievement against the stated aims, and therefore has limited value as a statement against which to monitor achievement.

14 In any assessment of the Council's performance, however, it is important to remember the background against which it has had to operate and the nature of its functions as an advisory body. The VTC was required to carry out a series of tasks for which no single organisation previously had responsibility. It was faced, from its inception, with two difficult tasks, which are, nevertheless, fundamental to its success. It had to convince both management and labour of the value of organised training, and it had to persuade and motivate individual industries and employers to accept this philosophy and put training into practice. This required significant changes of attitude on the part of many employers and employees, and attitudes are not changed overnight. The Council, therefore, saw as one of its first aims the establishment of a

climate of opinion and co-operation in which the two sides of industry could be persuaded to identify their training needs and develop the programmes necessary to meet those needs.

15 The Council has no executive role. It has therefore been obliged to operate by a process of recommendation, encouragement and persuasion. The Council does not itself carry out training, and it cannot compel others to do so. It has seen itself as a catalyst, seeking to stimulate and to co-ordinate the joint activity of employers and employees and has sought to encourage and guide those directly responsible for achieving its objectives. The Review Team found varying assessments of the success of the Council in this role, but the majority assessment was one of significant achievement.

16 The Council has:

- provided a tripartite forum where discussions on training have engendered co-operation and understanding;

- raised the level of awareness within industry of the value of, and need for organised training;

- heightened appreciation of the needs of special groups, through its advisory committees;

- developed training initiatives that cross industry boundaries.

17 To summarise, the Review Team believes the objectives stated in the Five Year Plan are not specific and are inadequate as a guide to monitoring priorities and measuring achievement. A proposed re-formulation of objectives will be discussed in Part III of this report. The Council's performance can only be measured subjectively but the Review Team considers the Council has been successful in achieving its aims.

FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL

18 The functions of the Council are set out in Section 12 of the Act and are reproduced in full in Appendix 2. It is an extensive

list, involving promotion, investigation and co-ordination in varying combinations in a variety of areas. The Council has discretion to determine the areas in which it will concentrate.

19 Some functions have received greater emphasis than others. The Council has been particularly active in promoting the benefits of training to individual employers through the training incentives scheme, in investigating and promoting improvements in cross-sector training, at the supervisory and management levels, in seeking improvements in the apprenticeship system taken as a whole, and in investigating methods to cater for the needs of particular groups of workers, especially women and Polynesians.

20 During the 1970s, the VTC realised that, in order to develop an overall strategy and to identify its priorities and monitor performance, a rolling plan was required.

21 Consequently, in 1977, a Five Year Plan was developed and rolled forward annually. This Plan:

- acts as a management document;
- provides a blueprint for orderly development;
- examines each function of the VTC against the requirements of the Act, emerging trends and needs, and proposes appropriate action programmes;
- encourages ITBs to formulate their own plans against the background of the VTC Plan;
- indicates resource needs; and
- is reviewed and updated annually.

22 The structure of the Plan is simple and requires a broad base of co-operation. Although it is essentially an "in-house document", it shows priorities clearly, and is available for public inspection.

23 The Plan was the subject of favourable comment from many quarters, and the Review Team commends the Council's initiative. It was noted that the Plan has the full support of the Ministers of Education and Labour who have recommended it to organisations with a similar structure and status.

24 The VTC Newsletter has been published regularly, with a circulation of 2600, and regular requests are received for individuals or organisations to be placed on the mailing list. Publications in all fields have received an excellent response and wide coverage has been given in Polynesian, supervisory, management,apprenticeship, and new technology fields. Further publications are planned, particularly covering management, small business, and the training of Polynesians.

25 There are continual requests from individuals and organisations not just for publications, but for material on training and establishment of contacts and these are handled as they occur, either direct or by referral. There have been several visits from overseas by people working in training who want to study the New Zealand experience. Close liaison with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been part of servicing this function.

26 The VTC has been slow in establishing a reference library, mainly because it was unable to employ a librarian, and has had to rely on what could be done part time by the information officer. However, a start has been made by key word indexing, cataloguing, and publishing of a library information bulletin, and this will continue.

27 The VTC has been active in keeping in touch with training overseas, and maintaining "a continuous awareness of relevant overseas developments in that field". Apart from subscribing to a selected range of publications, and receiving relevant overseas documents issued by the OECD, and the ILO, the Council has provided limited financial assistance to executive training officers to broaden their experience in other countries. The Director has always maintained personal contact with the Manpower Services Commission in the United Kingdom, and of late with the Director of the Federal Institute for Vocational Training in the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, the VTC administers a number of travelling and study award schemes in training. These include the Queen Elizabeth II Technicians Study Award, Commonwealth Education Scheme Travel Award, Mobil Oil Trade Union Training Fellowship, and

until recently the Alex-Harvey Industries Fellowship. Furthermore, the Director is a member of the selection panel for two Fulbright Awards awarded to those engaged in vocational training.

28 The VTC has deliberately kept a low profile in the private sector as far as publicity for the Council and the secretariat is concerned. Major publicity has always been directed to the work of the industrial training boards, success stories from work in the field, innovations in training methods, and publicity for new and qualified personnel. However, the Council has kept close links with the Press Gallery, and good relations with the secretarial staff of the Ministers of Education and Labour. There has been a continuing follow-up of contacts with key officials in employer and employee organisations and people of influence and background in industry and commerce and Government departments.

29 The Council has not become closely involved in training in the public sector or in the social welfare area (displaced, perhaps, by higher priorities in the private sector and in industry, commerce and agriculture), nor has it made recommendations for programmes of retraining (a need which has only recently come to the fore). In addition, the Council has no mandate to intervene in the preparation and development of prescriptions and syllabuses not to act as a provider of training.

30 The Act provides that the Council shall promote, foster and undertake inquiries, investigations and research. The Council has undertaken a large number of investigative projects (e.g. Survey of Extended Trade Training, Guidelines for Organised Training. However, pure research projects have been difficult to arrange, undertake and fund. Some have been joint undertakings with universities and the New Zealand Council for Educational Research. Further research projects have been limited because of insufficient resources.

31 Among the less developed functions, however, manpower forecasting was the one on which we received most comment. In practice only a limited amount of manpower forecasting has been attempted. Certainly a number of boards have carried out surveys,

at varying levels of sophistication. However, most of these have been of the one-off variety, specific rather than general, and the information base remains rudimentary. Several problems are evident. First, the ITBs tend to have a national focus, whereas many labour markets have a distinctly local character. Second, the ITBs naturally concern themselves with their own industries, whereas many skills span more than one industry. This means that, in the absence of special arrangements to counterbalance the strong industry focus, many cross sector skills will often be inadequately catered for while boards which do attempt planning in this area will be disadvantaged if other industries using the same skills fail to take complementary action. Third, the absence of linkages between the various studies which have been made inhibits the development of a co-ordinated view of supply and demand. And fourth, among those who hoped that precise numbers would emerge, there is perhaps some disappointment that unrealistic expectations of forecasting remain unmet.

32 The Department of Labour's involvement in manpower forecasting grew out of the NDC planning exercise. Two general approaches have been tried in tandem. The "top down" method, on which most of the recent effort has been spent, involves the development of a macro input-output model of the labour market. In essence this involves the extrapolation of statistical trends, and it is thus a fairly mechanistic exercise. The development of this approach is continuing, but it is unlikely to be completed before the mid-1980's. The "bottom up" approach is essentially a more qualitative and impressionistic method, involving assistance to industrial training boards, the use of "key informants" in industry to provide regular subjective assessments, and the development of a corporate manpower planning advisory function. The intention here was that the various elements could be fitted together as a jigsaw, and that even if some of the pieces were missing sufficient of the picture would emerge to guide policy responses. Unfortunately, lack of resources has substantially restricted work in this area.

33 In summary, therefore, despite enthusiasm and well-meaning efforts over the past ten years, manpower forecasting successes have been disappointingly few.

POWERS OF THE COUNCIL

34 Section 13 of the Act (Appendix 2) grants it "such powers, rights and authorities as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions". Those functions, as Section 12 makes clear, are recommendatory, not executive.

35 This has had considerable significance in determining the way in which the VTC has had to develop its strategies in its endeavours to make the desired impact on industry. For example, it has been necessary to encourage and not direct industrial training boards and other agencies to undertake a desired course of action in connection with vocational training. The boards must meet certain criteria in qualifying for financial support but are corporate bodies acting under delegated authority from the Council. The Council, seeing its role as one of advice and encouragement to industry, has not sought stronger powers.

36 The Review Team noted a wide range of opinion both on the appropriateness of the method of working adopted by the Council, and on the case for more executive power in the future. A body of opinion thought the Council should have more "teeth". A consensus was that the limitation of powers has been appropriate. The Council has had to operate sensitively in dealing with employer, and employee groups, Government departments, apprenticeship committees and industrial training boards, all of whom would have been quick to resent any suggestion of interference in their affairs.

37 Although criticisms on the point were general rather than specific, some feeling was evident that the Council had not represented its views to the Government strongly enough. On the other hand, the Council has not been as closely consulted on the Government's employment and training policies as the Council would have liked. The legislation gives it scope to take the initiative and to offer independent advice to the Government. Reflecting the priorities it has set itself it has tended to concentrate its attention outwards to the ITBs and industry rather than directly to the Government. Perhaps the criticism could be summed up by observing that while the Council's independence appeared to have

been established and recognised within the community, some felt that it might have been more clearly asserted.

Ministerial Responsibility for the Council

38 The Vocational Training Council has a form of joint responsibility to the Ministers of Education and Labour. Both Ministers are responsible for the appointment of Council members, and both may assign functions to the Council. The Council reports to the Minister of Education; but copies of any submission to that Minister are, almost without exception, sent to the Minister of Labour. Administrative responsibility for funding and staffing matters of the Council and the secretariat reside with the Department of Education.

39 Elsewhere in this report we comment on funding (paras 85-91) and the difficulty the Council has had in recruiting staff (paras 59-62). So far as the joint responsibility to Ministers is concerned the Review Team heard no adverse comments on this practice.

40 However, the Planning Council and others we spoke to believe that a number of factors now point to the logic of a prime relationship with the Minister of Labour rather than the Minister of Education.

How the Council Operates

41 The Council meets for a full day on five or six occasions each year. In addition, the Council's standing committee (the Chairman and 5 other Council members) meets for a half-day in the months the Council does not meet, to handle urgent business and matters referred to it by the Council. It also often has preliminary discussions on policy matters before they are considered by the Council. All activities of the standing committee are reported to the Council for approval or confirmation.

42 In addition, the Council has seven advisory committees appointed in terms of Section 15 of the Act. Four of these are chaired by Council members. The Council has also a VTC/SSCC co-ordinating committee which has recently been reactivated to forge closer links with training in the State sector.

43 Section 6 of the Act provides that the Director-General of Education and the Secretary of Labour may each authorise any officer of his department to attend Council meetings as his deputy. The respective Permanent Heads have attended only a few Council meetings, and have normally delegated this responsibility.

44 Most initiatives originate from within the secretariat and the balance come from the Council's advisory committees. Whilst this could be said to reflect on Council members it should be pointed out that their membership of the Council is a part-time activity and they act primarily as an informed "sounding board" for proposals. The Council and its standing committee receive a series of carefully prepared papers from its secretariat at all meetings, each concluding with a recommendation for action, plus regular progress reports on the Five Year Plan. However, the members do find it difficult to grasp details of the full range of activities of the:

- advisory committees;
- training boards and group schemes; and
- other bodies which interrelate with the Council.

45 As the Council has become more involved in employment policy it is increasingly expected to be represented on a wide range of employment - oriented agencies. This places a considerable load on the Council Chairman and senior secretariat staff and raises the question whether the Chairman should be full-time (as for example the Planning Council and the UGC); or, continue as at present on a part-time basis with a greater time commitment.

Advisory Committees to the Council

46 Under Section 15 of the Act "the Council may from time to time appoint advisory committees, technical committees and committees to deal with the problems of particular industries or occupations, to advise it on such matters as it may refer to them; and the Council may from time to time delegate to any such committee any of its functions, powers and duties, except the power of delegation".

47 The Council has used these powers to set up advisory committees to deal with major 'across the board' issues. It sees these committees as complementing the industrial training boards. Among them are, to name but three, the Polynesian Advisory Committee, the Women's Advisory Committee, and the Apprenticeship and Related Trades Training Advisory Committee. They have power to co-opt persons with special knowledge or expertise in their field and consult widely. A full list of the Council's advisory committees and functions, and their actitivies is at Appendix 3.

48 Of special interest is the Women's Advisory Committee which was set up by the Council to offer advice on the problems and special needs of women in the workforce and in vocational education and training.

49 New Zealand has a commitment to meet the special needs of women in employment, education and training through its participation in, and acceptance of, declarations made in various international fora such as the OECD and the ILO. Statements made at these meetings request member states to take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women and to take affirmative action, for example, to "stimulate and further the development of, and increase access to, employment training and 'recurrent' education programmes particularly for women whose skills need upgrading and for women re-entering the labour force, taking into account new technologies and industrial developments".

50 The Review Team has concluded that the Women's Advisory Committee is the appropriate group to promote these principles in vocational training and to work in harmony with the Council, other advisory committees, ITBs and other agencies with responsibilities for vocational education and training.

51 Opinions varied on the achievements of the advisory committees. We detected some feeling at the industrial training board level that one or two of the special committees had outlived their usefulness, and that they are of little use to the boards. Some tensions are apparent because of this feeling, and a corresponding feeling of the

committees that boards have not been receptive to their work. There is also a confusion in the responsibilities of the boards and the advisory committees.

52 The Review Team has identified three main reasons for the tension that exists between some of the boards and the advisory committees. Each, by their functions, have differing priorities. The responsibilities of each have not been clarified sufficiently, and there has been a lack of effective communication between them on occasion. No doubt the fault lies on both sides. The Polynesian Advisory Committee, for example, has produced high quality and innovative studies which have received recognition overseas. These same studies, however, have to be presented quite differently if they are to make an impact at the supervisory level in a factory. The Committee recognises this need.

53 Adverse reaction has occured when an advisory committee has gone direct to industry without working through the appropriate industrial training board. On occasion it may have been necessary to make direct approaches to a particular employer, or a group of firms, but the appropriate industrial training board, through the executive training officer, should be informed.

54 Tension can also arise when the advisory committees find that their particular point of view is not immediately given the same priority by the boards. It is the responsibility of the advisory committee to recognise this possibility, and therefore, make special efforts to cultivate the attitudes of the industrial training board members. Seldom, if ever, does direct confrontation assist in changing attitudes.

55 The achievements of the advisory committees are not easy to assess but most submissions acknowledged that they are necessary and valuable.

ADMINISTRATION AND STAFFING OF THE VTC

56 No subject invited more comment before the Review Team, or appeared to be causing as wide concern, as the staffing of the VTC. This is seen as a major limiting factor in the achievement of the

Council's functions. For this reason the Review Team paid particular attention to the staffing question, especially as it had been the subject of a number of previous reports and reviews.

57 The Director is appointed by the Council, and is not a public servant. All other staff, apart from one or two contract consultants, are public servants. Section 20 (1) of the Act states:

> "Other officers (1) There may from time to time be appointed under the State Services Act 1962 such research, clerical and other officers as may be required to enable the Council to carry out its functions under this Act."

58 In effect the staff so appointed are employed by the Department of Education and seconded to the VTC for an indefinite period. Exclusive of the director, the staff ceiling is 24; comprising two assistant directors, 8 advisory officers, 5 liaison officers and 9 administrative staff. Of these, 21 positions are permanently filled at present. Approval has been granted to employ two temporary senior advisers until the assistant-director positions currently vacant are filled. The liaison staff are located in Auckland, Palmerston North, Christchurch and Dunedin. The distribution of the present staff is shown in Appendix 4.

59 The strong criticisms levelled at the staffing of the VTC did not, in general, relate to the quality of the staff. Tributes were paid to some individual staff members by the boards and other organisations whom we consulted. Rather it reflected two main lines of concern, namely:

(i) the appointment procedures and appeal rights of the Public Service which are seen to be unduly restrictive; and

(ii) the resulting difficulty in making appointments from outside the Public Service prevents the Council from recruiting to the secretariat people with appropriate industry experience.

The answer to both problems, in most submissions, was considered to be independence i.e. that the advisory staff should be taken out of the Public Service.

60 Under the first heading there have been long delays in filling some positions, notably the assistant-director positions which have been vacant for some eighteen months. One of the reasons for this is the Public Service appeal system, which has inhibited appointments from outside the Service. With these positions vacant, the Director has lacked assistance at a senior level. It is apparent that this has placed a heavy burden on the Director and other staff members, and that communication, co-ordination and morale have been affected. These matters have been examined by both the Department of Education and the State Services Commission but have not been resolved to the satisfaction of the Council. Our proposals for future staffing arrangements are stated in Part III of this report.

61 The second main complaint is that staff lack appropriate industry background and experience. Unattractive salary levels, and the constraints already referred to prevent the recruitment of staff from outside. They are also unlikely to be found within the Public Service. The same considerations prevent the recruitment of executive training officers from the industrial training boards, who are not public servants. In some cases they are already on higher salaries than the Council could offer. The secretariat's advisory staff represent the VTC on the various boards, and their comparative lack of industry experience is perceived by many people as being a serious handicap in dealing with senior representatives of management and unions who sit on the boards. The Review Team saw some substance in this argument. On the other hand, (as mentioned in paras 81-82), some experienced and capable executive training officers informed us that personal qualities are the greatest determining factor in their success. Industry experience is less vital they thought, although they must also deal with senior people as do the Council secretariat staff. It is accepted that some infusion of staff with appropriate industry background and with the requisite personal qualities might be useful to the secretariat, and

that an occasional interchange of staff between the Council and the boards might be of benefit to both.

62 There are inherent difficulties in providing an adequate career structure in a small organisation like the VTC, and whatever the formal staffing arrangements and structure, the Council is likely to be vulnerable to competition. This is not necessarily a bad thing; it may well be that staff should not remain indefinitely with the VTC before moving on to broaden their experience. The Review Team saw no indication - nor do staff or Council members in general believe - that any significant increase in present staff ceiling is needed in the main office in Wellington. Elsewhere, however, we point to the need for additional staff in the regions. (see para 157).

Liaison Officers

63 The VTC employs liaison officers in Auckland (2), Palmerston North, Christchurch and Dunedin. The general objectives and responsibilities of liaison officers are in line with the objectives of the VTC set out in the Five Year Plan. They report to a senior advisory officer in Head Office who is responsible to the Director for co-ordinating their activities. They are expected to act as a link for the VTC and ITBs in the regions, identifying the broad training needs of these districts and relaying these to the Council. They serve on various regional committees, assist in the implementation of special employment schemes, and maintain liaison with Government departments and educational institutions. The Council regards these officers as being the 'eyes and ears' of the VTC and the industrial training boards in their regions.

64 The emphasis of their role varies from district to district according to geographical factors, the nature and incidence of industry and other local conditions. The aims are similar but the approach differs. This may be illustrated by a brief comparison of the work of the liaison officers in two very different regions, Auckland and Otago (stated in more detail in Appendices 5 and 6).

Auckland Region

65 The two liaison officers based in Auckland cover the whole of the Auckland province. Their duties fall mainly under the following headings:

(i) Advising firms on group training schemes and incentives, and on training matters where the firm is not covered by an ITB or the issue straddles the board structure;

(ii) Liaising with the Regional Office of the Department of Education and tertiary institutions on cross-sector training;

(iii) Reporting to the Department of Trade and Industry on regional development grant projects;

(iv) Assisting in co-ordination of Young Persons' Training Programmes (YPTP); and

(v) Representing the VTC on three ITBs.

66 The two officers are located in the same premises as a number of ETOs from different ITBs. This leads to an unscheduled and time consuming involvement in an advisory capacity and in the administrative supervision of the office. Although of assistance to the boards, these duties detract from the liaison role.

Otago Region

67 The liaison officer based in Dunedin is responsible for Otago and Southland. His role, in an area without the concentration of industry or any ETOs, is quite different.

68 The liaison officer works closely with the Otago Training Co-ordinating Group. This is a committee of representatives from tertiary education and Government departments set up in 1974. It has wide terms of reference to discuss training needs and the allocation of resources and to make representations or recommendations to the appropriate authorities. The group works

with other agencies in training. The VTC considers that the group is established as its voice for training in Otago. The liaison officer's activities cover a wide span, including arranging courses, publishing training directories, and encouraging those involved in training.

69 The Otago officer's approach is now being duplicated by the new appointee in Palmerston North.

70 The Review Team has formed the view, as did the Planning Council, that regional vocational training should be linked with the national network and more firmly co-ordinated to provide a forum where local employment, training and education policies and programmes can be monitored. A VTC regional presence is both necessary and valuable: local needs and problems can best be determined on the spot. It is necessary, however, for the roles of the liaison officers vis a vis the ITBs to be clarified and procedural machinery formalised.

INDUSTRIAL TRAINING BOARDS

71 The main thrust of the work of the VTC until recently has been through the industrial training boards. The Council has taken the view, since its inception, that individual industries should know their own training needs and problems best, and that the board structure is a logical means of giving expression to these needs, and of establishing an effective training organisation within an industry.

72 The boards are voluntary organisations. Their basic membership comprises representation of employer and employee groups within the particular industry, a representative of the Department of Education and a member of the Council's secretariat. Eight boards have representatives of the Department of Labour. Representation may also include other Government departments, professional bodies and "interest" groups, or individuals co-opted for their special expertise. Total membership may be as few as five or as many as sixteen or seventeen. Women currently chair two boards (Hotel and Catering; Local Government) as do two employee representatives (Electrical; Electronics). Some of the larger Boards, such as the

Engineering Industry Training Board, have set up regional and standing or ad hoc committees. A 1972 amendment to the Vocational Training Council Act 1968 gave the boards corporate status. They may be gazetted as corporate bodies only on the authority of the Minister acting on the recommendation of the Council, which may also recommend the disestablishment of any board. Strictly the boards are advisory committees to the Council, which was required to delegate its powers and duties to them. The Council is the channel through which boards may make representations to the Government.

73 Twenty-nine gazetted industrial training boards including one for employers and one for trade unions have now been established plus the Fire Services Council which operates in many respects as an industrial training board. While precise figures are impossible to establish, the Council considers that approximately seventy-five percent of the labour force are covered by the boards (see Appendix 7) which also sets down factual details of the boards.)

74 Some boards are more effective than others, and there were differing opinions as to the extent to which they have succeeded in encouraging management to accept responsibility for training. There was, however, very little criticism of the board system in itself, and a general view that it has been successful. This is attributed primarily to:

(i) the tripartite nature of the boards: employers; employees; and the Government;

(ii) the fact that the boards are the creatures of their own industries;

(iii) the growing acceptance that training is mutually beneficial to both employers and employees.

75 Some boards, especially the Shipping and Waterfront Boards, believe that the constructive partnership of the two sides in training matters has had a significant "flow on" effect in other aspects of their industries, and has led to a general improvement in their industrial atmosphere.

76 The boards consulted, with few exceptions, saw finance as a major problem. This is discussed in paras 86-90.

77 The Review Team also examined the respective roles and the relationship of the Council and the ITBs. As already indicated, the Council view has been that industries should know their own needs best. It has delegated its powers to them. In the final analysis, however, the Council is the body responsible under the Act to retain an oversight of all the boards' activities, to ensure that consistent and co-ordinated policies are developed and maintained through the whole VTC structure. The Council has also assumed direct responsibility, through its advisory committees, for "across the board" training needs such as women, Polynesians, and institutional training. The boards have been created to develop systematic training programmes for their industries, and have a dual responsibility and are accountable to their respective industries and to the Council.

78 A feeling was detected by the Review Team that the respective roles of the Council, committees and boards are blurred, and that some tensions are creeping into the relationship as a result. Boards generally appreciate and value the advice and assistance of the Council. They would find it difficult to visualise a situation where there was no VTC or similar agency standing behind them. A number of board Chairmen accepted that the delegation of authority should be accompanied by firm guidance, and, where necessary, restraint from the Council.

79 It is the Council's policy that a formal review of the operations of each board should be carried out every three years. This involves the preparation of a review report by the board concerned to the Council which is commented on by the secretariat before consideration at a Council meeting. Twenty-one boards have been reviewed to date; seven of the remaining eight have been established within the last two to three years. Several boards have expressed doubt as to the effectiveness of the review system. They consider their reviews to have been useful in informing Council members of the board's activities and as a stocktaking of themselves

and their own programmes but that the reviews did not involve either searching questioning or adequate comment and feedback to the board.

Executive Training Officers

80 The executive training officers are the focal point for advice, assistance and information on training within the policies laid down by their boards. They make recommendations to their boards based on their assessment of needs, carry out the instructions of their boards, and encourage management to make full use of the training opportunities available for all levels of staff, and to appoint their own trainers where the organisation is large enough to warrant this. At the same time, they pay particular attention to smaller firms where such appointments are not feasible. They are not, except in a few special circumstances, involved in off-job training themselves (eg Waterfront and Tanning). Several people commented that this range of duties is not accurately reflected in the title of executive training officers.

81 Clearly, the success or failure of an industry training board's programme depends largely on the ability and personal qualities of its ETOs. The quality of the officer is vital in influencing the attitude of managers and employers, and in formulating and successfully introducing systematic on-job or off-job training programmes. For this reason the Review Team devoted some attention to the background, work and qualities of the ETOs.

82 Executive training officers have industry, Government service, teaching, and armed services backgrounds. Five are women. As might be expected, their quality and personal characteristics are variable. Some are able. Others lack the personal qualities, background or communication skills needed to successfully 'sell' training to top management. All new appointees as ETOs are given a brief induction programme at the VTC, but there is scope for more adequate organised training. ETOs consider that the quality and personality of the person is all-important. A knowledge of the industry to start with is useful, but a lack of industry background on appointment does not prevent the right sort of person from becoming a successful ETO.

83. The Review Team's attention was drawn to the lack of any real career structure for executive training officers. Salaries and conditions vary significantly, being influenced not only by job content and the quality of the individual, but by such factors as industry comparisons and the ability of boards to pay. Salaries range at present from $10,700 (Building ITB) to approximately $26,000 (Waterfront Training Organisation) a year. The average salary is $16,480. This inhibits movement between boards (although there have been one or two such movements). Some ETOs regard their careers as industry-oriented and not in the management of training. Experienced and high calibre ETOs can be well suited to managerial or industrial relations posts in industry. Others are likely to remain in training.

84 Executive training officers have a generally good relationship with the VTC. They look to the Council, as do the ITBs, for advice on Government policy, as a clearing house for policy issues, and for advice and guidance on their problems. Several ETO's spoke of a feeling of isolation and would welcome close interest by board members as well as the VTC.

FUNDING

85 The 1980/81 grant to the VTC IS $2.1 million including $1.5 million in grants to ITBs. To put this in perspective, the Government is spending about $10 million on subsidies for vocational training, plus $99 million on tertiary technical training and $197 million on university education.

86 One of the issues raised consistently in submissions and discussions was the difficulty experienced by most ITBs in raising finance from firms in their industry to meet the balance of board's operating expenditure. Present policy provides that the Government, through the VTC, may make grants of up to 90 percent of the salary and administration costs of employing each approved executive training officer. A maximum grant of $22,410 per officer per year has been approved for 1980/81. For those boards whose activities do not warrant the employment of an executive training officer a maximum grant of $2,275 may be made. In addition, the Council is granted an amount equivalent to approximately 10 percent of the

total ($2,490 per ETO) in the form of a discretionary fund.

87 Industry is required to meet at least 10 percent of the budget and in many cases finds more (see Appendix 7). However, some boards have serious problems in collecting levies and in the enforcement of the Industrial Training Levies Act 1978. This Act provides for a levy to form part of the appropriate ITB funds to be imposed on an industry if employers (or their representative organisations) agree. The levy can only be applied to factories registered with the Department of Labour. Such a levy has been introduced in four ITB jurisdictions to date.

88 Major difficulties with collecting existing voluntary levies and contributions appear to be associated with one or more of the following features:

(i) a large number of small units, many not affiliated to a national employer organisation;

(ii) difficulties in defining industry boundaries;

(iii) the absence of appropriate machinery for collecting levies;

(iv) training involving cross-sectoral occupational groupings;

(v) industries with weak or divided employer representation.

89 The overwhelming majority of submissions favoured introduction of a compulsory levy across all industry, typically assessed on payroll, to spread the costs evenly among firms. In general, submissions suggested confining the levy proceeds to ITB operating costs and did not suggest extension to other training costs presently funded by the Government. Several variants of the levy system were suggested, such as levy/grant and levy/exemption.

90 Another issue raised by some ITBs was the difficulty of planning and budgeting when the annual Government grant was not known a year or two in advance, and, in fact, not until well into the financial year, e.g. the 1980/81 funding was not advised to ITBs until June 1980.

91 A further issue was the inadequacy of the system of accounting in terms of assessing the performance of ITBs and manifesting their accountability to the VTC. ITB accounts like those of the Council are compiled on the basis of expenditure and revenue items rather than according to functional activities. For most boards the bulk of expenditure is salary and related costs of ETO's and accountability is achieved through reviews of ITB activity. Nevertheless, the present system does not permit a quantitative assessment of the relative allocation of ETO time and overall budget to various functions.

INTER-RELATIONSHIPS AND CO-ORDINATION

92 The Terms of Reference required the Review Team to examine the inter-relationships, the nature of co-ordination and to identify any duplication among the agencies involved in training and employment. In fulfilling its functions, the VTC has developed special relationships and initiated a wide range of contacts and cross-representations with many organisations and associations concerned with vocational training. Its contacts with organisations concerned specifically with employment are much more limited.

93 A complex set of relationships has been built up by the Council and by the ITBs and these are illustrated in Appendix 8. These relationships include Government departments, 'quangos', employer and employee groups, examining agencies as well as educational institutions. The nature of the relationships which the Council and a typical ITB have established - direct representation, cross-representation, observer status or less formal links - is also illustrated in the two charts at Appendix 8.

94 The VTC and the ITBs interact with many of the same organisations such as the Department of Education and apprenticeship committees, but not necessarily with the same people. There is, however, a significant degree of cross-membership and reciprocal membership. We were told, jokingly perhaps, of meetings breaking up and most of the participants moving to another venue to reconvene on another topic.

95 The Council has not become involved so far in social work training. Only tentative links have been established with the New Zealand Social Work Training Council. That Council has the responsibility to advise appropriate Ministers and the Director-General of Social Welfare on aspects of social work training and to encourage co-operation and co-ordination. The New Zealand Social Work Training Council also has a mandate, under its Terms of Reference, to assess various forms of training, advise on appropriate curricula, negotiate with appropriate organisations for the establishment of training courses, and develop suitable forms of recognition for social work training. Clearly, closer links between the VTC and the New Zealand Social Work Training Council should be established.

96 A further concern that has so far escaped the detailed attention of the VTC is the vocational training needs of people with physical or mental disablement. In its comment to the Review Team the Advisory Council for the Community Welfare of Disabled Persons quoted figures from a survey covering the Wellington Hospital Board district which revealed that 61.0 per 1,000 males and 65.1 per 1,000 females were physically disabled in some way. The frequency of people born intellectually handicapped in New Zealand in 1978 was 4.5 percent.

97 In September - October 1979 an OECD/NZ Government Conference on Transition of Handicapped Adolescents from School to Employment held in Auckland focused on the special training needs of young people with mental or physical impairments. The VTC should involve itself with the training for people with disabilities in the same way as it is presently involved with Polynesians and women in industry.

98 We did not have the time, or the resources, to examine in detail all the links illustrated in the charts at Appendix 8. For example we came across on the one hand duplication and overlap and on the other lack of co-ordination between:

. the National Council of Adult Education and the VTC in, for example, Polynesian workers' training needs; women in the workforce;

- the National Council of Adult Education and the Department of Education's Rural Education Activities Programmes (REAP);

- the Rural Education Activities Programmes and the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries;
- the apprenticeship committees and the ITBs;

- the examining authorities and the ITBs;

- in districts and regions, training liaison committees, vocational guidance liaison committees, employment advisory committees and work exploration committees;

- some Government departments, e.g. Maori Affairs and VTC/ITBs;

- courses in universities and some technical institutes;

- some of the industrial training boards, e.g. Electrical and Electronics, Electrical and Local Government, Contracting and Building

- advisory committees and some industrial training boards;

- the VTC (and ITBs) with the Accident Compensation Commission on safety training;

- the multitude of agencies concerned with aspects of management education and training;

- the VTC, Departments of Labour and Education and apprenticeship committees in manpower forecasting;

- the Departments of Education and Labour, especially in some districts, e.g. in school to work transition.

99 In a field as complex as vocational training and employment, a measure of overlap and duplication is inevitable and tolerable. All aspects could not be catered for effectively within one large

organisation. The establishment of links and fora for consultation is, therefore, essential for effective policy making and the implementation of policies.

100 In summary the Review Team found that the responsibilities of many of the agencies in vocational training, and education were blurred and that the co-ordination between some of them was inadequate. This created some tension in the relationships and opened the way for potential conflict and wasted effort. In general, the VTC and the ITBs has established relatively harmonious relationships with a wide range or organisations but these other agencies had not always inter-acted as effectively with each other as one would have wished. In Part III we focus on the relationships and the overlap in the responsibilities of a number of the most important agencies on training and employment and suggest measures to ensure more effective co-ordination between them.

CONCLUSION

101 Imprecise objectives have made it difficult to measure the achievements of the Vocational Training Council. Bearing in mind, however, that the Council has been working in a field where previously no single organisation had responsibility and that, lacking executive powers, it has had to operate by a process of recommendation, encouragement and persuasion, there is much for which it can take credit. It has provided a tripartite forum where the mutually beneficial results of more organised training have fostered co-operation and understanding among employer organisations, trade unions and Government departments; it has raised the level of general awareness of the need for organised training; and through its advisory committees it has heightened appreciation of the needs of special groups and developed important initiatives in training which span all industries. Perhaps the least developed function is manpower forecasting.

102 The Council is equipped with advisory and recommendatory powers but it has no executive responsibilities. This has meant that it has had to adopt a voluntary approach which has made it difficult to secure commitments to organised training. Nevertheless, the Review Team is convinced that the voluntary approach is more effective in the longer term.

103 A major problem the Council has experienced is in recruiting to the secretariat, people with appropriate background and experience.

104 Twenty-nine industrial training boards have been established, covering the greater part of the labour force, and although the achievements of the boards vary the system itself is sound. The Review Team considers, however, that the procedures established by the VTC to review the objectives and guide the activities of the Boards need strengthening. Some boards have experienced difficulties in collecting the industry contribution towards their administration costs, and the system of annual grants makes it difficult for boards to plan ahead.

105 There is a large number of agencies in the vocational training field. The Review Team found that some co-ordination is achieved by cross and reciprocal membership, but a degree of overlap remains. Indeed, in the VTC network itself the roles of the Council, its advisory committees and the ITBs have become blurred over time, and some tensions are now apparent. This suggests that in general there is a need to clarify the objectives, functions and responsibilities of the various agencies and to develop formal relationships in appropriate cases, both nationally and regionally.

PART III
WHAT IS NEEDED

PLANNING COUNCIL'S INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS

106 There have been three phases in the growth and the development of the VTC. The first phase was establishing itself as a relative newcomer in the field of vocational training and education. The second phase was the setting up of the industrial training board network. It is now entering a third phase of integrating vocational education and training policies with national employment strategies. In October 1980 the New Zealand Planning Council published its report "Employment: Towards an Active Employment Policy". The Cabinet Committee on Expenditure noted that the present Review was to be co-ordinated with, and parallel to, the work of the New Zealand Planning Council.

107 The Planning Council stated that the administration of an 'active employment policy' should be based on the following principles:

(i) effective co-ordination of active employment measures, nationally and regionally;

(ii) community involvement; and

(iii) regional flexibility.

108 The Council asserted that there is no one institution responsible for advising the Government on employment and training policies and goes on to identify a lack of co-ordination at national and regional levels in:

- training;
- manpower forecasting and planning;
- vocational guidance and placement services.

109 The Council believed that the involvement of the major social partners and the education community is too diffuse and any review should "aim to strengthen the effective participation in policy-making of unions, employers and educationalists", (Page 54).

110 The Council considered three broad options for administrative reform:

(i) a semi-autonomous statutory authority, on the model of the Manpower Services Commission in the UK, to administer employment, guidance and training services; or

(ii) a new Department of Employment; or

(iii) a re-organised Department of Labour.

111 After considering these options the Council recommended that:

(i) the Department of Labour should become the central source of policy advice, co-ordination, and leadership in the development of an active employment policy. To achieve this the Department's Head and District offices should be re-organised to allow for a separate management structure responsible for employment and training; and

(ii) a statutory Labour Market Advisory Board (LMAB) be established based on the present Consultative Committee on Employment Policy (CCEP), responsible to the Minister of Labour with augmented membership and under an independent Chairman as with the VTC. The LMAB should establish standing or ad hoc committees on employment issues. The VTC and the LMAB were to be chaired by the same person thus linking them together. It would be serviced by a secretariat recruited from various sources. The ITBs should produce manpower forecasts for their industries to be co-ordinated by the Department of Labour's research and planning unit. The apprenticeship committees should be merged with or work alongside the ITBs. The LMAB should have regional boards.

112 The Review Team's own enquiries confirm a lack of co-ordination. This is limiting the development of coherent employment and training policies which the Planning Council has

identified nationally and regionally in training, manpower forecasting and planning, as well as pastoral and guidance services. We also agree that the effective participation in policy making of unions, employers and educationalists needs strengthening.

113 However, while we agree on the aims we do not agree with the Planning Council's administrative proposals to achieve "an active employment policy". The Planning Council's proposals stem from the statement in its report (page 53) that co-ordination is lacking because "no one institution is effectively responsible for advising the Government on employment and training policies". Although it does not say so, the Council apparently rejects this notion itself and proposes instead that a re-organised Department of Labour, the VTC and a new Labour Market Advisory Board (based on the CCEP) should share this responsibility.

114 The Review Team has examined the administrative options considered by the Planning Council and rejects them for much the same reasons as the Council. No comment is made on the proposed reorganisation of the Department of Labour as this is outside our Terms of Reference. However, it should be noted that, in itself, a reorganisation such as that proposed by the Planning Council would not achieve the co-ordination of employment and training policy and implementation that is required. We do, however, agree with the Planning Council that the Department of Labour should become the central governmental agency for policy advice, co-ordination and leadership in the development of an active employment policy.

115 The Review Team does not support the Planning Council's proposed new Labour Market Advisory Board, based on the Consultative Committee on Employment Policy for several reasons. It would:

(i) transform the current informal CCEP into a statutory agency;

(ii) require new regional networks which could be expensive to create and would take some time to be functional;

(iii) disturb the existing relationships;

(iv) be an additional burden of the time of some of the most influential people who have a role in the development of employment and training policies.

116 The Consultative Committee on Employment Policy has been successful because of its informality, where the social partners, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Labour, exchange views and consider the implications of employment policies which are being canvassed. It is serviced by the Department, but no formal commitments are made. Rather, the committee is a forum where informal soundings take place between influential people who can assist with the formation and the effective implementation of employment policies.

117 The membership of the CCEP, besides the Secretary of Labour, is two representatives each from the Employers' Federation and the Federation of Labour. The Chairman of the VTC has been co-opted and thus a link has been forged between employment and training. The educational community is not represented. The Planning Council proposal for a LMAB overlaps the membership of the existing VTC.

118 The Planning Council envisaged that the LMAB would set up standing or ad hoc committees to consider such matters as the impact of new technology, work exploration schemes, the manpower requirements of special projects and the employment implications of structural changes.

119 The Planning Council also envisaged the establishment of regional LMABs. We agree with the desirability of obtaining local and regional input into employment and training policies and we appreciate the contribution such regional groups can play in the implementation of policies. If the Department of Labour is to be reorganised to sharpen its impact on employment policy formation, then this reorganisation will probably extend to the Department's district offices.

120 One final point should be made: the need to husband scarce secretariat staff resources. The twin policy issues of employment and training are complex and the development of coherent policies

calls for a nice mixture of skills, experience, aptitude, and credibility in secretarial staff that are in short supply and are unlikely to be found in any one department or organisation. Flexible arrangements for the recruitment of staff are crucial. It is even more important not to have too many independent organisations competing for staff who are already in short supply.

121 The Review Team, therefore, rejects the Planning Council's proposal to establish a Labour Market Advisory Board to complement the Vocational Training Council. The current situation is a fluid one which has produced uncertainties and tensions and the system overall is not as well co-ordinated as most would wish. It is, however, our view that the necessary fora exist for the questions of policy and responsibility to be resolved without the need to establish yet another organisation. The goodwill exists in the Departments of Labour and Education, the Vocational Training Council, the industrial training boards, the apprenticeship committees and the examining authorities to resolve conflicts as they arise.

122 What is required, we believe, are marginal adjustments and fine tuning to the existing machinery rather than the dramatic changes in existing relationships or the establishment of new organisations.

OBJECTIVES OF THE VTC

123 As we have seen above (paras 13-17) the current objectives of the VTC are not entirely satisfactory for the 1980's. They are too general to provide a sense of priorities so that, in effect, anything to do with vocational training qualifies for support, while the blandness of expression does little to encourage a debate about options or to command a positive response. A further problem is the difficulty of assigning quantitative measures or qualitative assessments to the current objectives and therefore of monitoring achievement. The Review Team agrees with the sentiments behind the Council's statement of objectives but considers that some reformulation is necessary to enhance their usefulness to the Council.

124 Such a reformulation should meet several tests. First, the objectives should focus attention on policy issues, for example, by

emphasising linkages between training and employment, training and education, and training and technology. Second, the objectives should be oriented towards the achievement of results. This implies that they should be measurable, certainly qualitatively, and quantitatively, if possible. Third, they should be expressed in such a way that they encourage a search for options. The pursuit of objectives should foster debate. Fourth, the Council's priorities should emerge from its statement of objectives. And fifth, objectives should be regularly reviewed.

125 The Review Team considers that the adoption of a set of objectives should not be imposed from outside but should arise from consultation and agreement among the social partners. As a guide to such discussion, it is recommended that the Council's objectives might be:

(i) To identify the contribution which effective vocational training can make to personal development, increased productivity, and faster economic growth, and in particular to recommend action which:

(a) avoids training-related skill shortages, and especially shortages of newly emerging skills or skills which are crucial to economic growth;

(b) secures better perception by firms of how training can improve employee satisfaction and productivity; and

(c) maintains investment in skills notwithstanding fluctuations in the level of economic activity;

(ii) To identify those aspects of vocational training which require public intervention and support;

(iii) To identify and recommend action to overcome deficiencies in basic education and training which limit the employment prospects of new entrants to the labour market;

(iv) To identify and recommend action to increase opportunities for adults to update, upgrade or broaden their skills through retraining; and

(v) Generally to promote the introduction and development of efficient and cost-effective methods of training, both nationally and regionally.

126 Statutory recognition of the Council's objectives was discussed. However, in view of the importance the Review Team attaches to regular reviews of objectives, with adjustments when necessary to take account of newly emerging priorities, the benefits of greater prominence afforded by a legislative statement are outweighed by the potential loss of flexibility. Nevertheless, a Government endorsement is desirable and accordingly the Review Team recommends that the Council's objectives should be submitted to the Ministers in April each year as a basis for discussion with the Chairman.

FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL AND THE BOARDS

127 The functions of the Council and the boards are identical under the Act, although in practice there are important differences of emphasis among the boards and between them and the parent body. These variations have been absorbed satisfactorily within the existing framework, and no change in functions between the VTC and the ITBs is warranted simply on the ground of administrative tidiness.

128 Changes are necessary, however, in the context of the proposed reformulation of the Council's objectives and the recast roles they imply for both the VTC and the boards. These changes are designed to:

(i) retain and strengthen the recommendatory and advisory role of the VTC network;

(ii) differentiate the functions of the VTC and the boards;

(iii) enhance the central co-ordinating function of the VTC;

(iv) place greater emphasis on the VTC's role in public policy formulation;

(v) re-assert the industry orientation of ITBs but make clear the wider context in which they operate;

(vi) clarify the accountability of ITBs, which lies to the VTC for efficiency and effectiveness but is demonstrated through the quality of their relationship with industry; and

(vii) provide for stronger links at the regional level and for wider community participation.

129 While we see a need for closer integration between the work of ITBs and the central body and for overall guidance by the VTC, and while under our proposals the ITBs would have a general responsibility to the VTC for their expenditure of public funds, the VTC should avoid day-to-day administrative involvement and leave the ITBs to handle their own affairs once the general guidelines have been set.

130 The functions we propose for the VTC and the Boards include in each case some which are mandatory and others which are discretionary. Our recommendations are:

(i) Mandatory Functions of the VTC:

(a) co-ordinate the activities of and provide overall guidance to ITBs;

(b) co-ordinate manpower forecasting exercises by the boards (see paras 132-144), in association with the Department of Labour;

(c) undertake or arrange for research into aspects of vocational training;

(d) collect and disseminate information on vocational training developments, both in New Zealand and elsewhere;

(e) make recommendations to the Government on any vocational training activities supported by public funds;

(f) co-ordinate the development and revision of prescriptions and syllabuses for qualifications issued by the proposed vocational awards authority;

(g) evaluate the effectiveness of the Council itself and of the ITBs; and

(h) undertake any activities specifically requested by the Ministers.

(ii) Discretionary Functions of the VTC:
make recommendations on such matters as:

(a) the number of trainees and the quality of training needed to satisfy specific skill requirements;

(b) planning and co-ordinating training schemes, especially for cross-sector training and for smoothing out trainee intakes;

(c) promoting the training needs of special groups;

(d) encouraging improvements in on-job training within in industry;

(e) the financing of training;

(f) initiating pilot vocational training schemes capable of general application; and

(g) the award of travelling scholarships for vocational training purposes.

(iii) Mandatory Functions of the Boards:

(a) undertake industry-based manpower forecasting, under the general direction of the VTC;

(b) undertake any other activities specifically requested by the VTC;

(c) promote the benefits of organised training to firms and individuals; and

(d) recommend on the development of organised training programmes, both on-job and off-job.

(iv) Discretionary Functions of the Boards:

(a) recommend on the development of induction training programmes for new entrants;

(b) recommend on programmes of retraining; and

(c) develop on-job training manuals and other suitable materials to improve training performance.

131 We would expect following its current practice the Council would translate this general statement of functions into statements of specific action programmes. We endorse this approach. We suggest, however, that a three-year planning horizon is sufficient for scheduling of specific activities.

Manpower Forecasting

132 One of the features of the current labour market is the simultaneous existence of high levels of unemployment and skill shortages which employers report are inhibiting increases in output. If these shortages are met in the traditional way, by importing skilled labour, two types of social cost are incurred: firstly, the cost there has always been of establishing the immigrant and his or her family in New Zealand and providing them with the necessary social infrastructure; and secondly, the costs not present previously of not training and not employing New Zealanders of working age. This points to a need to examine the operation of the labour market more closely than has been the practice in the past.

133 This need is reinforced where the training is of long duration and/or provided separately from employment. Where these conditions apply there needs to be a flow of information from those who require labour with certain skills to those who provide the training in those skills.

134 More systematic attempts at manpower forecasting could thus be expected to assist the operations of the labour market in several ways:

(i) The most significant influence on the training policies and decisions of individual firms and on manpower forecasts in general is the expected level of economic activity. Imbalances in the supply of skills arise from cyclical fluctuations and are accentuated because of the time-lags between recruitment and completion of training. Systematic forecasting could trigger action to smooth out the peaks and troughs of training intakes and thereby anticipate skill surpluses and shortfalls.

(ii) On the quality side, changes in the balance of skills required could similarly be anticipated. Shifts of this kind may be partly attributed to cyclical fluctuations, as employers substitute one skill for another or adjust the inputs of capital and labour, but more importantly they arise from structural changes such as the decline or expansion of particular sectors and technological developments.

(iii) There are several causes of skill-shortage which more or better training cannot be expected to resolve. Examples include labour, immobility (reluctance to relocate), relatively unattractive wages and conditions of work, under-utilisation of skills and poor management of resources. The system of manpower forecasting we envisage would focus attention on these factors as well as numbers in formal training.

A Manpower Forecasting Package

135 Manpower forecasting is a hazardous activity. Changing economic circumstances can alter requirements and migration inflows and outflows can have a significant impact. Nevertheless, the Review Team is persuaded of the need to develop a system of communication by industry of forward requirements to guide training providers on likely trends in skill needs. Such a system could also

provide information which would enable careers advisors and vocational guidance counsellors to give more soundly based advice on likely employment prospects to those about to enter or re-enter the labour force.

136 Bearing in mind both the inherent limitations of forecasting and the need to ensure that requests to industry for information should be modest and relevant to policy, the Review Team recommends a three-pronged approach involving:

(i) regular, general sample surveys of industry for trends in the requirements for skills which demand long-term training;
(ii) more detailed studies in specific skills triggered by the general surveys; and
(iii) more flexible training programmes

(i) Regular Surveys of Trends

137 It is suggested that the industrial training boards, the VTC and the Department of Labour establish a regular national consultative exercise, on a sample survey basis, focussing on the "bottom up" approach but with strong co-ordination to develop qualitative assessments of trends in the requirements for those skills which need training longer than, say, one year.

138 Under this proposal, the Department of Labour would provide the technical advice and the overall assumptions to be used. Particular attention would be paid to the need to identify regional as against national requirements, to cater adequately for cross-sector skills and to ensure consistency across sectors. The Department would also be responsible for developing suitable qualitative measures to round out and complement the information flowing from industry. This task would be assisted, as would the drawing of samples, if the boundaries of ITBs were specified in terms of the Department's Standard Industrial Classifications. The Department would have the responsibility for preparing the final report.

139 Each year the boards would survey a sample of their industry and would report to the VTC on the likely trends for, say, up to

five years ahead, using a standard reporting format. The boards should also be asked to identify the causes of possible shortfalls and indicate what preventive action seems necessary.

140 The VTC's role would be to maintain linkages between boards, to act as the ITB for skills not covered by boards, and collate the flow of information coming back from the ITBs for the Department of Labour.

(ii) Specific Skill Studies

141 From time to time these general surveys would indicate likely pressure points which would call for closer study. In some cases, particularly with skills specific to one industry, these would become obvious to the ITB concerned. In others, the picture may not emerge until the responses from several industries had been collated. In these situations, involving cross-sector skills, detailed studies could be carried out by the VTC itself, by the Department of Labour, or by one or more ITBs acting for the VTC on behalf of all industries. Again the Department of Labour would be seen as the source of technical advice and care would be necessary to develop consistency and compatability among the specific studies.

(iii) A More Flexible Training Pattern

142 Since the necessity for long range forecasting diminishes as the time required for training is shortened, the Review Team sees the development of more flexible training patterns as an essential ingredient of the manpower forecasting package. As part of their forecasting role, therefore, industrial training boards should explore the relevance of such measures as:

(a) systematic recruitment and training for all occupations requiring long periods of training;

(b) emphasis on training of a quality which enhances mobility;

(c) relating the length of training to the achievement of learning objectives;

(d) greater flexibility on age of entry and on opportunities for adults to acquire or update their skills; and

(e) differentiation between the learning needs of initial entrants and those of adults.

143 In turn the VTC should satisfy itself that measures such as these have been incorporated as far as possible in any proposal for public expenditure on special action to resolve skill shortages.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL

144 At present the Council has 13 full members and 3 associate members with representation as in paragraph 10. The members act as representatives of their particular constituency and the contribution each makes to the Council's business varies. Some people who spoke to the Review Team sought additional membership to represent their particular interests. We consider that an increase in the numbers on Council would not lead to increased effectiveness.

145 We considered reducing the size of the Council. Probably the optimum size is two representatives each from the Federation of Labour and the Employers' Federation, the Director-General of Education, and the Secretary of Labour, with an independent full-time Chairman. However, it is unlikely that the present groups that are represented on the Council would favour any reduction in membership.

146 We propose that university representation would be more appropriately sought from the Vice-Chancellors' Committee rather than the UGC. If the AAVA and TCB are merged as we suggest elsewhere there would be a reduction of one in the Council membership.

147 Currently, the CSU and the SSCC each has a representative on the Council. We considered whether the training commitment of, and the size of the training resource controlled by, the State warranted representation on the Council but on balance we proposed that

involvement could best be achieved thought the VTC/SSCC Co-ordinating Committee augmented with CSU representation. We therefore recommend that the associate membership of the SSCC and the CSU be terminated.

148 The Review Team has noted that the existing part-time chairmanship is becoming a de facto full-time job. We are concerned, on the one hand, that this burden is an unfair one to place on someone who is a part time appointee. On the other hand the changed role we envisage for the Council demands that the Chairman be full-time. We recommend accordingly.

149 Currently there is provision for not more than five Ministerial appointments. The Review Team recognises the value of a mechanism for ensuring adequate representation of special interests in vocational training. We suggest, however that this need could still be met with a reduction from five to perhaps two or three. For example, the special vocational training needs of handicapped people.

150 We have suggested above that provision for two of the associate members be deleted. We consider that retention of associate membership as a special category is inappropriate and recommend accordingly.

151 We received strong representations that organisations recommending appointments to agencies such as the VTC may not always appreciate the very heavy burden placed on their representatives. The point was also made that the nominating organisations do not always demonstrate the commitment to the Council that could be expected. In our view it is incumbent for the organisations represented on the VTC to take a close interest in the Council's proceedings.

152 In summary, we recommend that the Council be re-constituted to comprise 14 full members as follows:

. a full-time independent Chairman;
. representatives of Manufacturers' Federation (1);
Employers' Federation (2);

Federation of Labour (2);
Technical Institutes Association (1);
Vice-Chancellors Committee (1);

- the Chairman of the proposed vocational awards authority;
- Director-General of Education;
- Secretary of Labour;
- Up to three members representing special interests, appointed by the two Ministers.

MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

153 We agree with the NZ Planning Council and we recommend that the Act should be amended to provide for the Council to have primary responsibility to the Minister of Labour, and to retain a special relationship with the Minister of Education. In effect this is a reversal of the present arrangement. This is not to imply any criticism of successive Ministers of Education. Twelve years ago when the Council was being established a major need was to affect a training relationship with the educational institutions. Today, however this need is less important. The institutions are in place; education is well represented on the ITBs; and on-job and off-job training is flourishing.

154 The major policy need now is to link employment, education and training policies and this is primarily a Labour portfolio responsibility. The switch from Education to Labour which we propose could be seen by the employer and employee groups as positive recognition of the changed role we envisage for the VTC. As we have said, the Council is about to embark upon the third phase in its development and act as a link between Education and Labour in helping to formulate an active employment policy which is a major issue.

155 It would follow from a shift in primary Ministerial responsibility that funding and staffing responsibilities would be transferred from the Department of Education to the Department of Labour.

ADMINISTRATION AND STAFFING OF THE VTC

Staffing

156 The Council's present staffing arrangements, and the difficulties it has experienced, were discussed in Part II of this report. In the Review Team's opinion the actual staffing issues to be decided are the Council's ceiling and the nature of the staffing arrangements.

Ceiling

157 The present ceiling is 24, and the Council is staffed up to 23 which includes two temporary appointments recently made of senior advisory officers, in lieu of the two vacant assistant-director positions. Given the future regional functions of the VTC as envisaged in this report, the Review Team sees a need for an increase of three in the Council's ceiling and we recommend accordingly.

Future Staffing Arrangements

158 The main issue is the most suitable staffing arrangement to overcome the Council's present difficulties and to provide for the needs of the future. The Review Team has considered several alternatives. These include:

(i) The Status Quo

159 The Director is appointed by the Council, and the remainder of the staff are public servants or are employed on contract. The Review Team considers that the present difficulties are unlikely to be resolved under this arrangement. The Council feels it has been inhibited by the appeal provisions of the State Services Act 1962, in appointing staff acceptable to the Council to the assistant-director positions. For this reason the Council would prefer these positions to be outside the Public Service.

(ii) Greater Use of Contract Staff

160 The contract system has proved a valuable means of acquiring skills for specific purposes. We have no criticism to make of its use to date. Nevertheless, we have reservations about any

significant extension of its use. Although the matter has not been tested the practice was judged in 1976 by the SSC to be contrary to Section 20(1) of the Vocational Training Council Act 1968 which says:

> "20. Other officers - (1) There may from time to time be appointed under the State Services Act 1962 such research, clerical, and other officers as may be required to enable the Council to carry out its functions under this Act."

161 As a result of this ruling, and by agreement between SSC and PSA, eight contract employees were brought onto the permanent staff so that only two contract positions (1 unfilled) remain. Conditions for these are determined between SSC and the Council. Any wider use of contract staff could, therefore, be expected to arouse PSA opposition, and would probably require an amendment to the Act. Quite apart from these legal and industrial considerations the Review Team believes that a substantial number of contract staff could lead to tensions between them and other aovisory officers, especially if the terms of employment for the contract employees were the more favourable. It should be added that we have no evidence of such tensions to date.

(iii) Use of Non-Public Servants

162 Another possibility would be for all of the Council's staff to be outside the public service enabling the Council to recruit staff from any source on whatever terms it might consider necessary. This arrangement was recommended by the 1965 Commission of Inquiry, which considered that departmental officers could find a conflict of interest in carrying out Council directions. It might also enhance the Council's credibility with industry and employee groups with whom the staff must work. The Review Team has no evidence that any conflict in loyalty has ever arisen.

163 On the other hand it can be argued that a degree of control is necessary since public funds are being spent by the Council. In any case, if granted the facility of appointing non-public servants, the Council would be required to do this in agreement with the State Services Commission. Finally, there may be opposition from the

opposition from the State Services Unions. As a review of the staffing of the Vocational Training Council secretariat pointed out in 1978, the current Combined State Unions' representative on the Council has consistently counselled against this arrangement.

(iv) Flexible Staffing Arrangements

164 The Council's main requirement lies in the need to recruit advisory/liaison staff with a range of background and experience. The duties of the administrative staff, however, are quite different. The Review Team, therefore, favours an arrangement which would provide greater flexibility in appointing advisory/liaison staff from outside the public service, while leaving administrative staff within the public service. We have looked to the staffing arrangement of the NZ Planning Council, a body of roughly comparable size, as a model. The essential features of the Planning Council staffing arrangements are that:

- the Director is appointed by the Council;
- advisory staff are recruited from outside the public service, or seconded from departments for set terms;
- administrative servicing is provided mainly by the Treasury;
- staff ceilings and public service establishments do not apply, but the Council submits an annual programme of work to the Minister and receives an overall resource allocation;
- staff salaries and conditions are based on those in the public service.

165 As a means of ensuring that the tripartite nature of the Council itself is reflected in the secretariat we recommend that:

(i) the Director and Assistant Directors be appointed directly by the Council;

(ii) liaison and advisory staff be appointed by a mixture of contract and secondment from employer groups, unions and departments, with appointments in either case being for set terms and with salaries fixed in agreement with the SSC;

(iii) the administrative staff remain officers of the Public Service as at present, attached to the Department with responsiblility for administration of the Act.

It will be necessary to make transitional arrangements for existing advisory and liaison staff who prefer a continued public service career.

INDUSTRIAL TRAINING BOARDS

166 Currently the boundaries of individual ITBs are defined loosely. In the section on manpower forecasting (paras) we comment on the advantages to be gained by prescribing these boundaries in terms of the Department of Labour's Standard Industrial Classifications. For many boards this definition would be little more than a formality, but for a few there would need to be some realignment of coverage. We recommend that the boundaries of the ITB's be specified in terms of the Department of Labour's Standard Industrial Classifications and that the negotiations of this be left to the VTC with the boards concerned, and further, that when agreement is reached, both the coverage and the objectives of each Board be set out in its Gazette Notice.

167 At the same time as it looks at boundaries the VTC could explore the possibilities of amalgamation.* We have no evidence to support any major change in the number of boards established. However, amalgamations appear feasible between the following:

Apparel and Textile
Building and Contracting
Electrical and Electronic
Furniture and proposed Timber Products.

168 In general, the stage has been reached when new boards should be established only with caution and only when it is clear that the goals sought cannot be met by an expansion of an existing board. For example, it would be inappropriate to set up a new board in the local government sector, and any initiatives in that area should be directed towards using the Local Government Training Board as the

* The Council has a sub-committee of ETO's considering this question.

umbrella organisation. While widespread amalgamations may not be desirable, there appears to be scope for sharing resources and facilities, and the VTC should see active involvement in this area as part of its overall co-ordinating responsibility and we so recommend.

169 We have already noted that much of the strength of the ITBs derives from their identification with industry, and that this in turn flows from their tripartite composition. We would not wish to see this disturbed. However, given the close relationship between employment and training and given our redefinition of the role of the VTC and the ITBs which gives this relationship a central place in their activities, we recommend that the Department of Labour representation, currently limited to eight boards, be substantially extended.

170 The new relationship we see between the VTC and the ITBs requires the former to adopt a more positive co-ordinating role, with the ITBs acting as the arms of the Council in their relationships with industry. While the periodic reviews of boards by the Council have value and should be continued, and while financial probity is assured by the requirement that audited accounts are received before the VTC pays boards their second-quarter grants, we believe that more is needed. In our view the existing arrangements are insufficient to provide Council members with the information required for them to exercise the overall co-ordinating role we envisage, and insufficient also to cause boards to review regularly their own activities in the light of wider employment and training considerations. We therefore recommend that, at the same time as boards send their annual accounts to the VTC, they should also submit a brief report (a couple of pages should be sufficient) outlining precise achievements over the past year and more importantly, specific objectives for the current year in relation to the resources sought. Such reports should accompany and be seen as an integral part of applications for administration grants.

171 The Council might also give consideration to the adoption of a portfolio system whereby each Council member is assigned two or three Boards with which he or she can develop a closer relationship than is encouraged by the present arrangements.

Executive Training Officers

172 The existing arrangements whereby the VTC seeks approval for additional ETO's through the new policy review has proved satisfactory and we see no reason for this to be changed.

173 While it is likely that many ETO's would continue to see their future careers within industry there would be some who could make a contribution to the Council's activities. Much could be gained from having in the Council's secretariat staff who have had direct board experience. Because of the current range of salaries for ETO's this is difficult to achieve. However this would be facilitated if the proposals we have made on the secretariat's staffing arrangements are accepted.

174 During the course of the review we were doubtful that the name "executive training officer" was the most appropriate title. It does not, in the Review Team's view, reflect the range of responsibilities carried by many ETO's. This is an issue which the VTC may wish to pick up and discuss with the boards themselves.

FUNDING

Compulsory Levy

175 The issue of a compulsory levy to finance training has been examined by the Government on previous occasions. The case for a levy has been argued with respect not only to training by industry but also to redundancy, other aspects of active employment policy, and even to tertiary education in general. Certainly it would be difficult to justify the high transactions cost of a compulsory levy across all industry solely to finance ITB operating costs. At the very least, such a levy should be sufficient also to cover the VTC secretariat's operating costs, training incentives and existing subsidies for apprenticeship training and administration. These costs are essentially associated with specific skill training and therefore represent inputs to industry rather than general education.

176 The boundary between vocational training and education is difficult to establish in practice, however, especially when the possibility of post-employment retraining is admitted. It has been argued, for example, that existing financial support for trade training and sub-trade training is inequitably small in relation to that provided for individuals undertaking professional and quasi-professional tertiary education. If these boundary problems are conceded, the issue expands into one of funding post-secondary vocational education from what amounts to a particular form of general taxation.

177 It may be that a degree of restriction can be achieved by concentrating on training more directly associated with particular industries. If so, the arguments for levy-financed training are different from the more general arguments for government intervention. These are based on under-provision of education due to the presence of external benefits, improved labour market operation, or maintenance of the productive potential of a rapidly growing labour force. The arguments for a levy are based instead on a theory of 'poaching', i.e. that because knowledge and skills reside in the employee, a firm providing training cannot prevent this skill being lost to competitors who may not incur the same training costs.

178 The validity of this theory has never been established. It usually ignores the fact that the benefits of training accrue to the individual as well as the firm and that, presumably, at least part of the costs are borne by the individual in the form of lower wages (or reduced leisure) while training. In a competitive labour market, wages would reflect the full costs of training and a case could perhaps be made for grants or loans to individuals for vocational training. Subsidies to industries on the other hand, imply that wages are not sufficiently flexible to allow full recovery of a firm's training costs.

179 This may be the case in New Zealand and there is some supporting evidence. But input subsidies to industry have the important limitation that they restrict private choice by focusing on particular industries and often on particular forms of training, especially institutional training. There is thus considerable

180 If the 'poaching' theory is accepted, it suggests measures to reduce the relative cost of training to firms (in the absence of flexible wages). There is no obvious reason, however, why this should be associated with a tax on all labour as envisaged in compulsory levy suggestions. Grants from general taxation would equally achieve the desired result without penalising labour in general. A levy based on payroll would discriminate against labour-intensive industries (e.g. services) and be counter-productive from an employment point of view. It would also involve additional bureaucracy. An across-the-board levy on payroll could be collected by the Inland Revenue Department as part of the Accident Compensation levy. This is likely to confuse safety and training objectives, however, and be complicated by any exemptions introduced.

181 Apart from the lack of any strong theoretical suppport for compulsory levy finance for industrial training there are two practical reasons why the Review Team does not favour this proposal.

182 Firstly, it is clear that there is considerable opposition among employers to a compulsory levy. This was a major reason for the VTC's opting for a voluntary approach in the first place. In essence, the calls for a levy represent an attempt by firms which do undertake training to shift the perceived costs on to other firms or the Government.

183 Secondly, the Government, after considering the possibility at some length, rejected compulsory levies for training and decided to convert industrial training incentives into subsidies of a 'pump priming' rather than of a continuing nature. The Review Team does not believe that this decision should be modified at this stage before the effectiveness of the new arrangements has been assessed.

ITB Operating Costs

184 In the absence of a compulsory levy the Review Team does not propose that ITB's should be deprived of the opportunity to solicit industry funds to support boards' operating costs. Indeed, this pattern should be encouraged. It follows that where firms in an

industry can be collectively persuaded that ITB's can provide a worthwhile service (in essence, the boards are providing services to their respective industries) the ITB should be able to collect funds on the basis of a voluntary levy or fee-for-service basis.

185 However, the problems of collecting small sums from numerous firms with often disparate interests are responsible for a good deal of unproductive time. The present policy of 90 percent funding is designed to encourage ITB's to secure industry participation. The same objective could be met by a flat determinate grant per ITB with the option for boards to raise any additional finance from industry for other projects they wished to mount. This would remove the compulsion to collect levies and would establish a certain base level of operation. It would also provide an inducement to secure industry funding for any expansion of ITB services. Thus, growth would be entirely industry financed.

186 Such a proposal could involve an increase of up to 10 percent in ITB grants in the first year (up to $150,000 in total). In subsequent years ITB grants should be indexed to allow for relevant price level changes in the same way as departmental expenditure. This would have the added advantage that boards could be advised of three year planning levels in the context of the annual review of forecasts of expenditure. Any bid for increases in the real value of grants would be subject to normal new policy procedures. This last point is consistent with the Minister of Finance's recent decision to include requests for additional ETO's in the annual new policy review.

Discretionary Fund

187 The VTC should continue to use the discretionary fund (10 percent of total ITB grants) for specific purposes not provided for in the individual ITB grants. The present criteria of the fund are wide but the Review Team does not consider that they need modification. However, emphasis can be given to grants to ITBs for projects they are carrying out at the request of the VTC.

VTC Funding

188 No change in funding of the Council itself is considered necessary. The annual grant should be subject to appropriate price level adjustments whilst bids for additional resources should continue to be included in the annual new policy review.

Accountability

189 Although the Council and ITBs are technically accountable to the Government and are subject to Audit, the present accounting format is of limited value in establishing such responsibility. We consider that the Council should examine a functional classification of expenditure to show the activities on which funds are being spent. Such a procedure would also aid the ITBs in demonstrating the value of their services to industry.

190 We recommend that:

(i) ITBs no longer be required to find a minimum of 10 percent of their operating expenses from industry;

(ii) differential flat grants be introduced
  (a) for the first approved ETO of each ITB, at a higher rate to cover overhead expenses;
  (b) for each subsequent approved ETO of each ITB, at an appropriate lower rate;

(iii) the grants, on average, be fixed at the 1980/81 level of $22,410 per ETO plus 10 percent, indexed for price increases in following years;

(iv) ITBs be advised of their three-year planning levels in the context of the annual reviews of expenditure forecasts;

(v) additional industry support for ITB programmes be encouraged;

(vi) the VTC discretionary fund be retained at a level equivalent to 10 percent of the sum of the grants for ETOs;

(vii) the Council examine the possibility of introducing a

functional classification of expenditure with effect from 1 April 1982;

(viii) requests for additional Government funding for ITBs and the VTC continue to be dealt with in the annual new policy review.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION

191 The chart in Appendix 8 illustrates the range of organisations with some responsibility for aspects of employment and training policies. And, elsewhere (see paras 92-100) examples have been given of duplication, lack of co-ordination and ineffective relationships between some of these organisations and the VTC network. This situation has provoked some tension and conflict which has arisen largely because responsibilities have not been redefined to reflect the changes that have taken place in a dynamic and rapidly changing employment and training environment.

192 The public policy area we are concerned with is large and complex and requires the close involvement of central Government, the social partners and other community interests. It is inconceivable to bring all these interests together in one organisation. What is required is the closer articulation of the many organisations that have a responsibility; marginal changes in the responsibilities and activities of some of these to reflect new needs; and a redefinition of the objectives, functions and responsibilities of the main agencies, such as the Departments of Labour and Education, the VTC, the examining authorities, the apprenticeship committees and the industrial training boards.

Apprenticeship Committees

193 The Vocational Training Council, in its Review of Apprenticeship report, drew attention to the multiplicity of organisations connected with apprenticeship administration (for example, apprenticeship committees, the Departments of Education and Labour, and the New Zealand Trades Certification Board), and recommended that a New Zealand Apprenticeship Commission be established to deal with policy matters common to all trades. While such a Commission

could be expected to streamline relationships within the apprenticeship system narrowly defined, the inclusion of a representative of the VTC on the Commission may not in itself be sufficient to draw together the apprenticeship system and the wider VTC/ITB training network.

194 Apprenticeship committees are concerned with both the training given to apprentices and their wages and other conditions of employment. The link between the acquisition of skills and rates of pay lies behind many discussions on training and will therefore have an indirect influence on many of the activities of industrial training boards. Few boards, however, would see their responsibilities in wages and conditions of employment being as central as they are for apprenticeship committees. On the other hand, if the boards are to display a concern for vocational training right across their industries, an involvement in apprenticeship training logically follows.

195 To some extent this involvement will be secured through the shift in functions we later propose between the Trades Certification Board and the industrial training boards (see para 213). Nevertheless, the Review Team is satisfied that additional positive measures are needed to foster co-operation between boards and apprenticeship committees and to guard against duplication of effort.

196 One approach would be to merge apprenticeship committees with industrial training boards. Currently, however, the representation on boards is not evenly balanced between employees and employers, making them an inappropriate forum for determining wages and conditions of employment. Second, responsibility for detailed administration of apprenticeship would deflect boards from the broader strategies on which we believe their energies should be focused. And third, the dismantling of the apprenticeship committee structure - particularly in the wake of the major report on apprenticeship just released by the VTC - would inevitably bring a loss of goodwill.

197 Improved co-ordination can be achieved, however, without merger or takeover. Already the groundwork has been laid with the VTC

proposal for an Apprenticeship Commission on which the Council itself is represented and with our later recommendation that the ITBs (or the VTC where no appropriate ITB exists) link in with the examining and certification system by assuming responsibility for syllabus and prescription development. To complete this set of inter-relationships, three further measures are recommended:

(i) NZ Apprenticeship Committees (currently an equal number of worker and employer representatives - usually four each - a person familiar with technical education and the Commissioner of Apprenticeship as chairman) should be expanded to include one representative of the relevant ITB or the VTC as appropriate. Several apprenticeship committees already offer observer status to their ITB: this should become standard for all, informally at this stage but by amendment to the Apprentices Act in due course.

(ii) Conversely, when ITBs are discussing apprenticeship matters (for example, when prescriptions are reviewed) they should invite a representative from the relevant NZ apprenticeship committee to participate.

(iii) Employer and union groups should be encouraged to include among their nominations to NZ apprenticeship committees at least one person each who is also a member of the relevant ITB.

These proposals will, we believe, improve co-ordination.

Examining Authorities

198 There are several statutory bodies and other organisations currently involved in the construction of training syllabuses and the examination processes. It is timely that some consideration should be given to a rationalisation of the present system.

199 The Trades Certification Board (TCB) and the Authority for Advanced Vocational Awards (AAVA) are responsible for conducting certification examinations mainly in the trades and technician

areas. The AAVA is also now moving toward the issuing of some higher level diploma awards.

200 Although the range of qualifications gained through the two bodies is very wide, their basic functions are essentially the same: to conduct examinations and award certificates to meet the requirements of particular sections of industry and commerce. There is no apparent reason, therefore, why one examining authority could not adequately fulfil the responsibilities of both TCB and AAVA as a vocational awards authority.

201 There has sometimes been doubt as to whether a particular vocational qualification would more appropriately lie within AAVA rather than TCB and vice versa. Trade and technician training requirements are becoming increasingly blurred and with the rapid introduction of new technologies, the overlap in the functions between tradesman and technician will be further accentuated. The establishment of one examining authority would greatly assist the provision of qualifications at a level appropriate to the skills required.

202 Both TCB and AAVA have lacked sufficient resources to enable them to keep pace with the changing demands of industry and commerce. They are very conscious of the urgent need for specialist expertise in areas of curriculum design, test construction, evaluation and analysis. If TCB and AAVA were amalgamated, a resource unit could well be established within the new authority including skilled personnel.

203 There has been much criticism in the past particularly of TCB, concerning outdated prescriptions. The system by which these are revised is time-consuming. It involves e.g. a request by a NZ apprenticeship committee for revision; the formation of a revision committee comprising representatives of employers' associations, unions, ATTI and the Department of Education; consideration of drafts by interested organisations; approval by the NZ Apprenticeship Committee; and finally approval by the TCB.

204 The recently adopted practice of TCB to invite the NZ apprenticeship committees to consider a revision after a prescription has been in use for three years should bring improvement. However, it will still be four and often five years before these prescriptions would be implemented.

205 The AAVA when carrying out revisions generally invites representatives from the various interested professional associations and educational interests. More recently, some of the ITBs have been involved, particularly the Engineering ITB.

206 There is a need for a stronger link between the VTC and the TCB/AAVA or an amalgamated examining authority. The VTC is the one agency charged with the responsibility to consider the development of training courses and programmes, both within industry and educational institutions. These functions are pursued by delegation to the Council's various advisory committees or an appropriate ITB.

207 The manpower forecasting role envisaged for ITB leads equally and appropriately to the identification of the skills and training needs of industry and also to the construction of suitable training syllabuses to meet those needs.

208 For the development of well-integrated packages of training programmes, the VTC and ITBs should be closely involved in the construction of the prescriptions and the moderation of the examination papers. The Motor Trade Certification Board (MTCB) currently enjoys this type of relationship. The TCB delegates to this ITB its prescription revision and examination moderation functions. The MTCB calls together both industry and educational representatives and furnishes TCB with a revised prescription. The revised prescription, however, must still go before the NZ Motor Trades Apprenticeship Committee for approval.

209 We recommend that the responsibility for the training programmes for apprentices be transferred to the VTC and the appropriate ITB to ensure that no training programmes become isolated and entrenched. All training programmes, including those

for apprentices, must be viewed as an integral part of an industry's total training package of both on-job and off-job training.

210 The NZ apprenticeship committees would continue to be responsible for the administrative and legislative aspects of apprenticeship, but be dependent on the appropriate ITB to supply the list of skills for the apprenticeship order and for the preparation of the examination prescriptions for apprentice courses.

211 We further recommend that syllabus construction responsibilities be delegated to the ITBs. The ITBs would convene appropriate syllabus revision committees with representatives from employer and employee groups active in the industry, ATTI, Department of Education, and the resource unit of the vocational awards authority. The syllabuses should be designed in clear objective terms that would lead to appropriate teaching methods and effective evaluation both of the learner and the programme. To achieve this, the syllabus committees would be guided by close involvement with the vocational awards authority curriculum design resource specialist.

212 The vocational awards authority should confine its examining role to the certification level and all examinations and assessments leading to certification should become the responsibility of the educational institution conducting the courses. These institutions, would be obliged to follow strictly the syllabuses designed by the ITB syllabus committee for each intermediate course stage. The work load of the authority would be greatly reduced thus enabling it to concentrate on its certification function. The movement of responsibility to the educational institutions would appear to be consistent with the current practice in relation to AAVA stages 1, 2 and in part stage 4 and also the movement by TCB toward 1st and 2nd assessments in place of the qualifying examinations.

213 <u>In summary we recommend</u>:

(i) The amalgamation of the TCB and the AAVA into one vocational awards authority with responsibility for certificate level examinations. The authority should house a specialist resource

unit, the personnel of which would:

(a) have expertise in curriculum design, test construction evaluation and analysis;
(b) be employed either on contract (3-5 years) or by secondment from Department of Education Curriculum Development Unit, universities, NZCER, or elsewhere;
(c) be included on ITB syllabus committees;

(ii) the transfer of responsibility of syllabus construction to the VTC network and that:

(a) the VTC Chairman be a member of the vocational award authority;
(b) the VTC advisory committees and ITBs establish syllabus committees to be responsible for;
- supplying educational institutions with course syllabuses;
- providing the authority with prescriptions for certificate level examinations;
- moderating examination papers for the authority; and
- providing NZ apprenticeship committees with syllabuses and lists of skills;

(iii) that the proposed amalgamated examining authority have statutory authority as do the present TCB and AAVA.

Department of Labour

214 The Planning Council has proposed that the Department of Labour be reorganised both nationally and at the district level to enable it to effectively fulfil its employment and training responsibilities. As we have said previously this is outside our Terms of Reference, but we would support such an initiative, especially as it would provide opportunity to redefine the objectives, functions and responsibilities of the Department. We would expect that such an examination would confirm among its other responsibilities the Department's central position in employment, manpower forecasting, vocational guidance and placement services.

215 If after the proposed review of the organisation of Department of Labour, the Industrial Training Service remains with the Department, the Review Team recommends that its annual training

programmes and any new proposals the Service may wish to undertake be submitted to the VTC for recommendation and comment to ensure closer articulation with other national training priorities.

Educational Community

216 The increase in unemployment among the school leaver and the young has led to greater tension between educationalists and employers and to a number of reactions such as:

(i) the back to basics movement;

(ii) calls for more specific vocational emphasis in schools and in training; and

(iii) a wide range of policies to cope with transition from school to work such as:

- new secondary school courses for low achievers;
- training of a broad kind leading to specific skills;
- skill training outside the traditional apprenticeship trades;
- school to work programmes;
- part-time study and part-time work programmes;
- employment subsidies in the form of payment to employers to provide training;
- young persons training programmes;
- job entry training.

217 The present unemployment problems are likely to be with us for a long time and are unlikely to improve greatly. Thus what is required is a greater appreciation of:

(i) the necessity for continuing education;

(ii) the contribution pastoral services such as guidance networks, including vocational guidance, can make so that the young and adults who wish to retrain are

aware of the consequences of various personal, education and career choices;

(iii) the respective contribution that the educationalist and the employer can make to the training and education.

218 Traditionally training has been based on occupations. A hierarchical structure of apprentice, technician, technologist, and professional has an infrastructure of prescription committees, examining and certifying boards, and various formalised teaching arrangements. Each occupation has tended to become a universe, with interchange and flexibility difficult to effect. Industrial training boards have emphasised rationalisation, co-ordination, and flexibility in training programmes and the development of training networks that make it possible for people to retrain and qualify for a second occupation. Thus individual choice has been widened.

219 There have been changes, also, in the approach of the educational institutions. Information and guidance services have become more important. The advent of internal assessment has switched the focus from the national examining bodies. And attention has switched from syllabus prescription to course and curriculum developments with an emphasis on evaluation, and the development of new techniques and research.

220 The startling increase in the number of unemployed school leavers has placed the Department of Education and other educational agencies under intense pressure to devise appropriate programmes to bridge the transition from school to work. These programmes have implications for the secondary school, the tertiary institutions as well as other training agencies including the Department of Education itself. Although the Department is outside our Terms of Reference, we recommend that the co-ordination and inter-relationship of the Department and the other groups who form the educational community such as the NCAE, PPTA, UGC, SCORITE, the TIA and the ATTI be critically examined and refined to ensure that the network is an effective delivery system; the initial steps to be

taken by the Department, in close consultation with the VTC.

221 The Review Team considers that the VTC should have a monitoring role for new vocational courses in technical institutes to ensure their compatibility with the needs of industry and commerce. We therefore recommend that all new vocational course developments proposed for technical institutes should be referred to the VTC for comment before approval.

Standing Committee on Relationships in Tertiary Education (SCORITE)

222 The Standing Committee on Relationships in Universities and Technical Institutes was set up by the Minister of Education in July 1972. In November 1973 the Minister approved the extension of the committee to include representation of the Teachers' College Councils and renamed the committee the Standing Committee for Relationship in Tertiary Education (SCORITE).

223 The committee's Terms of Reference are:

> "To provide a forum for the exchange of views and information among the statutory bodies and organisations engaged in education and training at the tertiary level on any matters of common concern, including the appropriate location of courses."

224 The committee has, we understand, provided a useful forum for discussion on developments affecting one or several tertiary institutions and has been successful in the provision of some degree of cross-crediting between the various tertiary education sectors.

225 In the main, the committee has enabled early discussion of proposed new courses and programmes in relation to their necessity and the suitability of the institution in which they are to be located.

226 While it is possible, through the Director-General of Education, to give effect to SCORITE conclusions in relation to courses proposed for location in either the teachers' colleges or the technical institutes, this is not so in the case of the universities.

227 Although we did not have discussion with SCORITE's Chairman specifically on this point, the Review Team received evidence that unnecessary duplication of vocational courses had occurred in some universities in spite of activities of SCORITE and the " early warning system" of the university Vice-Chancellors' Committee. The autonomy of the universities enables them to mount courses of almost any type within their overall Government grant and there is no authority empowered to restrain any undesired duplication of courses.

228 The Review Team recommends that SCORITE be empowered to prevent the undesirable development or duplication of vocational courses in universities and that the universities be requested to consult with the VTC before proceeding with the introduction of new vocational courses or learning programmes.

Other Government Departments

229 Departmental staff training programmes are outside our Terms of Reference. There are, however, several whose policies and programmes can have a quite significant impact on vocational training in the broader context. It should also be noted that the allocation of public funds to overall departmental staff training is very large. Thus there is a need to ensure effective coordination between the State and the private sectors to ensure the best use is made of the human and material resources devoted to training. The VTC is well-placed to effect this co-ordination.

230 We were told of examples of lack of co-ordination between departmental training proposals which were not directed at departmental staff. Health, the Forest Service, Agriculture and Fisheries, to name but three, sponsor vocational training programmes directly related to the public policy areas they help to administer. On the other hand, the Department of Maori Affairs sponsors training programmes which span the areas of responsibility which fall directly under the aegis of the VTC network. Despite this community of interest we understand there has been little, if any, formal consultation. We find this surprising as the VTC has a

very active and pervasive advisory committee dedicated to dealing with the problems and special needs of Polynesians in the workforce.

231 Management and supervisory education has been a special concern of the Council. Last year the State Services Commission contracted a special report on management training for the State Services. We understand that there has been no consultation between the consultant who prepared the report and the VTC on these proposals.

232 The VTC/SSCC co-ordinating committee which the Council has recently re-activated will do much to co-ordinate these and other state sector training programmes and in the interests of the most effective use of training institutions and other resources, we applaud this VTC initiative.

233 However, to strengthen the co-ordinating role of the VTC and to enhance its advisory function to the Government we recommend that a Cabinet directive be issued that no proposal for public expenditure on vocational training, other than on departmental staff training, should be approved unless the proposal has first been referred to the VTC for recommendation and comment. The adoption of such a recommendation will normally require a swift response from the VTC network.

Regional Co-ordination

234 During our discussions of co-ordination and inter-relationships, we have so far concentrated largely on what happens in Wellington. Co-ordination within the regions, and between the regions and the centre, are no less important, both for the development of public policy and for its effective implementation. For this to be achieved, the Review Team considers that two sets of measures are required: to heighten awareness of the contribution which the VTC network can make to effective training and to develop regional machinery to co-ordinate the agencies involved in education, training and employment.

Regional Presence of the VTC Network

235 Although several ITBs have regional training advisers who are

able to develop contacts with individual institutions, employers and employee groups, it would be impractical for all to do this. It is also unnecessary. The liaison function which the VTC has already developed in Otago provides a model which can be used elsewhere. Its purpose would be to cater for the general training needs of small business, ensuring that employers and employees become aware of the programmes and services which are available, stimulating the development of additional programmes where necessary, calling in the services of the relevant ITBs when specialist needs arise, and providing a general vocational training advisory service to the local community.

236 There are currently some substantial gaps in the VTC's regional coverage. To fill these gaps and to allow the national implementation of the Otago liaison model, we earlier recommended (para 157) that three additional staff be appointed to the VTC, to be located in Hamilton, Rotorua, and Wellington-Hutt.

Regional Co-ordinating Machinery

237 Again with the exception of Otago-Southland, there is little regional co-ordination in training. In some areas individual aspects of employment and training policy are catered for: employment advisory committees, vocational guidance liaison committees, and work exploration committees have been set up, with varying degrees of success. What is missing, however, is a general regional overview.

238 The Review Team recommends that these existing regional agencies should combine their efforts by coming together to form regional Employment and Training Councils. These Councils would be a forum where community input can be obtained and where the implications of national employment and training programmes can be monitored as they are implemented. They would also have a responsibility for identifying and responding to local employment problems and training and retraining needs. Servicing these Councils would be the responsibility of the Department of Labour.

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239 The composition, methods of operation and functions of the Councils would vary from one region to another, according to local requirements. As a minimum, however, membership would cover local employer and employee groups, representatives of educational institutions, a representative of the VTC network, and (perhaps as observers rather than as full members) the Departments of Education and Labour. Experience with employment advisory committees suggests that effective operation will require the setting up of subcommittees covering particular problems of local concern. Functions of these Councils might be expected to cover:

(i) monitoring and reviewing the impact of national employment, vocational education, vocational guidance and training programmes at the local level;

(ii) encouraging more effective ways and means of co-ordinating the services of provider training agencies and formulating integrated basic training programmes;

(iii) interpreting and commenting on manpower information from a local viewpoint, and where necessary recommending the development of flexible and responsive programmes;

(iv) conducting studies on issues of local importance;

(v) providing a local employment and training "intelligence" service.

(vi) advising the Government, the VTC and other agencies as appropriate on general or specific employment, vocational education, vocational guidance and training programmes.

240 The regional Employment and Training Councils would be free-standing and independent. They would be linked to the VTC network through the VTC's liaison officers, to the Department of Labour because of its servicing role, and to other agencies because of their membership and participation. Their accountability, however, would be to their local communities, and their success would depend substantially on the credibility they could earn.

241 The wide span of interest of these Councils implies that there is no single agency to which they would report. When dealing with regional issues they could be expected to liaise directly with the local trades councils, employer groups, technical institutes, the Employment and Vocational Guidance Service or whatever. On national issues, their feedback might be directed to the Minister of Labour, the Minister of Education or the Vocational Training Council. To ensure a consistent and co-ordinated approach, however, it may be necessary to use a single agency, and in this respect the Department of Labour is perhaps best placed, to act as the conduit for national liaison.

Other Inter-relationships

242 Although we have concentrated on those inter-relationships which impinge most directly on the efective functioning of the VTC network, there are numerous others, detailed in Appendix 8, which lack of time and resources have prevented our examining closely. We recommend that the VTC, as a matter of urgency, conduct a consultative review of the respective responsibilities and the nature of its relationships with the agencies which we have not dealt with specifically.

CONCLUSION

243 In this section of the report the Review Team propose various changes in some of the institutional arrangements for vocational training. These are designed to achieve several related purposes.

244 Firstly, we propose closer links between vocational training and active employment policy. In particular, we recommend that the Minister of Labour take primary responsibility for the VTC administration and the extension of Labour Department representation on industrial training boards. We also propose more systematic attempts to obtain from industry projections of labour requirements. We do not go so far as to support establishment of a single statutory agency responsible for active employment policy, such as that proposed by the Planning Council. We do support initiatives to reorganise and upgrade the Department of Labour and favour the retention of the present consultative committee on

employment policy, which has the confidence of its members and appears to be working well.

245 Secondly, we propose stronger co-ordination of the provision of vocational training and education. This will require the relationship already established with the Minister of Education and his Department to be maintained. Co-ordination can be enhanced by cross-representation among ITBs and relevant apprenticeship committees; amalgamation of statutory trades and technicians examining authorities, strengthened syllabus construction services with VTC and ITBs having a greater role in syllabus revision, provision for VTC to comment on all new publicly-financed vocational training and, finally, a stronger regional organisation of the VTC linked to existing employment, education and counselling services.

246 Thirdly, we propose changes in the prescribed objectives of the VTC to enhance their usefulness as operating goals, and changes in the respective role and functions of the VTC and the ITB to ensure greater accountability in relation to these goals.

247 Fourthly, we considered and rejected the suggestion of a compulsory across-the-board levy on payroll to fund industrial training. We consider that assistance for training can be provided from general government revenues and industry's own resources without such a levy. The essence of our funding proposals is that a base level of ITB operating costs should be met by a government grant while any growth, other than general price movements, is met by industry from voluntary levies or fees for ITB services. The recently revised system of training incentives should be allowed to work before any further changes are made.

248 Various other recommendations have been made to ensure that the VTC and its staff are able to respond effectively to these changed objectives and functions. In particular, it is proposed that more flexible methods of appointment be adopted to allow senior and advisory staff to be recruited from industry or on secondment from departments.

249 In total, these changes will enable the Council and ITB, to take a more active role in assisting the Government to meet the employment and training challenges of the next decade and also ensure that policies are developed after appropriate consultations between the responsible major partners.

PART IV

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

250 If the recommendations contained in this report are accepted some consequential changes will be required to the following Acts:

Trades Certification Act 1966
Vocational Training Council Act 1968
Apprentices Act 1968
Vocational Awards Act 1979

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

251 Additional resources would be required to give effect to some of the Review Team's recommendations. Those proposals which would have significant costs are set out below together with an estimate of their annual cost. The Review Team has no proposals for the funding of these additional costs, but noted that insofar as the proposals are considered in the context of the Government's annual review of new policies, some compensatory savings may be required in terms of conditions of that review.

	Estimated Annual Cost ($000)
Three additional regional staff	90
Establishment of new base grants for ITBs	150
Increased Emolument of full-time chairman	30
Provision of personnel for expert syllabus revision	60
	330

252 There is also likely to be some additional cost arising from more flexible staffing arrangements including recruitment from outside the Public Service. It is envisaged that resources to undertake and interpret regular surveys of industry manpower projections would be provided largely within the present resources of the Department of Labour, ITBs and the VTC secretariat.

253 Against these additional costs, the Review Team would expect some savings in the administration of examining authorities as a

result of their amalgamation. Furthermore, a major aim of the recommendations is that improved co-ordination of the provision of institutional vocational training should realise some gains over the longer term.

APPENDIX 1A

LIST OF PERSONS AND ORGANISATIONS FROM WHOM WRITTEN COMMENT WAS RECEIVED

Accident Compensation Commission
Advisory Council for the Community Welfare of Disabled Persons
Authority for Advanced Vocational Awards (2)
Building Industry Training Board
Combined State Unions
Committee on Women
Electrical Industry Training Board
Electronics Industry Training Board
Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board
Local Government Training Board
National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women
National Council of Adult Education
New Zealand Apparel Industry Training Board
New Zealand Association of Teachers in Technical Institutes
New Zealand Council for Educational Research
New Zealand Employers Federation
New Zealand Federation of Labour
New Zealand Fire Service Commission
New Zealand Furniture Industry Training Board
New Zealand Institute of Management
New Zealand Manufacturers Federation
New Zealand Motor Trade Certification Board
New Zealand Post Primary Teachers' Association
New Zealand Trades Certification Board
New Zealand Waterfront Training Organisation
Otago Regional Development Council
Road Transport Industry Training Board
Tanning Industry Training Board
The Technical Institutes Association of New Zealand
Universities Entrance Board
Mr D M Wilson

APPENDIX 1B

LIST OF PERSONS AND ORGANISATIONS CONSULTED

(i) COUNCIL MEMBERS OF VTC

Major-General L A Pearce	(Chairman)
Mr E W Mills	(Deputy Chairman)
Mr J A Boomer	
Mr A F Crothall	
Mr I M Moses	
Mr W C Nathan	(Also as Chairman, Polynesian Advisory Committee)
Mr A Russ	
Mrs D J Stafford	(Also as Chairman, Women's Advisory Committee)
Mr D G R Sutcliffe	
Mr R E Taylor	
Mr R J W Wallis	
Mr J P Delahunty	
Mr C W Massey	
Mr P G Morris	

(ii) PERMANENT HEADS AND DEPUTIES

Mr W L Renwick	Director-General of Education
Mr J A Ross	Assistant Director-General of Education
Mr G L Jackson	Secretary of Labour
Mr P J Lorimer	Assistant Secretary of Labour
Mr J G McArthur	Assistant Secretary, The Treasury

(iii) INDUSTRIAL TRAINING BOARDS

Agriculture	Mr J C Andrew (Chairman)
	Mr M Kennedy
Aviation and Travel	Mr D Bassett
Distribution	Mr B I Purdy (Chairman)
	Mr M R Allison
Electrical	Mr C T Lynch (Chairman)
	Mr I J Jones
Engineering	Mr J L McLennan (Chairman)
	Mr M Barber
Fishing	Mr N Jarman (Chairman)
	Mr M V Willing
Footwear	Mr R Wolfe (Chairman)
Furniture	Mr A Graves (Chairman)
Hotel and Catering	Mrs P Thompson (Chairman)
	Mr J J Williams
	Mr B Moore
Local Government	Mrs D T Nicholson (Chairman)
	Mr D P Johnston
Meat	Mr R Archer
Motor Trade	Mr A J Blakeway
Shipping	Mr H D M Jones (Chairman)
	Mr G Dobie
Textile	Mr A J Rudkin (Chairman)
Trade Union	Mr W J Knox (Chairman)
	Mr J L'Estrange
Waterfront	Mr V P Blakeley (Chairman)
	Mr J Fisher

(iv) OTHER PEOPLE CONSULTED

Mr N Woods	Previously Secretary of Labour
Mr P Palmer	NZ Planning Council
Mr R E Taylor	NZ Employers' Federation
Mr W A Montgomery	NZ Institute of Management
Mr G Eversfield	UEB Industries Chairman, Training of Training Training Working Party
Mr R J Willyams	Principal, Manakau Technical Institute
Mr J Magnall	J Wattie Industries (Group Training Scheme)
Mr W C Nathan	Chairman, Polynesian Advisory Committee
Mr E W Mills Mr E L Simpson	) Authority for Advanced Vocational Awards
Mr R J W Wallis Mr F Torrance	) NZ Trades Certification Board)
Ms K Roper	Post Primary Teachers Association
Mr J A Bateman Mr J Hercus Mr C Johnson	Technical Institutes Association
Mr J P Gavigan Mr R W S Fargher	) Association of Teachers in) Technical Institutes

Mr P Creevey	NZ Council of Adult
Mrs B Norris	Education
Mrs N Collins	Vocational Guidance Service
Miss V Boyd	
Mr C P McBride	)
(VTC)	) Group of ETOs
Mr R Archer	)
Mr G Atkinson	)
Mr D Bassett	)
Mrs B M Miller	) .....
Mr B Moore	)
Mrs H Havill-Smith	Consultant Librarian

NOTE: In addition the Review Team or Representatives of the Team interviewed twelve members, of the staff of the Council and one contract employee.

APPENDIX 2

FUNCTIONS OF THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING COUNCIL

Section 12 of the Vocational Training Council Act, 1968 lists 13 optional and five mandatory functions of the Council as follows:

12. Functions of the Council

(1) The Council shall from time to time make recommendations to the Government, departments of State, authorities in the fields of industry, commerce, agriculture, and social welfare, and such other institutions as may be interested in all or any aspects of vocational training. In particular the Council may make recommendations as aforesaid for all or any of the following purposes:

(a) For the increase or reduction in the number of trainees in any specified occupation to meet such requirements as may be forecast by the Council;

(b) For the development in technical institutes and similar institutions of training courses and training programmes;

(c) For the development in industrial and commercial establishments and in departments of State of training programmes for the employees employed in those establishments;

(d) For the establishment in particular localities of institutions for vocational education and training;

(e) For the planning and co-ordination of training schemes to meet future requirements;

(f) For the co-ordination of training schemes where departments of State on the one hand and authorities or employers engaged in the fields of industry, commerce, agriculture, or social welfare on the other hand train persons for the same occupation;

(g) For the introduction of training in occupations where the Council finds the requirement for training is insufficiently met or understood;

(h) For the establishment of training and retraining schemes under appropriate controlling authorities established for the purpose in occupations where the Council finds training or retraining schemes to be necessary and where no such authority exists;

(i) For the introduction of a system of levies to be paid by employers for the purpose of financing a training scheme or training schemes in respect of any vocation with which those employed are connected;

(j) For the award of travelling scholarships to enable suitable teachers, practitioners, or trainees who are engaged in any specified occupation to gain experience or further experience in that occupation either in New Zealand or overseas or both;

(k) For the fostering of research in vocational training generally or in any particular aspect or field of vocational training;

(l) For the carrying out or promotion by appropriate institutions of research, inquiries, and investigations in any field of vocational training;

(m) For the development and implementation of techniques relating to occupational identification, description, and classification and to job analysis and specification.

(2) Without limiting its functions under sub-section (1) of this section, the Council shall from time to time:

(a) Maintain amongst persons connected with vocational training in any field, a continuous awareness of relevant overseas developments in that field;

(b) Promote, foster, and undertake inquiries, investigations, and research in vocational training generally and in specific aspects and fields of vocational training;

(c) Undertake the analysis, processing, and interpretation of information obtained by or on behalf of any authority, institution or person in the course of inquiries, investigations, or research carried out by or on behalf of it or him or any aspect of vocational training;

(d) Prepare, publish, and circulate reports on its inquiries, investigations, and research and on any analysis or interpretation undertaken under paragraph (c) of this sub-section;

(e) Carry out such other functions in relation to vocational training as the Minister of Education or the Minister of Labour, or both of them, may from time to time assign to it.

Section 13 of the Act lists the powers of the Council as follows:

13. Powers of Council

(1) The Council shall have all such powers, rights, and authorities as may be reasonably necessary to enable it to carry out its functions.

(2) The Council shall have power to spend any of its funds in the exercise of its functions or on any purpose ancillary thereto.

(3) Without limiting the general powers conferred on it by this section, the Council may charge such fees as may from time to time be approved by the Minister in respect of any service performed by it in the exercise of its functions.

APPENDIX 3 - Part A

VTC ADVISORY COMMITTEES

- Apprenticeship and Related Trade Training Advisory Committee.

  ..To advise the Council on all matters relating to apprenticeship and related trade training.

- Institutional Training Advisory Committee

  ..To advise the Council about the development of training for the housekeeping and catering staff of residential institutions. The Committee works closely with the Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board.

- Management Training Advisory Committee

  ..To advise the Council about training of all levels of management. The Committee has the following working parties:

  (i) Management Education and Training W.P.
  (ii) Small Business Education and Training W.P.
  (iii) Supervisory Education and Training W.P.
  (iv) Training Systems Working Party
  (v) Training Trainers Working Party

- Polynesian Advisory Committee

  ..To advise the Council on the problems and special needs of Polynesians in the workforce and in vocational education and training. The Committee has three regional advisory committees.

- Women's Advisory Committee

  ..To advise the Council on the problems and special needs of women in the workforce and in vocational education and training.

. Clerical and Commercial Working Party

..To promote the development of effective programmes for the education, training and development of clerical and commercial workers within the context of technological and social change.

. Micro-Electronics Training Advisory Committee

..To promote the implementation of effective programmes both on and off the job for the education, training, and development of all involved either in the context of micro-electronic technologies based on appropriate manpower forecasts.

Appendix 3 Part B

SOME ACTIVITIES OF VTC ADVISORY COMMITTEES

ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Apprenticeship and Related Trade Training

This committee's early activities publicised moves towards extended trade training, explained the procedures involved in making changes to apprenticeship schemes, and encouraged the use of apprentice training records. In the last three years the committee has carried out a survey of the two longest running extended trade training schemes, reviewed the apprenticeship system and made recommendations for the future directions apprentice training should take.

Clerical and Commercial

The Clerical and Commercial Working Party formed earlier this year is undertaking a training needs analysis of jobs in the clerical area in a range of business undertakings. The current changes in technology are being taken into account.

Some preliminary reports have been prepared and guidelines will be available during the coming year.

Institutional Training

The Institutional Training Advisory Committee has done everything a board without an executive training officer could be expected to do. It is represented on the ITB and is fully recognised as a constituent member concerned with the promotion of training in institutional catering and housekeeping services.

It has a mailing list of about 300 institutions and those courses which it has managed to establish have been successful.

supervisory; the Council has been involved for some years in supervisory training which is, focused on those members of the management team supervising at the work face.

An earlier publication "Guidelines for the Training and Development of Supervisors" was well received and widely promoted. The Working Party has been monitoring results and considering further ways and means of encouraging and co-ordinating implementation of its recommendations. The basic programme is now available in most centres in New Zealand and specialised programmes are available in many centres and through a number of industry training boards.

Small Business; the Small Business Working Party made recommendations to the Management Advisory Committee in January 1979. Since then overall developments have been slow. The rate of impetus has been a reflection of the availability of resources necessary to carry out a planned programme of work. During 1980 the Council has made every effort to recognise the plight of the small business sector in New Zealand. In particular the Council has approved proposals which have:

* established a growing liaison between the VTC and the Small Business Agency;

* made provision for the drawing up of terms of reference for a joint contract assignment:

  (i) to advise and guide field staff, ITBs, providers of formal training, small businesses and other interested groups of the types and sources of small business training material/aids available.

  (ii) provide a guide as to how programmes of education might be established and whether learning material or detailed course curriculum is to be decided.

The successful tender came from the Business Development Centre, Otago University. The study began in June 1980, completion date being December 1980.

Management Education and Training

The Vocational Training Council is making every effort to improve the experience of managers at all levels. Specifically, the Council has seen management and supervisory education in training, the training of trainers, and the assisting of managers of small business as being specific area requiring a broader spectrum approach than can be provided through individual Industry Training Boards.

For this purpose the Council has established a Management Advisory Committee to co-ordinate:

middle and upper management training,
supervisory training,
the management of the small business,
training of trainers,
organised training.

A Management Training Development Unit has been recommended. Approaches have been made to the Government to approve the proposal and attention has been drawn to the need to improve managerial effectiveness. This unit would further research the needs identified by the Management Advisory Committee and its Working Parties. This would be done by direct liaison with industry, through industry training boards as appropriate, and provider organisations, and by commissioning specific research.

It is intended that the Unit would work with specialist trainers in industry, including industry training board staff and with provider organisations to assist the development of new or existing on-job and off-job programmes to meet identified needs and provide maximum impact on managerial performance. Furthermore, it would negotiate with appropriate provider organisations to run proven programmes where demands for these are known to exist, monitor and evaluate programmes and on-going performance, and initiate remedial action.

Meanwhile, momentum has been maintained in a number of on-going programmes and various exercises have been initiated as follows:

. Training of Trainers : This Working Party has identified the following as areas of major concern :

- . line manager coaching
- . training training officers
- . publication of "Fact Sheets" for trainers
- . training instructors

There is in practice much in common between the needs of staff who have specialised responsibilities for training, and the many other staff such as line managers who have or should have a training interest and responsibility built into their jobs. A contract has been let for the development of a programme for improving the coaching skills of line managers.

The Working Party also considers the training function to be complex in that training officers perform roles and tasks at various levels according to the demands of their organisations and their own expertise. The following categories broadly cover the field:

- . Training Needs Analyst and Programme Designer
- . Consultant/Facilitator
- . Instructor/Tutor
- . Manager/Administrator

Basic facts in a ready form are always a problem to trainers and as a result a series of "Fact Sheets" have been commissioned and will shortly be published. Consideration is at present being given to developing programmes to improve the skills of training officers and instructors.

The availability of resources in VTC and of suitable people in New Zealand has restricted developments in this Working Party's areas of concern.

. Organised Training : The Council's two training guidelines published in 1979 emphasised that work performance and personal development can be improved through effective organised training.

The first booklet, "Guidelines for Organised Training", is a practical guideline to help managers and trainers achieve their objectives by promoting the establishment of effective organised training at all levels.

The second - "Making the Smaller Business Profitable" - gives a practical guideline to show the smaller firm's owner/manager how training may be organised in the firm to help solve problems and achieve aims, and what education and training assistance is available for the smaller firm.

The guidelines are introductory and basic. Where there is a demand for a more detailed treatment of some aspect of the training cycle - e.g. identifying training needs, evaluating the effectiveness of training, or management development - supporting guidelines will be prepared.

Both publications have been produced without copyright restrictions and individual organisations are able to adapt the content to suit their own ends. However, the guidelines will not necessarily need this modification, as they are generally applicable to all sectors of industry and commerce. There has been a steady demand for them.

Microelectronics and New Technologies

Following a report by the Director on overseas developments and further investigation in New Zealand the VTC recently set up an advisory committee with a representative membership and a terms of reference consistent with the broad needs identified to date:

The VTC accepted the concept of accelerated and therefore constant change, and that the impact of these changes is becoming increasingly unpredictable. Thus the challenge to training during a period which may witness structural industrial and social changes is formidable.

Polynesian Advisory Committee

Research projects which have been funded by VTC and undertaken by external agencies and are just being printed all form the basis for future expansion of the committee's activities. While the group is described as an advisory body it really accomplished a great deal in an activist sense while operating under delegated authority from the Council.

Publication of the well received "Understanding Booklet" has provided the committee with not only a means of correcting misconceptions and possible injustices but also facilitated two way communication between differing groups. Upwards of 3000 of these publications have been made available nationally.

Contact over a wide ranging area has resulted in requests from over 500 companies to assist in the development of programmes which not only identify problem areas but also implement policies to overcome them. This is done with due recognition of the special needs of Polynesians in the workforce.

Women's Committee

The Committee was set up by Council to cater for the special needs of women. They have been very well aware of the work of the committee and responded to it. Penetration in the sense of reaching women to discuss their training needs has been limited solely by resources to meet the demand. Achievements have included published guidelines for employers, special management courses for women, radio technician courses for females, video tape careers presentation, supervisory course module and discussion tape on careers and training. Their effectiveness is difficult to judge because there is no agreed criterion for "success" in these matters. The Committee is part of a well established network for dealing with women's issues, serving their aspirations and developing their potential.

APPENDIX 4

VTC STAFFING DISTRIBUTION

Head Office

1	Director	
2	Assistant Directors - both vacant but two temporary advisers employed	
1	Secretary	
1	Assistant Secretary	
7	Advisory Officers - including	1 - Polynesian (Vacant) 1 - Women
7	General Administration	

Regional Officers

Auckland - 2 Liaison Officers
1 Adviser - Polynesian

Palmerston North - 1 Liaison Officer

Christchurch - 1 Liaison Officer

Dunedin - 1 Liaison Officer

APPENDIX 5

LIAISON OFFICERS - AUCKLAND REGION

1. Number - 2 Officers
2. Region - Northland, Greater Auckland area, Waikato, Rotorua, Bay of Plenty, Thames
3. Apart from the concentration of industry and commerce in this region, there are six technical institutes and two Universities. There is considerable liaison with these institutions.
4. The two officers are housed in the same premises as a number of executive training officers, and consequently in addition to their normal range of liaison duties they act in an advisory capacity on an "as required" basis to these officers.
5. The VTC also provides clerical and typing services on a fee paying basis for the ETOs and there is a tendency for the Senior Liaison Officer to become over-involved in a supervisory capacity in this area.
6. The following is a summary of activities of the two officers for June 1980, and may be taken as a fairly typical work load:

+ Group Training Schemes and Incentives,
+ Induction of new ETOs,
+ Liaison with all Tertiary Education establishments,
+ Regional Development Grant projects - and report back to Trade and Industry,
+ Department of Labour YPT programme - co-ordination between ITBs and Training Committee,
+ Representation of VTC on ITBs - Electronics, Waterfront, Plumbing and Gas - also deputy member to these boards,
+ Promotion of VTC Joint Supervisor Courses,
+ Promotion of Management Nos 2 and 3 series Organised Training Guideline Booklets - regional and 'company' level promotion,
+ Liaison with industry at 'company' level - advising on training methods e.g. Ceramics, Mogalair, Reid Rubber, Feltex, Winstones, Williamson Jeffrey, Aerosol, White Cliff Sawmills, Screencrafts, Moore Paragon, Nathans, Nestles - companies who do not fit neatly into a board structure.

APPENDIX 6

LIAISON OFFICER - OTAGO

THE OTAGO TRAINING CO-ORDINATING GROUP

1. Historical development of the Group

2. Present Function and what has been achieved

1. Historical Development of the Group

1.1 The Otago Training Co-ordinating Group was established in September, 1974 on the initiative of the VTC Liaison Officer. Represented were Otago University, Industrial Training Service, Otago Polytechnic, Vocational Guidance Service, District Commissioner of Works, District Superintendent of Trade and Industry and the VTC.

1.2 The terms of reference were -

. To provide a forum to recognise the role and responsibility of each agency, and to ensure the services and facilities of each are mutually known.

. To discuss current and projected regional activities to ensure that government assisted resources were being used to best advantage, and the appropriate cross referrals are made.

. To consider areas of training needs and potential training needs, in line with national and regional needs - where they may conflict with industry and firms' aims, to agree on the most effective action possible with unity of effort.

. Where training needs were not being met, to recommend to those concerned suggested courses of action.

. To respond to requests for training assistance in the manner most appropriate to the need.

1.3 Results from the Group's work include management training activities, pre-retirement courses, conspectus of regional training, a directory of training services in the region, suggested improvement of vocational guidance, and the encouragement of a "subsidiary" Southland group. Emphasis has been on improved productivity in the region, increased organisational efficiency and encouraging personal development, export promotion and import substitution, the evaluation of training on a cost/benefit basis, and the promotion of training as a regular line management responsibility.

1.4 An extract from a letter from the Group Chairman to the Chairman of the Vocational Training Council, General Pearce, 28.6.77:

"Co-operation between the institutions providing training and co-ordination of training programmes is insufficient reason for the existence of the group. The group must also be in a position to assess the training needs of the region, to liaise with the various industry training boards, and in particular to convince the various industries in the region of the need for training."

1.5 Recommendations arising from Meeting of the Group, 28 July 1978 were:

. Definition of training needs required.
. Rationalising training requirements of region required.
. Provision of training - who does it, where should it be held, what type of training needed?
. Evaluation of training provided required.
. Questions need to be asked about the kind of people who need training,

+ about their educational competence;
+ about their regular environment;
+ about fitting a learning experience into a comfortable environment for a particular group

. Suggest OTCG delegates a smaller group to investigate "training needs". This group should have power to co-opt outside the Group.
. Questions should be directed at educators but in addition the consumers could be given an effective hearing.
. Greatest need was to motivate people to train.
. "The problem of the transition from school to workforce" were gaining momentum and need more recognition.
. Group needed to be expanded to include representatives from industry.
. Projects have to be seen as worthwhile.
. Identification of "training needs" of the area is important and how to do something about it.
. Responsibility for evaluating training in region has to be delegated.
. There was a lack of resources in some areas of training - how to combat this and still provide effective training.
. Group lacked "teeth" - suggested solutions?
. Group should have an overview of training in Otago/Southland.
. Suggested a Programme Training Board with all the courses listed which a person could be referred to if in the training field.
. Liaising with the various ITBs - greater efforts required here.
. The Training Co-ordinating Group would still exist but meet only once a year.
. VTC Liaison Officer to convene meeting which could meet on the 29 September in the SBA Office, Great King Street, Dunedin.

Suggested representation:
Department of Trade and Industries and Productivity Centre,
Otago Polytechnic
NZIM,
University - Management and Extension Departments,
Labour Department, TWI Manager,
Small Business Agency.

2. Present Function and what has been achieved

2.1 In September 1978, a smaller version of the main co-ordination group met. This was designated the "programme committee". The Small Business Agency undertook to give support to this Committee by secretarial services and its office space for meetings. The group has been active and has achieved the following:

- Formation of a small active group of trainers,
- Provision of integrated training programmes,
- Provision of a public forum on the training needs in Otago,
- A weekend seminar on the new technology,
- A brochure on supervisory training,
- A management training supplement,
- Management Workshops in Provincial centres.

2.2 The Group has definitely established itself as the voice for training and development in Otago.

2.3 A recent enquiry carried out by the VTC indicated that:

- Continued existence is only because of the goodwill of organisations represented and the motivation of individuals in the group.
- The co-ordinating role of the VTC as a non-aligned interest group has been essential.
- The decision point has now been reached where because of economic constraints, the effect on the individual

organisations is being felt.

- Experience has shown that, necessarily, individual organisations have to duplicate some of the administrative inputs.
- Because of absence of executive training officers in the region, a co-ordinated "network" needs to be established.
- The Otago Training Co-ordinating Group under its umbrella has most of the government training agencies with the exception of the State Services Commission. (Government department's training appear still centralised in approach although there is a decreasing amount of this because of high travel costs.)
- The provincial centres need the service and expertise of the Otago Training Co-ordinating Group's resources.
- There is still a great consumer resistance to training in the industrial community and to overcome this a more sophisticated marketing/sales approach is required.
- People, hard-wear and soft-wear resources need to be upgraded.
- There is a greater need for "consumer" involvement.
- To achieve the most from the government dollar, productivity providers need assistant. This is seen as being best provided by -

a. Government funding of a common function e.g. "network list". This would need to be later computerised and would cost in the region of $2,000.

b. If government funding of providers accountability is essential so the group would need to be formalised and have a constitution which has already been discussed by the "programme committee".

c. Activity/finance accountability limited to regional manpower and development policies.

APPENDIX 7, PART B

SOME ACTIVITIES

TRAINING BOARDS AND SIMILAR BODIES

The following are brief summaries of the major activities of each training board and similar bodies recognised by the Council as the "focal point" for training activities within the particular industrial or commercial group.

Agriculture

The Agricultural Training Council (ATC) experienced early problems partly because of the nature of the basic primary industries, the 70,000 (approx) units throughout the country, and the emerging of new and important horticultural industries. The ATC now caters for all these industries and the equine industry.

The Council also administers the regional training programmes at the request of the Government and funded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. This involves the employment and control of 15 agricultural training officers, and servicing 15 regional training committees.

The organisation is excellent and considerable care is exercised in identifying precisely, training needs. This approach has been commended by the NZ Planning Council. Close liaison is maintained with Massey University, Lincoln College, the technical institutes, in particular, the Technical Correspondence Institute, and the NZ Trades Certification Board.

Training at this stage is concentrated on technical topics, and to a lesser degree, man management. The development of the regional structure ensures that local needs are met, although care must be exercised to ensure co-ordination with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Apparel

The Apparel ITB has had a major impact on operator training in the

industry. One of its early activities was to develop a training manual for sewing machinists and then train trainers in the use of the manual. Eighty-five percent of the people working in the apparel industry are operators and it is estimated that 80 percent of those operators have been exposed to training as a result of the board's actions. In the last five years 40,000 to 45,000 operators have been trained through schemes set up under the board's auspices.

In addition, approximately 160 trainees have been trained, about 50 percent of whom are still working in the industry. Supervisory training programmes were set up four years ago and to date approximately 50 percent of the industry's supervisors have been trained under these schemes. The board is moving into management training and its group training schemes are now being replaced by in-company systematic operator training schemes. The board has set up an apprenticeship scheme for needle trade mechanics and is currently revising the clothing trade apprenticeship.

Aviation and Travel

This Board was formed on 1 April 1980 by merging the former Travel Industry Training Council of the Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board with the Aviation Industry Training Board.

In the Aviation sector the Board has been most successful in introducing new training for the general aviation (or light aircraft) sector. This training has been largely of a specialised technical nature and extensive use is made of the specialised facilities and tutors in the RNZAF, Air New Zealand and other organisations such as Aerospace and James Aviation.

The Travel sector has concentrated on training junior and middle management staff and has been deeply involved in the re-designing of the travel option of the New Zealand Certificate in Commerce.

Each year futher programmes have been added to those offered and

existing ones reviewed. Because of the small business and high technology nature of most of the Aviation and Travel industry on-job training has been difficult to develop.

Bakers

This is a relatively new Group Scheme being in its second year.

In that time the Group has promoted on-job operative training using a training card system, safety training, modifications to apprentice training and management training in a coaching type situation.

Building

The major achievement of this Board has been the pioneering of what has become known as Extended Trade Training for Apprentices.

A study by the New Zealand Council for Educational Research established that at the completion of their first year, carpentry and joinery apprentices under this scheme were equivalent in skill and knowledge to those at one year and ten months under the traditional scheme. The equivalent improvement in fitting and turning was to the level of an apprentice who had completed two years.

The Board is also concerned with basic skill training (e.g. steel fabrication, crane operations and scaffolding), technician training, small business management training, professional training, specialist training (e.g. contract documents, quantity surveying) and related trades (e.g. Bricklayers, Blocklayers and Plasterers).

Contracting

The Contracting Industry Training Council has taken steps to promote organised on-job training within the contracting industry, especially at in-company level.

A task analysis of a crane driver/operator has recently been completed and it is hoped that the Power Crane Association Council

will accept this analysis and therefore develop it into a systemised training programme for in-company use throughout the country.

Other tasks analyses on various plant and machinery operations are completed or in progress and these will be put to use in similar training programmes for the civil engineering side of the industry. This board also caters for Agricultural contractors and chemical applicators.

Dairy

Acceptance in the dairy manufacturing industry of the role of the Dairy Industry Training Council (DITC) has been widespread. Support has been encouraging for on and off job courses, the development of teaching facilities at tertiary institutions and the provision of certificates at operator level.

Furthermore this is the first board to introduce training for Directors of Companies.

Career pathways based on Journal 5 on job training have become apparant on an industry basis, with a consequent increase in the demand for management training.

Tanker driver training has been so successful that more and more companies are introducing these structured courses. There has been a demonstrable reduction in running and maintenance costs.

Recently, specialist training was introduced at short notice to aim at the eradication of samonella contamination. This was successful and success was due partly to the organiser training scheme in the industry

Distribution

In an industry with some 18,000 employees and a Board with a staff of three ETO's it is very difficult to measure actual success.

However the Board has concentrated on the larger companies and assisted them in the development of in-company schemes. In addition the Board has promoted basic training in the Retail and Storekeeping and Warehousing areas.

In under 5 years 1383 persons have qualified in the former area and in under two years more than 750 in the latter area.

For small businesses the Board has promoted on-job-trainers schemes and taken specialist courses to Shopping Centres and other concentrations of retail activity. The Board has also produced a wide range of training guides, manuals, and other aids.

Electrical

The majority of this Board's work has concentrated on organising off-job training courses and identifying training needs in various sectors of the industry. The off-job training courses have included: supervision, foreman, teaching methods, training trainers, electronics refresher and storekeeping.

The training needs studies have included : apprenticeships, linemen, manufacturing sector, and Supply Authorities. In addition the Board has developed basic material for surveying industry sectors, been involved in the development of in-house training schemes, and syllabus and apprenticeship order revision.

The Board has had problems in its relationships with the Electrical Supply Authorities Association.

Electronics

The major area of activity of this Board have related to the revision of the Apprenticeship Order to incorporate Electronics Tradesmen and the consequent new syallabus and provisions for Registration.

In addition the Board has assisted other industries requiring retraining as a result of "new technology" (e.g. Printing, Textiles and Camera).

Assistance has also been given to specialised groups:

(a) Training of Security and Fire Alarm Servicemen

(b) Special Apprenticeship Training Scheme for Women in Radio and Television Servicing
(c) Training Theatre Projectionists

The Board has had problems in raising the industry portion of its finances.

Embalmers and Funeral Directors

This Group Scheme was one of the earliest,being established in 1975.

At all times the group has relied mainly on the voluntary efforts of individuals (usually from the Embalmers Association).

As the industry is small problems arise in releasing staff in small centres and because of the limited range of work occuring in a normal training period much training for these people must be undertaken in a large centre.

Training has concentrated on refresher and upgrading training for existing staff and the development with CIT of new entrant courses.

In the future new development training (e.g. new procedures, chemicals) and specialist training (e.g. disaster work, counselling, management) will be added.

The total cost to Government is about $3,000 a year.

Employers

This is a relatively new Board which concentrates on industrial relations training.

Engineering

This board is involved in the identification of training needs and the development of on-and off-job programmes to meet these needs for all levels and the many sectors of the industry. Operator, trade, supervisory, technician and graduate training are all included in these activities.
One of the board's officers is employed full time servicing the Plastics industry and another has spent a considerable amount of his time preparing a training manual for the foundry sector.

The impact of new technology is a major factor in the Board's programmes.

Resources are a problem for this board which is also expected to service the engineering component of other industries. The Board is therefore one of the most important of all the ITB's.

Fire Service

During 1974 and 1975 the Fire Service was undergoing substantial changes.

The Fire Service Council explored with the VTC the establishment of a Fire Service Training Board along the lines of other industry training boards established under the VTC Act. Whilst this was not to eventuate, a VTC representative was added to the Training Advisory Committee from September 1975.

With a unified service, career structures were to be important so the Fire Service Council in mid 1975 requested the VTC to prepare a draft outline of a skills analysis to lead to a training needs

survey for the New Zealand Fire Service. This was completed in late 1975.

From 1 April 1976 a single Service was introduced.

As a result of continuing work with VTC the Service now has a unified career structure matched by a training and qualification pattern leading from Probationary Fireman to a New Zealand Certificate in Fire Technology for those at higher levels. All the courses and qualifications are also available to volunteer firemen.

Fishing

The Fishing Industry Training Council (FITC) after a somewhat hesitant start, is now fully operative in the catching and processing section of the industry. It works closely with the Fishing Industry Training Board and is acknowledged by the industry as its authoritative educational and training voice.

Factors outside the control of the FITC have combined to create difficulties in implementing organiser training programmes but considerable momentum has been achieved.

In the catching area, courses are held on site on a wide range of topics, and particular attention is paid to the training need generated by new technology. A disappointment has been the failure to develop career patterns based on a cadetship scheme.

There has been an encouraging response from the processing sector and the quality control courses have been in keen demand.

This board has formulated plans for the next three years to meet clearly identified needs and is appointing a second executive training officer.

Footwear

This Board has concentrated on training on-job trainers for all companies. The scheme used is the SATRA (U.K.) programme. The Board has also undertaken extensive training of supervisors both in their general supervisory and staff training roles.

Furniture

There are just over 500 companies in this industry most of which have been visited at least once by one of the two group training officers. Without an executive training officer, this board's activities have been rather hampered. However, the group training officers have been very active organising technical seminars, factory visits and foremen's meetings which have had a fairly wide coverage of the industry in the Auckland and Canterbury districts. An ETO is now being appointed for this board.

Hotel and Catering

This board has the problem of a very diffuse industry which ranges from the hotel chains to the corner hamburger bar. Therefore an equitable funding scheme is very difficult.

The major achievement has been the introduction of a structured chef traineeship which replaced a scheme organised and administered by the union. This national scheme is now administered by the board.

The board is also very deeply involved in the development of on-job training systems and training on-job trainers.

Suitable short and longer courses have been developed in conjunction with technical institutes for various levels of staff. The board has also been involved in the development of appropriate TCB and AAVA qualifications.

Journalism

This board has concentrated its activities into three main areas: on-job training of staff; specialist off-job courses and seminars; and liaison with the three full time journalism courses - Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington.

The first activity of the board was to develop a "kitset" of lessons for use in on-job training. It is now an award provision that each office must have a tutor and that all junior staff must receive training during working hours. These tutors attend an annual refresher seminar.

Local Government

The Local Government Training Board has a regional structure based on eight group training schemes. Because training incentives are to be phased out the board and the VTC are currently examining ways in which a regional structure might be continued.

An increase in the general awareness of the need for continued training has meant that many requests are now received by training officers and group training schemes for the provision of both "on the job" and relevant formal training courses in all aspects of local body work.

Although figures are not yet available, reports from Christchurch indicate that there is a marked reduction in accidents since the introduction of road safety training for Council employees engaged in maintenance which involves the re-direction of traffic. Reports from Dunedin indicate that their training programmes have produced similar results.

The Auckland Regional Authority is at present undertaking a cost/benefit study covering the effects of bus-driver training. This report should be available shortly. Local Government management personnel, besides being the subject of an important report on training, are now constantly contacting their training officers and the Local Government Training Board to seek advice. This is particularly apparent in the area of course evaluation where the number of requests received indicates a growing perception by management of not only the need for training but the necessity of evaluation.

A management training survey carried out by Dr R J Moore of Otago University, using the Dunedin City Council as model, has been so successful that a third edition is being printed. Requests for the report have been received from as far away as Europe. Another publication, the "Foremans Guide", has sold over 1500 copies.

Problems of staff integration were overcome for the new Rotorua District Council after a training seminar was organised. Effects of this training exercise have been described as 'dramatic' by independent observers.

Qualification, career structures and pathways have been discussed within local Government for over 60 years. The AAVA has agreed to institute a New Zealand Certificate in local Government administration. Support was based on a survey carried out by the board.

Success stories in the field of grader driver training, clerical and technical areas plus all other local Government functions are too numerous to note here, but suffice to say that awareness of the board's training activities have led to increased efficiency and productivity.

Logging and Forestry

The Logging and Forest Industry Training Board has been gazetted for some 8 months. It has concentrated its efforts on extending the

voluntary certification of loggers to areas outside the Bay of Plenty. This programme was developed under a group training scheme and provides four skill levels.

The certificate and its accompanying standards of skill and experience emphasise effective performance, personal developmen and safe working methods. Well over 400 men from the four participating companies have been trained.

There has been the obvious enthusiasm, engendered by the availability of the certificate, shown by loggers who can now obtain evidence of their skills and experience. However, another valuable result is the reduction of accidents in a traditionally dangerous occupation.

The largest employer in the group, with 570 company personnel and contractors engaged in logging, reports the following:

"In an analysis of lost time accidents over the past 18 months it was found that of its 420 loggers who do not hold Loggers' Certificates, 217 or 51% have sustained lost time accidents. Of those 147 loggers who do hold a certificate, only 7 or 5% have suffered a lost time accident."

Meat

This board has concentrated on establishing organised training on an in-company basis as a priority. There are now 28 senior training managers with over 400 full and part-time trainers working on on-job and other in-company training. The board has also developed an extensive range of off-job specialist skills programmes and training of supervisors and middle management.

After a hesitant start there is now a good employer/union relationship on training matters.

Training incentives have played a large part in encouraging training in this industry.

Motor Trade

This board has a long history of successful training in its industry. Programmes are now promoted for all areas of the retail motor trade including trades, management, technician, salesmen, and garage attendants.

Training manuals which set out a systematic programme of on-and off-job training for each occupation have been a feature of the board's activities over the years.

This board is probably one of the best ITBs and is strongly supported by the industry.

Pharmacy

This Group Scheme commenced on 1 April 1977.

Prior to that the Pharmaceutical Society had conducted some refresher training using volunteers as organisers and tutors.

With the appointment of a group trainer training needs were surveyed and the following were identified as priority areas:

(i) training recent graduates and their supervisor/trainers

(ii) the development of on-job training manuals; and

(iii) the development of a re-vamped national refresher training programme.

In 1979 88% of all eligible recent graduates attended a weekend training course as did 65% of the supervisor/trainers. Some of the on-job training manuals have been developed and pilot exercises are currently under way on refresher training.

The total cost to the Government is about $7,000 a year.

Plumbing, Gas and Drainlaying

The development of plastics and the advent of natural gas has

resulted in dramatic changes in this industry.

The Board has a vritually one hundred percent coverage of its industry, which is assisted by the use of a mobile training unit.

Syllabus and training and retraining requirements have kept the board's ETOs fully occupied.

Pulp and Paper

The Pulp and Paper Industry Training Board has yet to hold its inaugural meeting and cannot begin its work until an ETO is appointed early in 1981.

The board has the full support of the employer and employee bodies.

Road Transport

The RTITB is supported by the New Zealand Road Transport Association which has a membership of about 4500 operators which would represent about one third of the truck fleet. The board reported recently on its disappointment in not being able to cover all regions and all needs. An awareness of the need for training is not yet apparent in more than half of the licensed industry and the provision of training, much of which is needed at the driver level, is a task with which the board cannot cope adequately because of a lack of resources.

Successes have included the establishment of a group training scheme for drivers, specific seminars such as those on vehicle selection, first line supervisor courses, the introduction of a road transport option to the New Zealand Certificate of Engineering, and management training for the small business operator.

Shipping

This board has been working in a most difficult industry. Training other than that required for statutory purposes (e.g. deck and engineering officers, and able seamen) was not well supported.

The board, largely through the work of its first Chairman and its ETO, has introduced upgrading and refresher training in all areas of the sea-going industry. These programmes are strongly supported by all employer and employee groups.

Stock and Station Agents

This board's work after a few initial difficulties has gained considerable momentum over the past three years. It is accepted as an integral component of the industry. This is particularly noteworthy in an industry where competition is the life-blood of the industry, and there is a "mix" of limited liability companies and co-operatives. There is a marked degree of co-operation in the neutral area of training and its development.

The implementation of the stock and station course and certificate has assisted in providing a career structure. About 500 enrol each year for the course. The board has now moved to implement an advanced course because of an identified need for higher level education and training as part of this career structure.

Systematic "on-the-job" training has now been introduced in most companies and all organisations now have an introduction course for new employees. The majority of companies have training managers and in-office trainers.

Tanning

The New Zealand tanning industry does not benefit by the provision of any formal courses or qualifications for its staff through the tertiary education system, at a technical level.

The TITB, in recognition of this fact, has structured its responsibilities to alleviate this deficiency and has developed a series of correspondence courses and residential block courses which provide for a level of competence to meet the standards of the London City and Guilds Examinations.

These courses have been successful to the extent that last year's results achieved an 80% pass rate for a recognised international qualification.

Meanwhile discussions are taking place with the AAVA to gain recognition for the TITB correspondence course as an acceptable AAVA prescription.

Textile

Before the Textile ITB was set up, the textile industry had traditionally relied on the importation of skilled people from the United Kingdom. The training programmes instituted by this board have meant that, except at very advanced levels, the industry can now recruit and train workers within New Zealand.

It is estimated that approximately 20 percent of those working in the industry would have been exposed to training as a result of the board's actions. This relatively low percentage is caused by the decline in the industry which has meant that few new people have been recruited and trained staff have been retained where redundancies have occurred.

Trade Union

This board encourages training within the trade union movement for full and part-time trade union officials. This training is in their basic role as an official and in specialised aspects of industrial relations.

Using training incentives the board has been most successful in encouraging the larger union groups to appoint their own training officers. It has also maintained close liaison with the Australian Clyde Cameron Trade Union College.

The board has had the advantage of specialised advice, in its early stages, from an American trade union expert who visited New Zealand

for some two years, and recently from a former Secretary of Labour who has prepared a plan for the further development of its activities.

Like the Employers Board this board is working in an area unique for a training board but is firmly established and accepted by all parties.

Waterfront

The Waterfront Training Organisation can show clearly that the training given has meant a substantial reduction in accidents and, whilst it is difficult to document, there is strong evidence that training has contributed to improved industrial relations. In a large part the development of a multi-skill workforce has contributed to these benefits.

With changing technology (e.g. containers and roll-on roll-off ships) there are continuing demands for new training activities.

APPENDIX 7A

INDUSTRIAL TRAINING BOARD STATISTICS

NAME OF BOARD	AREAS COVERED	APPROX. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES COVERED	SIZE OF BOARD	NUMBER OF ETOS	OTHER STAFF	INCOME 1979-80 GOVT. $	INDUSTRY $	OTHER $	TOTAL $
AGRICULTURE	Sheep, Dairy, Mixed Arable, Horticultural, Equine, some farm servicing	129,000	13	4	+15 Agricultural Training Officers paid by Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries + 3 other staff	421,781	9,439	6,400	437,620
APPAREL	Manufacture of sewn goods	19,500	12	4	-	79,800	13,630	4,857	98,287
AVIATION AND TRAVEL	Airline, General Aviation, Manufacture, Engineering, Flying Schools, Travel Agents, Tour Operators	15,000	10	3½	1½	Aviation ITB 28,818	14,925	16,038	59,781
BUILDING	Building, Joinery, Masonry, Solid Plaster	54,000 (Building and Contracting combined)	12	2	-	45,296	6,050	345	51,691
CONTRACTING	Civil Engineering, Agricultural and Chemical, Applicator Contracting, Power Cranes	—	12	3	-	55,089	7,121	71,00	62,281
DAIRY	Manufacturing	8,500	11	2	1	36,493	39,584	-	76,077
DISTRIBUTION	Wholesaling, Retailing	219,000	9	3	-	53,900	5,398	217	59,515
ELECTRICAL	Power Boards, MED, Manufacturing, Contracting, Servicing	36,000	16	1	½	24,700	2,000	33,277	59,977
ELECTRONICS	Design, Manufacturing, Servicing and Application of Electronic Technology	15,000	9	1	1	26,799	3,020	-	29,819

NAME OF BOARD	AREAS COVERED	APPROX. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES COVERED	SIZE OF BOARD	NUMBER OF ETOS	OTHER STAFF	INCOME 1979-80 GOVT. $	INDUSTRY $	OTHER $	TOTAL $
ENGINEERING	Basic Metals, Foundries, Manufacturing, Maintenance, Plastics, Refrigeration, Electro-Mechanical, Consumer Durables	33,000	17	8	1	145,392	56,295	3,077	204,764
FISHING	Catching, Processing, Marketing	5,000	10	2	-	23,000	15,188	-	38,188
FOOTWEAR	Manufacture	6,000	10	1	-	27,700	3,905	8,246	39,851
FURNITURE	Manufacture	6,200	11	-	2 GTOs (1)	14,125	2,062	-	16,187
HOTEL AND CATERING	Hotels, Restaurants, Taverns, Institutions, Motels, Chartered Clubs, Catering (including Industrial Catering)	50,000	16	4	2	73,100	35,364	267	108,731
JOURNALISTS	Reporters, Editorial Staff, Photographers	2,000	10	1	-	22,160	4,133	63	26,356
LOCAL GOVERNMENT	Local Government	34,000	18	3½	-	23,700	21,000	10,424	55,124
LOGGING AND FOREST	Logging and Forest Management	9,700	11	1	-	25,410	8,000	-	33,410
MEAT	Meat Processing and By-Products	4,200	9	2	-	46,576	18,777	-	65,353
MOTOR TRADE	Retail Motor Trade and Assembly	74,000	14	4	1	74,225	19,113	7,984	101,322
PLUMBING, GAS AND DRAINLAYING	All sections of these industries	7,300	6	2	-	44,820	20,449	8,233	73,502
ROAD TRANSPORT	All Staff in Licensed and Ancillary Operations, Freight and Passenger Services, Taxi Operations	100,000	9	2	-	39,400	6,000	11,621	57,021

NAME OF BOARD	AREAS COVERED	APPROX. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES COVERED	SIZE OF BOARD	NUMBER OF ETOS	OTHER STAFF	INCOME 1979-80 GOVT. $	INDUSTRY $	OTHER $	TOTAL $
SHIPPING	Sea-Going and Shore Staff of Shipping Companies	5,000	5	1	1	19,700	22,100	-	41,800
STOCK AND STATION AGENTS	Stock and Station Staff, Servicing, Farming	16,000	11	1	-	19,700	3,996	4,543	28,239
TANNING	Tanning of Hides and Skins	2,000	10	1	-	19,700	6,991	500	27,191
TEXTILES	Carpets, Cordage, Dyeing, Knitting, Man-made Fibres, Narrow Fabrics Texturising, Textile and Woollen Mills, Wool Scouring	3,800	14	3	-	59,100	11,700	12,316	83,116
TRADE UNION	All Unions affiliated to FOL. Some other employee groups	20,000	12	2	1	23,700	3,000 (FOL)	89,225	115,925
WATERFRONT	Waterfront Staff including some Harbour Board employees	4,000	15	2	12	41,200 1978/79	259,599 1978/79	-	300,799 1978/79
PAPER AND PULP	Paper and Pulp Industry	Not Determined. Board newly established.	9 est.	1	1	22,410	12,590	-	35,000
EMPLOYERS		-	11	1	-	26,459	14,908	-	41,367
TOTALS	(1) Group Training Officers	878,200		66	43	1,564,253	646,337	217,704	2,428,294

Appendix 8


MINISTERS OF EDUCATION AND LABOUR
1. N.Z. Employers Federation
2. N.Z. Manufacturers Federation
3. Department of Education
4. Technical Institutes
5. Curriculum (Primary and Secondary)
6. S.S.C.C.
7. Other Government Departments
8. University Grants Committee
9. Universities
10. Accident Compensation Commission
11. SCORITE
12. Development Finance Corporation
13. Small Business Agency
14. Administrative Staff College
VOCATIONAL TRAINING COUNCIL
15. N.Z. Federation of Labour
16. Combined State Unions
17. Department of Labour
18. Apprenticeship Section
19. Industrial Training Service
20. Employment and Vocational Guidance Service
21. Technical Institutes Association
22. A.A.V.A.
23. T.C.B.
24. Apprenticeship Committees
25. Technician Training Councils
26. N.C.A.E.
27. A.T.T.I.
28. N.Z.I.M.
29. A.T.D.
30.
VTC Advisory Committees
ITBs or Equivalent
Other Bodies with VTC Membership e.g. NACWE, Fork Lift
VOCATIONAL TRAINING COUNCIL
30. Industry Employer Groups
31. Department of Education
32. Technical Institutes
33. A.A.V.A.
34. T.C.B.
35. Universities
36. Specialist Industry Groups
A TYPICAL INDUSTRY TRAINING BOARD
37. Industry Unions
38. Department of Labour
39. Apprenticeship Section
40. Employment and Vocational Guidance Service
41. Apprenticeship Committees
42. Technician Training Councils
43. Relevant Government Departments
BOARD COMMITTEES
44.
OTHER ITBs

APPENDIX 8

NOTES TO DIAGRAMS

A. Vocational Training Council

NOTE: The Chairman's membership of NZCER is not shown as this is personal to him. Relationships with NZCER are very good. A number of joint projects have been undertaken.

(1) NZ Employers Federation. Represented on Council. Relationships very good.

(2) NZ Manufacturers Federation. Represented on Council. Relationships very good.

(3) Department of Education. Represented on Council. Regular personnel changes in key areas have caused problems. Relationships otherwise are good.

(4) Technical Institutes. Direct contacts of staff with institutes range from poor to very good.

(5) Curriculum Unit. One member of the Secretariat is regularly involved and others from time to time. Relationships very good.

(6) State Services Co-ordinating Committee. Observer. Representation on Council. Relationships very good at present but depend on representatives on Council and Committees.

(7) Other Government departments. Relationships on an "as required" basis but relevant Departments have direct representation on fourteen boards (see 43).

(8) University Grants Committee. Observer. Representation on Council. Relationships very good.

(9) Universities. Relationships range from poor to very good.

(10) Accident Compensation Commission. Relationships good. Respective roles on safety training need clarification.

(11) SCORITE. VTC Chairman is member.

(12) Development Finance Corporation. Very limited contact.

(13) Small Business Agency. Relationships very good. Are involved with VTC Small Business Working Party.

(14) Administrative Staff College. Regular contacts. Relationships good.

(15) NZ Federation of Labour. Represented on Council. Relations very good.

(16) Combined State Unions. Observer. Representation on Council. Relationships very good.

(17) Department of Labour. Represented on Council. Relationships on matters such as Training Incentives, Levies, and Training Development Assistance very good. Other sections do not always understand role of VTC and inform them of activities, but do respond to specific requests.

(18) Apprenticeship Section. Relationships adequate. Staff seem to respond to requests rather than keep VTC advised in areas of common interest.

(19) Industrial Training Service. Patchy relationship. Its role appears uncertain. Co-ordination difficult to achieve. Respective roles need clarification.

(20) Employment and Vocational Guidance Service. VTC has traditionally had good relationships with Vocational Guidance Officers. Comments (17) and (18) otherwise apply.

(21) Technical Institutes Association. Represented on Council. VTC activities do not appear to reach individual tutor groups and this is no reflection on the present Council representative. Relationships patchy.

(22) Authority for Advanced Vocational Awards. Represented on Council. Relationships very good.

(23) Trades Certification Board. Chairman a personal member of Council. Contacts limited. Tend to respond to rather than advise VTC.

(24) Apprenticeship Committees. Do not, in general, appear to appreciate the respective roles of VTC and ITBs.

(25) Technician Training Councils. Only two have been formed and neither is very active.

(26) National Council for Adult Education. VTC has observer membership of the Council. Relationships are good.

(27) Association of Teachers in Technical Institutes. Relationships are good. Regular VTC/ATTI/TIA/Department of Education meetings are held.

(28) New Zealand Institute of Management and Association of Training and Development. Contact on an as-required basis. Some staff are members. Relationships good.

(29) Other bodies with VTC membership. Relationships appear to be generally satisfactory.

B. Industrial Training Boards

Note: This diagram applies in general to all ITBs and other national bodies recognised by VTC as the central body for industry training e.g. Fire Service Training Advisory Committee, Independent Group Schemes.

(30) Industry employer groups. Relationships generally very good. Problems have arisen with some executive directors of employer parent organisations.

(31) Department of Education. Relationships generally good but depends on Department's board member.

(32) Technical institutes. Relationships vary from poor to very good.

(33) Authority for Advanced Vocational Awards. Relationships have been very good in those instances where Boards have dealt with AAVA (TCA).

(34) Trades Certification Board. Relationships vary. Many ITB/TCB problems remain unresolved.

(35) Universities. Relationships, in those instances where boards have dealt with universities, range from poor to very good. Massey seems to stand out at the bottom end.

(36) Specialist industry groups. Some boards contain representation from specialist industry groups. Whether represented on the board or not relationships appear good.

(37) Industry unions. Relationships generally very good.

(38) Department of Labour. The Department is represented on a number of boards. Relationships generally good but depends on Department's board member.

(39) Apprenticeship Section. Relationships generally adequate. See (17).

(40) Employment and Vocational Guidance Service. Staff do not always seem to appreciate the role of ITBs but relationships are generally adequate to good.

(41) Apprenticeship Committees. Some relationships are first class. However, in many instances the Committees do not appear to understand the respective roles of VTC and ITBs.

(42) Technician Training Councils. Only one exists in a Board area and is not very active.

(43) Relevant Government departments. Some boards contain representation from relevant Government departments. Whether represented on the board or not relationships are generally good.

(44) Other ITBs. Relationships between boards are generally good. However, personalities can affect this. Overlap or gaps can happen as a result.

KEY

_____	Direct representation in direction of arrow
_____ _____ _____	Formal links established (e.g. observer status status, regular meetings, or other contacts)
----------	Contacts on a less formal basis - As required
X X X X X X	Contacts not standard for all boards

RESTRICTED

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BULLETIN

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

SEPTEMBER 1980

B2-80-1	INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - GENERAL (RESTRICTED)
B2-80-2	INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS 28 MAY TO 31 AUGUST 1980. (RESTRICTED)
B2-80-3	AIRCRAFT HIJACKING 1 JUNE TO 31 AUGUST 1980 (RESTRICTED)
B2-80-4	TERRORIST ACTIVITY BY THAI SEPARATIST GROUPS (RESTRICTED)

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Mr J.R. Brady, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	10
Detective Chief Inspector W.A.R. Galbraith, Police National Headquarters	11
Lt. Colonel S.A.P. Davies, RNZCT, Defence Headquarters, Ministry of Defence	12 - 23
Mr B.J. Fletcher, External Intelligence Bureau	24
Mr P.D. Jones, Department of Labour	25
Mr J.M. Flavell, Ministry of Civil Defence	26
Secretary of Transport	27
Director of Civil Aviation	28
Controller - Aviation Security	29
1 NZSAS Squadron	30
SAS Centre	31

File: Cas Card Terrorism

18/11

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

Terrorist Activity Bulletin

September 1980

B2-80-1 Terrorism : General

1. There has been no decrease in terrorist incidents during the quarter. Arab State and transnational terrorism has again occurred in the United States, France, Britain, Austria and throughout the Middle East. Political terrorism has reached a new peak in Turkey and Italian terrorists were responsible for the most serious incident ever to occur in Europe, the explosion at Bologna Railway Station on 3 August in which 83 people were killed and a large number injured. Despite the recent successes of the local counter terrorist forces West German terrorists appear to be preparing for further activity. Thai Moslem separatists have been active in Bangkok and the Southern Provinces and have issued a threat against foreign embassies, embassy personnel and international airlines.

2. Nine known hijackings of large commercial aircraft occurred during the quarter. One aircraft was seized for criminal purposes in the Persian Gulf. The majority of these hijackings occurred in North America and were carried out by Cuban refugees wishing to return to Cuba. These refugees used objects representing pistols or bombs to intimidate the aircraft crews. A new and effective technique adopted in August by Cuban hijackers was the use of easily obtained and concealed inflammable liquids such as petrol which were thrown around the cabin of the aircraft after take off, the hijackers then intimidated the crew by threatening to set the liquid alight. Since mid August armed U.S. Sky Marshals have been placed on selected commercial aircraft but the main emphasis is still being placed on airport security checks at U.S. airports.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

Terrorist Activity Bulletin

September 1980

B2-80-2 International Terrorist Incidents

The more prominent terrorist incidents for the period 28 May to 31 August 1980 are listed below:

28 May 1980 Italian Journalist Murdered in Italy

Walter TOBAGI a prominent Italian reporter who specialised in the coverage of political terrorism was shot by two members of the Red Brigade in Milan.

28 May 1980 Attack on Italian Police

Three police on duty outside a children's school in Rome were fired on by terrorists, one was killed, the others wounded.

31 May 1980 NATO Facility Bombed in Izmir Turkey

The NATO Rod and Gun Club, located in a suburb of Izmir, was extensively damaged by a fire which started as the result of an explosion. A placard indicated the Revolutionary Way was responsible.

1 June 1980 Explosion at Kuwait Oil Company Offices in London

A bomb exploded in the London offices of the Kuwait Oil Company. The front of the building was badly damaged.

3 June 1980 Yugoslav Diplomat's Home Bombed in Washington

During the early morning hours a bomb exploded at the home of the Charge d'affaires of the Yugoslavian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The bomb had been placed in a flower box at the front of the house and the blast caused extensive damage. No injuries were reported. The Croatian Freedom Fighters claimed responsibility for the bombing in a letter sent to the news media.

2...

3 June 1980 Bomb Explodes at Statue of Liberty in New York

A bomb exploded about 1925 hours in the exhibit area in the base of the Statue of Liberty. No one was injured in the explosion. In letters to the New York Times and the New York office of NBC News the "Croatian Freedom Fighters" claimed responsibility for the explosion. Written in Croatian, the letters called for the world "to notice the demands and the rights and situation of the Croatian people".

10 June 1980 Libyan Assassinations Continue

On 10 June 1980 Libyan President Qadhafi publicly directed Libyan Revolutionary Committees around the world to cease assassinating Libyan exiles except for those who had been given death sentences by the Revolutionary Court or had dealings with Egypt, Israel or the U.S. He also stated he could not guarantee the safety of those exiles who did not return to Libya. On 11 June a Libyan was wounded in Rome and another Libyan assassinated in Milan. On 13 June Musa KUSA a diplomat at the Libyan Peoples Bureau in London was expelled by the British Government for unlawful activity. On 14 June the British Embassy in Tripoli, Libya was set on fire by rioters but little damage was caused. Libyan state terrorism is expected to continue world wide.

19 June 1980 Gunmen Attack the British Embassy in Baghdad Iraq

Three gunmen shot their way into the British Embassy grounds in Baghdad. The trio threw grenades and fired automatic weapons as they rushed the Embassy but were unable to enter. Iraqi security forces then stormed the mission area and killed the terrorists. No other casualties were reported.

29 June 1980 Explosion Aboard Itavia Airlines DC9

An Itavia Airlines DC9 with 81 passengers crashed into the Tyrhenian Sea on 27 June. The pilot of the aircraft did not send a distress signal. Examination of the little wreckage that was found and the passengers bodies indicated that an explosion had occurred within the fuselage prior to the crash. The aircraft may have been carrying a member of the Italian Right Wing Terrorist Group "Armed Revolutionary Nuclei" to Sicily for terrorist activity.

1 July 1980 Terrorist Activity in Bangkok

At least 41 people were injured when three explosions occurred in different districts of Bangkok. A fourth bomb placed in a cinema was neutralised by police. Press reports stated that this terrorism was the work of a Thai Moslem separatist group usually active in the Thai/Malay border area.

3...

18 July 1980 Attack on Ex Premier Shapur Baktiar in Paris

Five gunmen lead by Aris NACCACH a Fatah Intelligence Officer burst into Shapur Baktiar's flat firing their weapons. Shapur Baktiar, the last Prime Minister of Iran under the Shah was not injured but a French landlady and policeman were killed. The gunmen who stated that were from the "Guardians of Islam" were arrested in the Latin Quarter. NACCACH stated he had been sent on the mission by the PLO who were acting on behalf of the Iranian "authorities".

20 July 1980 Murder of British Soldier in Northern Ireland

A British soldier who was off duty, was assassinated in a Londonderry bar by several men.

21 July 1980 Outbreak of Terrorism in Jamaica

On 19 July five people were killed when ten men armed with M16 rifles entered houses in Kingston and fired at the inhabitants. A nearby police station was then fired on. The Jamaican National Security Council announced the imposition of curfews in Kingston, the mobilisation of military reserves and the establishment of joint police/military headquarters in an effort to deal with this organised terrorism.

17-23 July 1980 Political Terrorism Continues in Turkey

On 17 July Abdurrahman KOKSALOGLU a Republican Party deputy was murdered apparently by a Right Wing Group. A former Prime Minister of Turkey Nihat ERIM was attacked by four armed men at Kantal on 19 July. He and his bodyguard were both killed, his wife was not harmed. He was a much respected figure and could have been Turkeys next President. Dev Soll (a Revolutionary Left Organisation) claimed responsibility. On 23 July one of Turkeys best known left wing Trade Union leaders Keml TURKLER was killed by a group of four gunmen and Recay UNAL a left wing journalist found murdcred. These latest assassinations bring the total of Turks murdered this year for political purposes to 1850.

21 July 1980 Murder of Police Auxiliary in Northern Ireland

A Police auxiliary was shot dead and his wife seriously wounded by terrorists who broke into their house in County Down.

22 July 1980 Assassination of Former Syrian Prime Minister in Paris

Salah Eddin Al BITAR a former Prime Minister of Syria and a leading opponent of the present Syrian Government was killed by a single shot in the neck in Paris. His assassin escaped amongst the crowds on the Champs Elysees.

23 July 1980 ETA Activity Continues in Northern Spain

ETA terrorist activity reached one of its periodic peaks in late July. On 23 July a Civil Guard bus was blown up near Lognono and a Civil Guard Officer killed and 34 of his men wounded. On 25 July seven bombs were exploded in public buildings and government offices in San Sebastian and Bilbao causing extensive damage. ETA has however denied reports that it was about to resume its bombing campaign in Spanish holiday resorts. Sixty seven people have been killed by Spanish terrorists this year. France has been asked by Spain to increase police operations in the border area.

23 July 1980 Former Iranian Diplomat Murdered in the U.S.

Ali TABATABAI a former Press Attache at the Royal Iranian Embassy in Washington was shot dead at his home in Maryland, by an attacker posing as a postman. TABATABAI was the founder and president of the Iranian Freedom Foundation which has stated its opposition to the present KHOMEINI regime. FBI officials believe the gunmen was David BELFIELD alias Daoud SALAHUDDIN who worked for the Iranian interests section established in the Algerian Consulate. BELFIELD and his accomplice Tyrone FRAZIER are Black Muslims, a local American Muslim sect. BELFIELD had connections with local Iranian students. A third man Horace BUTLER is also charged with conspiracy to murder. This involvement by Black Muslims in Arab State terrorism may indicate that some converts to Islam in the U.S. (if not elsewhere) may be willing to assist in terrorism.

25 July 1980 Theft of Eight Tons of Explosive by ETA Terrorists in Spain

Seven ETA terrorists led by a young woman stole eight tons of Goma 2 plastic explosive, 15 miles of fuse wire and numerous detonators from the Rio Tinto Chemical Company's store in Santander. Four of the terrorists wearing Civil Guard uniforms held the Company's guards whilst the explosives were loaded into a Company truck. Two Company guards were taken as hostages and later freed.

27 July 1980 German Terrorists Killed in Car Accident

Press reports state that Juliane PLAMBECK a leading member of the Red Army Faction and a fellow terrorist Wolfgang BEER were killed in a car accident near Stuttgart on 27 July. Police found a sub machine gun, three pistols, radio communication equipment and documents in her car. The documents suggested that the pair were planning to ambush the Federal Prosecutor Herr REBMANN who passed the scene each day whilst travelling to work. Despite the many recent successes of the counter terrorist forces in West Germany it would appear that West German terrorists are not disheartened and are retraining and regrouping in preparation for further activity.

5...

27 July 1980 Iraqi Diplomat Assassinated in Abu Dhabi

Hussein MOHAMMED a Second Secretary at the Iraqi Embassy in Abu Dhabi was killed and fourteen Iraqi diplomats and officials injured when a bomb exploded in a diplomat's apartment. Baghdad has accused the Iranian Government of this act.

28 July 1980 Jewish Children Attacked by Arab in Antwerp

One child was killed and twenty injured when an Arab threw two grenades into a group of Jewish children waiting for a bus which was to take them on a camping holiday. The Arab was arrested, he then stated his action was "an act of war against Israel". Police found he was carrying a loaded pistol.

30 July 1980 Khuzestan Terrorists Threaten to Strike Targets in The U.K. and Allied Countries

Nasr Ahmed NASR a spokesman for the Khuzestan guerilla movement stated that terrorists from his movement would strike at targets in the U.K. and allied countries, to avenge the deaths of the five terrorists killed in the relief of the Iranian Embassy London on 5 May 1980.

31 July 1980 Iraqi Diplomats Expelled from Austria

The Austrian Government has expelled Sami Hanma ATTALAH a First Secretary and Hamid TARRAD, an Attache, from Austria for terrorist activities. They gave an Arab refugee a box containing a "camera" to deliver to the Iranian Embassy. The refugee became alarmed when he opened the box and saw a package, the package exploded as he was telephoning the police. Eight people were injured.

31 July 1980 Turkish Diplomat and Daughter Assassinated in Athens

Galip OZMEN an Attache at the Turkish Embassy and his young daughter were killed by terrorists whilst sitting in a parked car in Athens. OZMEN's wife and another woman were seriously wounded in the same incident. The Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia may have been responsible.

3 August 1980 Terrorist Attack on Bologna Railway Station

On 3 August two terrorists planted a suitcase containing 88 lbs of explosive in the waiting room of Bologna Station in Italy. The station was packed with holiday travellers. This bomb later exploded killing 76 people and injuring 188 others. Several terrorist groups claimed responsibility but Italian authorities are convinced that this attack was carried out by a fanatical Right Wing group, the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei. The group stated this attack was to

avenge the indictment of eight of its members for the bombing of a train near Bologna in 1974. Italian Police believe Marco AFFATIGATO aged 22 a known member of the group who recently escaped from prison, was responsible with one other for planting the bomb. This is the worst terrorist incident to occur in Europe and led to a Nationwide two hour strike on 4 August led by the Communist Trade Union calling for sterner action against Italys terrorists. A National day of mourning was held on 7 August. Six more travellers injured in the explosion have since died. Italian Police are carrying out extensive searches to identify and arrest the terrorists. Signor Francesco COSSIGA the Italian Prime Minister stated that this massacre had been staged to destroy the nations faith in democracy. Some arrests of suspected terrorists have occurred.

5 August 1980 Explosion in Turkish Consulate in France

The Turkish Consulate at Lyons was damaged by a bomb on 5 August. On 6 August two gunmen entered the same Consulate and asked to see the Consul General. Shortly afterwards they fired their pistols at a group of Turkish workmen waiting for travel documents and the unarmed doorman, five workmen were wounded. The Armenian Liberation Army stated it was responsible for both attacks. An estimated 100,000 Armenians live in southern France.

6 August 1980 Political Violence Continues in San Salvador

Political violence reached a peak in San Salvador on 6 August when 31 people were murdered by terrorists. Four of these were murdered by a Right Wing group for complicity in the kidnapping of the South African Ambassador (Mr DUNN) by the Left Wing Popular Liberation Front (PLF) in November 1979. The PLF demanded a ransom of $20M which has not been paid and Mr DUNN has not been freed.

7 August 1980 Armed Robbery of Documents in Paris

An armed group of four men and two women entered a civil district headquarters in Paris and stole some 1500 official documents including passports, identity cards and car registration cards. These documents may be passed to European terrorist groups.

11 August 1980 British Soldier Killed by Bomb in South Armagh

A British soldier on patrol near the South Armagh/Eire border was killed by a remote control bomb and a passing motorist seriously injured. The Provisional IRA claimed responsibility.

15 August 1980 Japanese Red Army Terrorists Wish to Return to Japan

A Japanese newspaper has stated that Takamoro TAMIYA and eight other Japanese Red Army terrorists who were involved in the hijacking of a passenger aircraft in 1970 now wish to leave Pyongyang and return to Japan. TAMIYA said "They wanted to apologise to the Japanese people and make a fresh start".

16 August 1980 Italian Police Seize Forged Passports

Police raided a printing works outside Rome and seized 10,000 forged passports worth NZ$7M on the Black Market.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

Terrorist Activity Bulletin

September 1980

B2-80-3 Aircraft Hijacking

Details of known aircraft hijackings for the period 1 June to 31 August 1980 are given below:

30 June 1980
Boeing 737 Hijacked in Argentina

Roberto Atilio di PRINZIO, a supporter of the late President Peron, hijacked an Airlinea Argentines Boeing 737 flying from the Argentine coastal resort of Mar del Plata to Buenos Aires. He demanded $100,000 in cash from the Argentine Government. On arrival at Buenos Aires he allowed 45 passengers to disembark but held five passengers and the crew. He then demanded the Government pay him the $100,000, refuel the aircraft and allow the crew to fly him to Mexico. A rescue team then fired tear gas into the aircraft enabling seven hostages to escape. DI PRINZIO finally surrendered two hours later freeing his two remaining hostages. DI PRINZIO who was armed with a pistol showed symptoms of drug addiction and was carrying three packets of marijuana. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration have commented adversely on the use of tear gas on such occasions as it has a delayed effect and could force a desperate man to use his weapon before he is incapacitated. A further hazard is the dangerous effect of tear gas on the very young, the old or those in poor health.

11 July 1980
Incomplete Hijack of Northwest Airlines Boeing 727 in Washington, USA

At 1345 hours a Northwest Airlines Boeing 727 was taxiing to its take off position at Seattle Tacoma International Airport, Washington, when a passenger, Glen K. TRIPP told the crew he had a bomb in the suitcase he was carrying and demanded $100,000 and two parachutes. He also said he had murdered people before and wished to kill his present employer. The aircraft was immediately parked at an isolated ramp and negotiations with TRIPP commenced. At 1720 hours a passanger with a heart condition was released. At 1730 hours several Airline employees were allowed to leave the aircraft. The pilot then reported by radio that a flight attendant had put Valium in a drink given to TRIPP but this appeared to have no effect on him. At 2100 hours three

hostages were released by TRIPP in exchange for two parachutes. The $100,000 was then given to TRIPP at 2145 hours and he was told he could not safely jump from a B727 aircraft. He then demanded that he be given a light aircraft. It was pointed out to him that weather conditions were deteriorating and he agreed to accept a rented car instead of a light aircraft. TRIPP and his two hostages left the airliner at 2300 hours when the rented car drew up by the forward doors. TRIPP was arrested by FBI agents who had been waiting under the fuselage. TRIPP had no weapons or explosives and the $100,000 was recovered.

12 July 1980
Hijack of Phillippines Airlines B727

A Phillippines Airlines B727 was hijacked whilst on a domestic flight from Manila to Cebu. The hijacker Nicolas ALCORDO left his seat soon after take off and entered the flight deck. He demanded to be flown to Libya and also asked for a large sum of money. He asked the Captain to tell the passengers there was a bomb aboard the aircraft. The Captain told him no announcements could be made from the flight deck and suggested ALCORDO fetch a flight attendant. When ALCORDO left the flight deck, the Engineer locked the connecting door and the aircraft returned to Manila. The hijacker was arrested by police after the aircraft landed.

22 July 1980
Seizure of Delta Airlines L1011 Aircraft

At about 1520 hours a Delta Airlines L1011 aircraft on a scheduled flight from Chicago to San Juan,Puerto Rico via Miami was hijacked. The aircraft was carrying 144 passengers and 14 crew. Shortly after leaving Miami a Latin male threatened several air hostesses with a possible pistol and told them to tell the captain to proceed to Havana. The captain asked for a flight plan to Havana but was told to land at Camaguey Cuba due to weather conditions. The hijacker held a hostess with her arm bent behind her back and continued to threaten the passengers with his "pistol", he did not enter the cockpit. The aircraft landed at Camaguey at 1625 hours and the hijacker surrendered to the Cuban authorities. After paying a landing fee of $1029 contributed by the passengers, the aircraft was allowed to return to Miami. The hijacker who was not identified was a white Puerto Rican. It is not known whether he actually had a weapon. The weapon detection equipment used to screen passengers for this flight at Chicago and Miami was checked and found to be serviceable.

3...

24 July 1980
Hijack of Kuwait Airlines Boeing 737

At 1900 hours on 24 July a Boeing 737 aircraft of Kuwait Airlines was hijacked by two men armed with pistols and grenades whilst flying from Beirut to Kuwait. The hijackers demanded that they be paid a large sum of money due to them from a Kuwaiti business house. After a short period on the airfield at Kuwait during which 36 passengers were allowed to disembark the aircraft took off for Bahrain where it was refuelled. The aircraft then landed again at Kuwait at 0230 hours on 25 July. Efforts to negotiate a settlement were however unsuccessful and the hijackers forced the crew to take off for Abadan, the aircraft having to avoid several lorries parked on the runway. After a seven hour wait on the tarmac at Abadan the crew were forced to fly the B737 to Tehran but were unable to land as the runway had been blocked. The aircraft finally returned to Kuwait at 1500 hours on 25 July. At 2030 hours all auxiliary power to the aircraft was shut off and the hijackers surrendered an hour later. The hijackers who were Palestinians with Jordanian passports were handed their weapons by a member of the airport ground crew after they had passed passenger security checks. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration when commenting on the hijacking emphasised the danger caused by the intentional blocking of runways carried out to limit the further movements of hijacked aircraft. Crews may be forced to take off despite these obstacles.

10 August 1980
Hijack of U.S. Airliner to Cuba

A Spanish speaking man hijacked a U.S. airliner shortly after it took off from Miami. He kept flicking open his lighter and threatening to light the fuse of a "bomb" which later turned out to be a cake of suitably disguised soap. He demanded to be flown to Cuba. On arrival at Havana he was arrested by Cuban detectives. The aircraft returned to Miami after refuelling.

14 - 18 August 1980
Hijacking of American Aircraft by Cubans

Press reports state the following hijackings took place during these five days, all the hijackers who appeared to be Cuban refugees surrendered to the Cuban police on arrival in Havana.

a. On 14 August an Air Florida Boeing 737 flying between Miami and Key West was seized by seven men who poured petrol on the seats and threatened to set it alight, unless they were flown to Cuba.

b. On 15 August a National Airlines DC10 flying from Miami to Puerto Rico was hijacked by two men in the same manner.

c. A similar hijacking occurred on 16 August when a Republic Airlines DC9 was seized by four men who sprinkled an unidentified liquid around the cabin and threatened to ignite it whilst shouting Cuba, Cuba, Cuba.

d. Three Cubans carrying containers of petrol were arrested at Miami airport on 17 August.

e. Armed U.S. Sky Marshals have since been placed on selected commercial aircraft but the main emphasis remains on security checking at U.S. airports.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

Terrorist Activity Bulletin

September 1980

B2-80-4 **Terrorist Activity By Thai Separatist Groups**

Political History

1. Thailand is predominantly a Buddhist country, some 4% of the population are however Moslems. These 1.75m Moslems are largely ethnic Malays or descendants of the Indian and Arab merchants who migrated to the Southern Provinces of Thailand in the 13th century, the majority of these Moslems live in the southern border provinces of Satun, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. The Thai Government has in the past adopted a repressive policy towards Moslems and their Islamic culture which caused great resentment. In 1948, 250,000 Thai Moslems signed a petition requesting the United Nations to preside over the secession of Southern Thailand and its incorporation into Malaya. The Thai Government suppressed this petition but also introduced many local reforms designed to improve the economy of the area and the standing of the local Moslems. Some Thai Moslems however still felt they were treated as inferiors and formed several Moslem separatist groups which indulge in terrorist activity, often leading to reprisals by reactionary Buddhist terrorists. The presence of some 2,500 Communist guerrillas, the remnants of the Malayan Races Liberation Army, (MRLA) in this area has hindered social and economic development and requires the presence of large numbers of Malaysian and Thai troops to contain this major and increasing threat. Some limited co-operation may occur between the Malay units of the MRLA (believed to number about 700 guerrillas) and these Moslem separatist groups.

Separatist Groups

2. Moslem separatist activity in the southern border provinces increased in the first half of 1980 and has been largely conducted by four organisations:

The Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO)

a. This was founded in 1967 and is led by BIRA, a political science graduate of an Indian university. Its aim is to turn Pattani into an autonomous Muslim state. BIRA often visits Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya to publicise the cause and has received major financial support for PULO from Arab States notably Libya and Saudi Arabia. PULO is most active in the South East border states of Yala and Narathiwat. It has five or six military "Commands" and specialises in terrorist activity against local government installations such as police stations and also Buddhist priests and institutions. Some of its "military" commanders have been trained in Syria.

The Pattani National Liberation Front (BNPP)

b. Founded in 1947 this is led by Badri HAMADAN, a Middle East university graduate, its secretary was educated in Egypt. It may have received some early support from the Parti Islam, a political party in Northern Malaysia. The Thai Army has had some success against the BNPP and it has been further weakened by the destruction by fire of its HQ in the border town of Juteh. Many of the BNPP leaders have now left for East and West Malaysia and the organisation has now allied itself with PULO, hoping to revive its fortunes and to present the image of a more united Moslem front.

The National Revolutionary Front (BRN)

c. Founded in 1960 by Abdul Karim HASSAN (Ustag KARIM), an Islamic teacher. The BRN's aim is to achieve the national, social and religious "liberation" of the 1.2M Thai Moselms in the Thai/Malaysia border area. The BRN has the majority of its small armed units in the central and eastern border provinces. BRN terrorists have been responsible for several recent urban incidents in which 12 people have been killed and over 100 injured. A disturbing development is the BRN's recent alliance with the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM), which will assist the CPM in achieving a long sought aim, that of greater Malay support.

The Sabil Illah

d. This is a small urban Moslem terrorist group active in some major Thai cities. It may have links with a semi clandestine organisation in Malaysia known as the Tentera Sabilluh (Righteous Path Armed Forces) and its extremist splinter group the Angkatan Jihad (Holy War Forces). Some Thai authorities consider the Sabil Illah to be a highly motivated and well trained terrorist group.

Total Strength

e. The PULO/BNPP and the BRN can probably muster about 500-600 terrorists. A Thai Parliamentary Commission recently examined the situation in the border provinces and stated it believed there were some 84 armed groups in these provinces other than communist guerrillas. The activities of these 84 groups ranged from political terrorism to banditry, extortion and smuggling and were often changed to meet their current requirements or desires.

Known Terrorist Activity by Separatist or Reactionary Groups

3. Details of some recent major incidents are given below:

a. On 23 April 1974 terrorists (probably of the PULO) kidnapped two lady medical missionaries who were working at a leprosy clinic in Pattani province. Both ladies, one of whom was a New Zealander and the other English, were probably kidnapped to treat wounded terrorists. They were later found dead. Thai police later arrested four men.

b. In November 1975 50,000 Thai Malays demonstrated in Pattani against the alleged murder of five villagers by Thai troops, PULO threatened reprisals against the Thai Army.

c. In December 1975 a bomb was thrown at Moslem demonstrators in Pattani by members of a reactionary Buddhist organisation, killing eleven and wounding forty four of the demonstrators. In retaliation members of Sabil Illah planted two bombs at Bangkok International Airport and bombs at Haadyai railway station, causing over 20 casualties.

d. Members of PULO attempted to assassinate King Bhumibol and Queen Sikirit in September 1977 when they visited Yala. Five spectators were killed and forty seven injured by the two grenades. The Royal couple escaped unhurt.

e. Six time bombs exploded in the centre of Yala city on 7 March 1980 causing extensive damage.

f. Terrorists rounded up eleven rubber plantation workers in Narathiwat on 28 June 1980 and executed eight when they admitted being Buddhists. Similar terrorist activities directed against Buddhists have recently become more prevalent and are causing much official concern.

g. Forty one people were injured when three bombs exploded in Bangkok on 1 July 1980. Separatists or a right wing group may have been responsible.

h. On 19 July 1980 PULO threatened to attack foreign embassies and commercial aircraft in Bangkok and Songhkla or to kidnap diplomats; if the Thai Government did not cease its military operations against the separatists.

4. The serious situation developing in the South has forced the Thai Government to increase its political and military operations designed to suppress both the communist guerrillas and the Moslem separatists in these areas. The current increase of Moslem influence in the world may encourage local and international Moslem support for these separatist groups and spur them to further activity.

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RESTRICTED

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BULLETIN

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JUNE 1980 → File: CC Terrorism 11/7/80

B1-80-1 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - GENERAL (RESTRICTED)

B1-80-2 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING LATE 1979 AND THE FIRST HALF OF 1980 (RESTRICTED)

B1-80-3 AIRCRAFT HIJACKING (RESTRICTED)

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

Terrorist Activity Bulletin

June 1980

B1-80-1 **Terrorism : General**

1. The first half of 1980 saw the continuation worldwide of a pattern of terrorism set in the late 1970s, with bombings and shootings predominating. The period was notable for the number of attacks against diplomatic establishments and associated personnel; also for the first time a New Zealand mission was the target of a terrorist type attack when, in February 1980, a group of armed men broke into the New Zealand Embassy in Tehran and stole files and blank passports.

2. Adherence by the British Government to its espoused policy of not conceding to terrorist demands, was dramatically demonstrated during the recent attack by Arab gunmen on the Iranian Embassy in London. This incident, a classic example of conducting negotiations for as long as the situation demands and resorting to armed assault only when terrorists clearly indicate their intention to kill hostages, saw the effectiveness of British counter-terrorist planning and the defined roles played by British government officials, police and defence forces throughout the siege.

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

Terrorist Activity Bulletin

June 1980

B1-80-2 International Terrorist Incidents during late 1979 and the first half of 1980

The more prominent terrorist incidents for the period 24 November 1979 to 1 June 1980, are listed below:

11 Dec 1979 Explosion at Soviet UN Mission in New York

A bomb detonated outside the Soviet Mission to the UN about 2130 hours. The explosion in the driveway to the mission's garage blew out windows in at least three floors of the 12-story building and in a large apartment building across the street. Four Russians outside the mission and three policemen were injured. Omega-7 an anti-Castro group, claimed responsibility for the bombing.

21 Dec 79 Bomb Discovered at Taiwanese Mission in United States

A bomb about the size of a paperback book was discovered by a guard in some bushes at the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (the Taiwanese Mission) in Bethesda, Maryland.

2 Jan 1980 El Al Airlines Manager Assassinated in Turkey

The manager of El Al Airlines in Istanbul was assassinated as he was driving home. The Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) claimed responsibility for the killing.

11 Jan 1980 Panamanian Embassy Seized in El Salvador

Leftist militants seized the Panamanian Embassy in San Salvador and held several hostages including the ambassadors of Panama and Costa Rica and the Costa Rican charge d'affaires. The group said they were members of the 28 February Popular League and demanded the release of several of their members arrested in December 1979. On 14 January the Salvadoran Government released the League members from prison and the hostages, including the diplomats, were released from the Embassy.

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13 Jan 1980 Explosion at Aeroflot Office in New York

An explosion at the Aeroflot offices in New York resulted in damage to that office and broken windows in the offices nearby, including British Airways and Qantas. A man, seen throwing a package towards Aeroflot's glass windows, was caught and held. Three persons were slightly injured. Both Omega-7 (an anti-Castro group) and the Jewish Defense League claimed responsibility for the bombing.

16 Jan 1980 USSR Airline Office Bombed in Syria

The Aeroflot office in Damascus was bombed by unknown terrorists. The explosion caused extensive damage to the office and slightly injured one person. This is the first attack recorded against a Soviet establishment in Syria.

17 Jan 1980 Explosions at London Hotel

A bomb exploded on the fifth floor of a London hotel killing an Arab, who had registered as a student, and injuring a West German guest. The student may have been assembling a bomb. Several hours later a second bomb detonated under the rubble resulting in injury to a police officer. In a statement from Beirut delivered to the Reuter office the May 15 Arab Organisation claimed responsibility.

18 May 1980 UN Office Bombed in Guatemala

The building housing the United Nations offices in Guatemala was badly damaged by a bomb. No group claimed responsibility.

19 Jan 1980 Bombs Explode at Airlines Offices in Spain

Three bombs exploded in Madrid damaging the offices of TWA, British Airways and Swissair. A caller to news media in Madrid claimed the Justice of Armenian Genocide was responsible for the bombings.

22 Jan 1980 Explosion at Los Angeles International Airport

A bomb exploded at Los Angeles airport in a luggage area used by China Airlines causing much damage.

24 Jan 1980 Arson at US Military Motor Transport Park in Turkey

Three men and a woman entered a US military transport park near Yesilkoy Airport, poured gasoline on several vehicles and then ignited it. Several vehicles were damaged and the building destroyed. A banner found read "...Victory for THKPC...". The THKPC is the Turkish Peoples Liberation Party/Front.

26 Jan 1980 Bomb Explosion at a UNESCO Club in Spain

A package bomb exploded when a member of the Club opened it. The package had been left earlier by an unidentified youth. Two members were seriously injured.

29 Jan 1980 Explosion at Syrian Embassy in France

A bomb exploded on the ground floor of the Syrian Embassy in Paris damaging three floors of the building. One Syrian employee was killed and eight persons were injured, three seriously. Three different groups, the Lebanese Front, the Jewish Brigades and the Afghan Collective claimed responsibility for the explosion.

31 Jan 1980 Spanish Embassy Attacked in Guatemala

Peasants, claiming to be part of a leftist organisation, entered the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City and demanded to see the Ambassador. Once inside they took hostage the Spanish Ambassador, Guatemala's former vice president, and the former foreign minister and several of the Embassy staff. Fire broke out when police attempted to break into the barricaded area of the building to end the seige. Of the 30 or more persons held in the Embassy the only survivors were the Ambassador and one of the attackers. Both were seriously injured; the latter was abducted from the hospital by unidentified persons the day after the incident.

2 Feb 1980 Airlines Offices Bombed in Belgium

Two explosions within five minutes of each other extensively damaged the Brussels offices of both the Soviet and Turkish airlines. The explosives were concealed in plastic bags and placed in front of the two offices. No injuries were reported. The New Armenian Resistance claimed responsibility for both bombings.

2 Feb 1980 Explosion at Soviet Information Office in France

A bomb exploded at the Soviet Union's Office of Information in Paris. Only minor damage was caused and no injuries were reported. The New Armenian Resistance claimed responsibility for the attack which commemorated the memory of three Armenians executed for the bombing of a Moscow subway car in January 1979.

5 Feb 1980 Leftists Seize the Spanish Embassy in El Salvador

Members of the Popular League of February 28 (LP-28) seized the Spanish Embassy in San Salvador and took the Ambassador and a number of others hostage. The group demanded the release of jailed comrades and that Spain break relations with El Salvador. The seige ended on 18 February with the release of two Spanish diplomats. The Salvadoran Government agreed to several of the LP-28 demands including the release of a number of prisoners.

6 Feb 1980 Attempted Assassination of Turkish Ambassador in Switzerland

The Turkish Ambassador was slightly injured when shots were fired at his car as he was leaving the British Embassy in Bern. An Armenian group claimed responsibility for the attack. Local police detained three men.

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16 Feb 1980 British Army Officer Assassinated in West Germany

A British Army officer, Colonel Coe, was shot by a man and woman as he was parking his car in front of his home in Bielefeld. The Colonel, a senior staff officer at HQ Rhine Army, was shot three times by the couple who walked up to the car and fired into the vehicle. The PIRA claimed responsibility for the assassination.

18 Feb 1980 Danish and Belgian Embassies Occupied in Mexico

The National Democratic Popular Front, a leftist group, occupied the embassies of Belgium and Denmark. They demanded freedom for political prisoners and better living conditions for the poor. The group were apparently unarmed and no injuries were reported at either embassy.

18 Feb 1980 Airlines Bombed in Italy

Two bombs were detonated in Rome in front of the El Al, Swissair and Lufthansa airlines offices. Minor damage occurred and one person was slightly injured. The Armenian Army for the Liberation of Armenia stated it was responsible.

21 Feb 1980 Shot Fired at Soviet Mission in New York

A shot was fired at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in the early morning.

22 Feb 1980 Turkish Diplomat Killed in Egypt

A diplomat assigned to the Turkish Embassy in Cairo was killed near the Israeli Embassy. A suspect was arrested.

24 Feb 1980 Aeroflot Office in France Attacked by Youths

About 30 youths smashed a window of the Aeroflot office in Paris. They then proceeded to destroy computer consoles before throwing fire-bombs into the debris. A group calling itself the Assembly for Moral Order and Anti-Communist Youth claimed responsibility for the attack.

27 Feb 1980 Dominican Republic Embassy Seized in Colombia

Shortly after noon, during a reception celebrating the Dominican Republic's national day, members of the April 19 Movement (M-19) forcibly entered the Embassy of the Dominican Republic and took hostage all present, including about 45 diplomats. During the initial attack several people were wounded and one terrorist was killed. M-19 members demanded the release of over 300 of their members from prison, US$50 million ransom and publication of a manifesto. As the result of negotiations more than 30 hostages had been released in early April.

1 Mar 1980 British Military Police Patrol Attacked in West Germany

A British military police patrol was attacked by at least two gun-men. The patrol had stopped for a traffic signal when about 20 shots were fired at them. The driver was severly wounded. Police identified ammunition used as a type used by the IRA.

3 Mar 1980 Arab Kills Spanish Lawyer in Spain

An Arab killed a Spanish lawyer apparently mistaking him for a Jewish leader. Local police arrested a suspect, a Palestinian carrying a passport issued in Oman. The suspect was also carrying a photo of the president of the Spanish branch of B'nai B'rith who lives in the same apartment building as the victim. The PLO denied any involvement in the incident.

7 Mar 1980 Soviet Consulate Bombed in Germany

An unidentified man entered the Soviet Consulate in West Berlin and left a bomb in the lavatory which later exploded, causing extensive damage. Calls made to news agencies in Frankfurt and Berlin said the bombs were the work of the Peoples' Mujahedeen of Afghanistan.

7 Mar 1980 Privately Owned Vehicle Bombed in Laarbrueck, West Germany

An unidentified individual was seen in a British military housing area placing a package under a British-owned car. Shortly afterwards the vehicle was damaged by an explosion.

10 Mar 1980 Turkish Airlines Offices Bombed in Italy

An Armenian group claimed responsibility for two explosions at the Turkish Airlines office and the Turkish Tourist Office in Rome. Two people were killed, at least 11 were injured and a passing police car was damaged.

10 Mar 1980 British Soldier Wounded in West Germany

A British soldier was shot and wounded by unidentified gunmen near Osnabrueck.

11 Mar 1980 Shots Fired at British Military Radio Station in West Germany

During the early morning hours a man and a women fired a number of shots from a car at a British radio installation at Bielefeld. No injuries or damage were reported.

17 Mar 1980 Yugoslav Bank Bombed in New York

A powerful bomb exploded on the 30th floor of a 5th Avenue building outside the Yugoslav bank office. No injuries were reported but extensive damage occurred. A man telephoned authorities, told them that the Croatian Freedom Fighters were responsible for the bombing and directed them to a bus terminal baggage locker where they would find a message. The message was to be made public or two additional bombs would go off. These directions were carried out and there were no other explosions.

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29 Mar 1980 US Peace Corps Office Fired on in El Salvador

The US Peace Corps' office in San Salvador was fired on by gunmen. No one was injured.

8 Apr 1980 Fire Opened on Japanese Embassy in Guatemala

Several men fired on the Japanese Embassy from a passing car. No injuries or damage occurred.

11 Apr 1980 Libyan Journalist Assassinated in London

Two gunmen, members of a Libyan Death Squad, assassinated Muhammed Mustafa Ramadan a dissident Libyan journalist outside a London mosque. He was described as a bitter opponent of Qadhafi's regime. The two gunmen after shooting at pursuing policemen, were disarmed and arrested.

16 Apr 1980 US Navy Petty Officer Assassinated in Istanbul

Three Turkish terrorists shot a Chief Petty Officer and his Turkish friend outside their quarters. The murder increased the total number of US servicemen assassinated in Turkey during the last year, to eight.

17 Apr 1980 Attempted Assassination of Turkish Ambassador to Vatican

Members of the Armenian Secret Army ambushed the Ambassador as he was leaving his residence. The Ambassador, his bodyguard and driver were all wounded.

19 Apr 1980 Libyan Gunmen Continue Campaign of Assassination

A Libyan dissident Abd Al Jolil was shot whilst sitting in a cafe in Rome. He had refused to return to Libya. On 25 April, another prominent Libyan exile and dissident Mahmud Nafa, was assassinated in his London office.

30 Apr to 5 May 1980 Seige of the Iranian Embassy in London

Six terrorists took control of the Iranian Embassy in London on the morning of 30 April, holding 25 of its staff and one Metropolitan policeman as hostages. Five hostages were released during subsequent negotiation. The terrorists who identified themselves with the movement for autonomy in Arabistan, demanded that Iran should recognise the legitimate demands of her people and that their associates held by the Khomeini regime be freed. They also demanded a special plane to fly the hostages out of England. It soon became apparent to them that these demands would not be met and on 3 May they asked that the Ambassadors of Algeria, Jordan and Iraq should negotiate with the British Government on their behalf. The Ambassadors of these and other Arab countries agreed to meet on the afternoon of 5 May. However tension was rising amongst the terrorists and they killed a hostage on the evening of 5 May and threatened to kill the others. The decision was then taken to commit troops of the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) in aid of the Civil Power. The Embassy was then attacked by the SAS and after a brief struggle the terrorists were overcome, five being killed and one captured. A further hostage was killed by the terrorists during the SAS assault, nineteen hostages were freed.

12 May 1980 Belgian Jesuit Priest Assassinated in Guatemala

A Belgian Jesuit priest, Father Voordeckers, was shot by members of the Secret Anti Communist Army, who claimed he was a communist and a political activist.

14 May 1980 Armed Attack on Iranian Embassy in Paris

Gunmen in a car carried out a surprise attack on French police outside the Iranian embassy. Four policemen were wounded by fire from a sub machine gun and a grenade. The Corsican National Liberation Front claimed responsibility.

17 May 1980 Bomb Explodes in London Hotel

A man believed to be an Iranian, was killed when a bomb he was handling exploded. Two other men who were in the room were injured. The survivors were carrying two sets of travel documents; the three men may have been on a terrorist mission connected with the current Iraqi-Iranian feud.

2 June 1980 Sabotage of South African Oil Refineries

The large oil refineries at Sasolburg and Secunda, near Johannesburg, were attacked by saboteurs during the night 1-2 June. These refineries which process coal into liquid fuel are vital to the country's economy and defence. Eight oil storage tanks were set on fire by explosive charges at Sasolburg causing damage estimated at $NZ7 million. Damage at Secunda was less extensive. One security guard was wounded by the saboteurs, thought to be members of the African National Congress. The operation was carefully planned and skilfully executed.

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

Terrorist Activity Bulletin

June 1980

B1-80-3 Aircraft Hijacking

Aircraft hijacking again mainly by loners, continued throughout the first half of 1980.

12 December 1979
Successful Hijacking of a General Aviation Aircraft

A young man chartered a Cessna Model 172 with a pilot from Key West Florida, for an extended picture taking and sightseeing tour of the area. Shortly after takeoff the hijacker pointed a small hand gun at the pilot and told him that he wanted to be flown to Cuba. The hijacker instructed the pilot to maintain radio silence but when contacted by the air traffic control tower the pilot advised that he was heading south and that he had been hijacked. The hijacker also instructed the pilot to advise Havana Air route traffic control that there was a political refugee on board and he was armed. Upon landing in Havana the hijacker was taken into custody by Cuban authorities.

14 January 1980
Unsuccessful Hijacking of an Alitalia Aircraft

An Alitalia DC-9 aircraft was hijacked while on a flight from Rome Italy, to Tunis Tunisia. The DC-9 carried 83 passengers and six crew. Approximately 40 minutes after takeoff a man gained access to the cockpit and advised the pilot that he had an accomplice aboard who had 7 kilograms of explosives and who at his signal would be ready to blow up the aircraft.

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cont'd:

The hijacker demanded the release of 25 prisoners in Tunisia. He also demanded that the aircraft be flown to Tripoli Libya, but was told that the aircraft could not land there due to weather conditions. He then demanded to be flown to Malta but the Maltese would not authorise landing. The aircraft finally landed at Sicily. After landing the hijacker wanted the aircraft refueled and then to be flown to Tripoli or Benghazi Libya. After several hours of negotiation the hijacker released the women and children on board. Finally the hijacker was persuaded to surrender. He was taken into custody by Italian authorities and requested political asylum. The police ascertained that he did not have an accomplice and no explosives were found.

18 January 1980
Hijack of Middle East Airlines Boeing 720

A Middle East Airlines Boeing 720 en route from Beirut to Larnaca Cyprus, with 72 passengers aboard, was hijacked by a lone Lebanese gunman in an attempt to direct it to Tehran. The hijacker demanded the return of the Lebanese Shiite leader, Iman Sadr, from Libya where he "disappeared" during a visit in August 1978. The hijacker demanded the aircraft be flown to Tehran Iran, but agreed to return to Beirut when told the aircraft did not have sufficient fuel to make the flight. After landing at Beirut negotiations began and agreement was reached to disembark women and children passengers. Later male passengers and crew members deplaned. After securing Lebanese government representatives' agreement that he could hold an airport press conference, the hijacker left the plane and surrendered. At the press conference the hijacker called for more action by the Islamic world to find Sadr and for a revision of military presence in South Lebanon. The hijacker was identified as a Southern Lebanese of the Shiite Muslim Sect.

25 January 1980
Unsuccessful Attempt to Divert Plane to Tehran

An Atlanta man accompanied by his wife and two small children directed a Delta Airlines jet with approximately 65 persons aboard, to Havana Cuba. The armed hijacker seized the L-1011 aircraft en route from Atlanta to New York. Cuban authorities refused his demand for an aircraft and crew to fly him to Tehran. The incident ended when the passengers escaped from the plane unnoticed by the hijacker. The hijacker is presently in custody in Cuba.

28 January 1980
Middle East Airline Jet Hijacked and taken to Lebanon

A Lebanese man armed with a kitchen knife, hijacked a Middle East Airlines aircraft and directed it be flown to Beirut. He took over the plane whilst it was on a scheduled flight from Baghdad to Beirut. He surrendered to authorities after he was allowed to hold a press conference during which he asked the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference to ascertain the whereabouts of a Lebanese Shiite leader who disappeared in August 1978.

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30 January 1980
Unsuccessful Hijacking of an Interflug Aircraft

An attempt was made to hijack an aircraft of Interflug (a German Democratic Republic airline) while on a domestic flight from Erfurt to Berlin. During the flight the crew signalled that it had been hijacked. It was later reported that the two men had attempted to take over the aircraft by force. They were apparently overpowered by some of the crew and passengers and were apprehended. They were placed under arrest when the aircraft landed safely at Schoenfeld Airport, Berlin.

9 April 1980
Hijacking of American Airlines Boeing 727

A lone man armed with a pistol climbed the boundary wall and entered Ontario International Airport, some 35 miles from Los Angeles. An American Airlines Boeing 727 was waiting for passengers to board when the hijacker forced the crew to fly the plane to Cuba. After a refuelling stop at Dallas the aircraft continued to Havana. Cuban authorities took the man into custody. The aircraft was flown back to Miami on 9 April.

1 May 1980
Hijack of Pacific Southwest Airlines Boeing 727

On 1 May 1980 a Pacific Southwest Airlines Boeing 727 aircraft was hijacked while on the ground at Stockton California, preparing to board passengers for a flight to Los Angeles. The hijacker who was armed with a pistol, climbed over a 6 ft boundary fence and entered the aircraft via the ventral stairs. The crew, except for the flight engineer, escaped. The hijacker then demanded the planebe flown to Iran but was told this was not possible as the auxiliary power unit had been turned off and the engines could not be started. The hijacker than asked for a press reporter; this was refused and he agreed to read his statement on the American hostages in Iran to the press over the aircraft radio. He was then disarmed by the flight engineer.

6 May 1980
Hijacking of Transportes Aereos Portugese Aircraft

The Boeing 727 was en route from Lisbon to Faro (Portugal), when a man armed with a pistol commandeered the aircraft and demanded it be flown to Madrid. He then demanded $10 million and a flight to Switzerland. After landing in Madrid negotiations were conducted and the hijacker was persuaded to release the passengers and cancel his demands in return for a flight to Portugal. The hijacker surrendered when the aircraft arrived at Lisbon.

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15 May 1980
Unsuccessful Hijacking of Amphibian at Miami

On 15 May 1980 a young negro armed with a .22 rifle and a .38 revolver, threatened an aircraft mechanic at Miami and ordered him to fly a Grumman amphibian carrying the hijacker to Capetown. After eight hours of negotiation in a temperature of 100 degrees, the gunman finally surrendered, left the amphibian and was taken into custody.

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139/3.

CABINET OFFICE

Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

SECRET

TE (80) 1
Copy No. 7
14 May 1980

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

TERRORIST DEMANDS : GUIDELINES FOR ACTION

The attached working paper has been prepared by the Terrorist Intelligence Centre.

The Chairman of the Officials Committee recommends that the Cabinet Committee note for information, in accordance with its brief to receive reports on contingency plans and associated training to meet terrorist threats, the guidelines contained in the working paper for the formulation of the Government's approach in dealing with terrorist demands.

(Signed) P G Millen

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6	Permanent Head, Prime Minister's	) Cover sheet only - Officials
8	Commissioner of Police	) have already received the
9	Secretary of Defence	) attachment which is a working
10	Chief of Defence Staff	) paper issued by the Terrorist
11	Secretary of Foreign Affairs	) Intelligence Centre (NZSIS)
12	Director, EIB	) entitled "Guidelines for
13	Director of Civil Defence	) the Formulation of Government Approach in Dealing with Terrorist Demands"

5 Director of Security under c/s with apologies for oversight. PGM 21/5/80

NOTE : Please substitute this cover sheet for the earlier version circulated on 14 May.

SECRET

139/3

CABINET OFFICE

Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

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TE (80) 1
Copy No. 6
14 May 1980

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

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(Signed) P G Millen

See substitute cover sheet

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

NEW ZEALAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMULATION

OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH IN DEALING WITH

TERRORIST DEMANDS.

A WORKING PAPER

APRIL 1980

1. INTRODUCTION

2. MAIN TERRORIST GROUPS

3. MOTIVATION OF TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR AIMS

4. IDENTIFICATION OF PERPETRATORS

5. HARD LINE AND SOFT LINE

6. OPTIONS OPEN TO GOVERNMENT

7. NEGOTIATIONS

8. CONTROL OF THE NEWS MEDIA

9. CONCLUSION

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Politically motivated terrorism is so world-wide that no country can be regarded as immune from some form of terrorist activity. Drawing on reported experiences and lessons learned from terrorist incidents overseas, this paper seeks to advise the Government on a range of responses that it may wish to consider in the event of being faced with terrorist demands.

1.2. The paper is mainly concerned with lessons that can be drawn from the type of incident in which hostages are taken for bargaining purposes. As a variety of terrorist attacks have shown, including the French Embassy in The Hague and the hijacking of the ferry "Laju" in Singapore, hostages may be taken in a number of different situations, not necessarily in an aviation context. Aircraft hijacking is but one particular form of terrorist attack.

1.3. This paper addresses itself only to terrorist incidents that might take place in New Zealand. An incident overseas in which New Zealand nationals are involved would, of course, be handled by the Government of the country in which the incident takes place.

2. MAIN TERRORIST GROUPS

2.1. Since the late 1960's the majority of hostage taking incidents have been perpetrated by Palestinian liberation groups or the Japanese Red Army (JRA). In some cases there has been a merger of both groups to carry out operations. The outcome of many of these incidents has been extensive negotiations leading to acceptance of terrorist demands and the release of hostages. With the exception of isolated incidents and those involving Israeli hostages, there have been very few casualties as a result of terrorist hostage taking. Israeli hostage casualties have been particularly heavy due to the inflexible attitude of the Israeli Government in dealing with terrorists.

2.2. Despite its small size, the JRA is probably the most wide-ranging and potentially effective of the terrorist groups operational at present. Their actions to date have usually shown flexibility and extensive preparation in planning and training. A high percentage of JRA members are operationally experienced and have displayed great

personal and group discipline, initiative and confidence. As a result they tend to be stable and firm under pressure and changing circumstances. Since their involvement in the 1972 Lod Airport Massacre the JRA has rarely killed hostages and has used violence only when necessary. Indeed, the JRA is possibly the only terrorist group that deliberately encourages and exploits the empathy which can develop between hostages and their captors during an incident.

2.3. West German Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorist operations have generally been subject to very comprehensive planning and research. While as organised and ruthless as the JRA, the RAF generally lacks the strong personal and group discipline of the JRA and tends to be somewhat unstable under pressure, intolerant of delays and unexpected complications. They have shown themselves to be aloof and hostile as captors and in the past have made no efforts to establish or exploit a rapport with hostages. The RAF appears to prefer Europe as an area for operation, probably because of a well organised support network there.

2.4. By contrast Palestinian terrorists vary considerably in ability and dedication. Terrorists from the main Palestinian groups such as Al Fatah, Black September and the PFLP can be expected to be well trained and briefed for their operations. The quality of training and preparation behind some of the smaller groups, or groups acting on behalf of the main organisations, is frequently poor. Recent Al Fatah backed attacks on Iraqi Diplomats are an example of this, with members of the terrorist groups fleeing at, or even before, the first sign of resistance. On the other hand, the Al Fatah terrorists who raided Israel in March 1978 demonstrated a fanatical, even suicidal determination. Like the RAF, Palestinian terrorists tend to lack the strong discipline of the JRA and can become emotional and unpredictable under pressure. A complication to the identification of Palestinian Terrorist groups arises from the practice of some members of large groups to give themselves "unit" names which frequently have no apparent connection with the parent organisation.

2.5. There is no group known to exist in NZ for the sole purpose of furthering political aims by violent means. There are, however, some organisations which, by their nature, tend to draw towards themselves individuals who may not always be relied upon to act rationally and who might resort to violence in the face of real or imagined harrassment either locally or abroad, or out of frustration or sheer fanaticism. No local group is known to have a terrorist support infrastructure or to have developed technical facilities for the purpose of giving operational support to terrorists from overseas.

3. MOTIVATION OF TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR AIMS

3.1. Any decision making body such as the Officials Committee, requires a broad knowledge of todays terrorist groups, their aims and motivation. Terrorist motivation falls into one of three categories although the dividing lines are sometimes blurred; it may be;

a. Nationalist, religious, separatist or ethnic. Such groups have clearly defined political objectives. For example, the Palestinian terrorist organisations seek the establishment of a non-Jewish state in all or part of former Palestine, to which Palestinian Arabs can return.

b. Left wing revolutionary ideology - Castro's success in Cuba gave added inspiration to the revolution in Latin America and a number of guerilla organisations well to the left of orthodox Communism emerged. These groups follow Castro and Che Guevara's teaching that the "revolutionary situation" should be created by armed struggle, which takes precedence over all other forms of subversive activity.

c. Based upon ideology of the "New Left" which totally rejects modern industrial society. Many of the revolutionary youth, having rejected the established Communist parties as

being too bureaucratic, have been influenced by the writings of anarchists and Marxists. They have no clearly defined political objectives; they emphatically reject the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of the consumer society and highly industrialised countries. They totally reject the democratic process as a means of changing the system, and some groups advocate violence and terrorism as political weapons. These groups have emerged gradually from the revolutionary student protest movement which in the 1960s was vociferous and active - mostly in opposition to US intervention in Vietnam - first in Japan, then in the USA, later in Western Europe, especially in France and Western Germany, and to a lesser extent in the UK.

3.2. Each terrorist group has its own specific aims, but there are several purposes which most groups have in common: -

a. to advertise the existence and cause of the group on a national and international plane;

b. to intimidate the general public into supporting their cause;

c. to undermine and discredit government authorities who oppose their cause;

d. In certain cases, to provoke governments into repressive counter measures for the propaganda value and the sympathy from the general public which might result.

3.3. In hostage taking incidents, it is the terrorists' control over the lives of the hostages, rather than the mere occupation of the aircraft, the ship or the building, which provides them with negotiating 'currency'. They hope that, with this currency, they

will be able to blackmail a government, or governments, into acceding to demands which would otherwise be totally unacceptable. Logically, it follows that the terrorists will be reluctant to spend the 'currency' all at once by killing the hostages out of hand.

4. IDENTIFICATION OF PERPETRATORS

4.1. In assessing a hostage taking situation it is essential that the identity of the perpetrators be determined at the earliest opportunity. This is of particular importance in view of the vast difference in the tactics to be used against highly motivated, trained and disciplined terrorists directly concerned in a dedicated cause and those only indirectly involved e.g. hired assassins or students making a principled but misguided stand. Those less directly involved in the cause are more likely to wilt under pressure.

4.2. The pattern of behaviour of various terrorists involved in incidents over recent years has shown that certain groups are more dedicated and fanatical than others. However, it would be dangerous to assume, for instance, that the JRA are more fanatical than some Arab groups. Whilst the JRA have not yet been involved in a major fire fight with security forces some Arab groups, particularly in battle with Israeli security forces, have fought almost to the last man.

4.3. This varying dedication can be exemplified by the confused and tragic attempt by Egyptian Commandos to rescue hostages at Larnaca airport in Cyprus in February 1978. The commandos had been sent to Cyprus by President Sadat to avenge the death of his friend YUSSEF SIBAI, editor of al Ahram. After shooting SIBAI the two Palestinian gunmen rounded up hostages and herded them into a coffee shop. Two policemen who happened to be in the coffee shop handed over their pistols, as did three other men in civilian clothes who were either policemen or members of a private bodyguard. To the hostages' amazement the pistols were laid casually on a table where any one of them could have grabbed them. Nor were the gunmen particularly resolute, as when the head waiter appeared and demanded the release of some of his waiters held hostage, explaining that Saturday was a busy day, the gunmen let them go. Later, when on board a Cyprus Airways aircraft with their

hostages at Larnaca airport, the gunmen appeared to go into a state of catatonic shock when shooting broke out between the Egyptian Commandos and Cypriot snipers. A British pilot in command of the aircraft managed to personally take grenades and pistols from the gunmen's hands.

4.4. It was later postulated that the two Palestinian gunmen were hired assassins with Iraqi connections. They were subsequently found guilty of murder and sentenced to death by hanging. This incident lacked the discipline and planning displayed by politically motivated and more highly trained terrorists in previous operations. The only reason the gunmen got as far as they did was largely due to the Cypriots lack of resolve and willingness to readily accede to the gunmen's demands.

5. HARD LINE AND SOFT LINE

5.1. Ad hoc decision making within general policy guidelines appears to provide an effective means of dealing with terrorists. In deciding its strategy at the start of an incident the decision making body will need to bear in mind the full range of political restraints and considerations and will need to have maximum flexibility in order to adjust strategies to rapidly changing circumstances.

5.2. Few countries have openly declared that they will not give in to terrorist demands. Principal among the countries in this "hard line" category are Israel and the USA. Israel, with little option but to take a tough line, has suffered terrible casualties as a result. The United States has declared that it will not accede to terrorist demands nor negotiate with terrorists. Indeed at Khartoum in March 1973 the US Ambassador to the Sudan and his Charge d'Affairs, who had both been taken hostages by a Palestinian group, were later murdered following a press statement by the US President that the only way to remove insecurity in America's foreign posts was by refusing to give in to blackmail. Whether the US will maintain this hard line attitude if it is confronted with an incident similar to the JRA hijacking in Dacca, in which the lives of many people were involved, is a matter for conjecture.

5.3. An unexpected but welcome outcome of the Bonn Economic Summit meeting in July 1978 was the agreement by seven major industrial democracies on measures to intensify common undertakings to fight international terrorism. The United States, West Germany, France, Britain, Japan, Canada and Italy pledged sanctions against countries harbouring hijackers; ceasing all flights to and from such countries or from elsewhere by the airlines of an offending country. However, the hastily framed Bonn agreement left considerable room for clarification and deals only with aircraft hijacking.

5.4. There has been a pattern over recent years that where terrorist demands have been met, casualties amongst hostages have been minimal. However, this 'soft' line in meeting terrorists' demands has had serious implications. These have included the release of imprisoned terrorists (usually operationally experienced) to join their comrades, and the provision of considerable sums of money to assist terrorists in maintaining support bases, provide weapons and generally finance operations. Hitherto Japan has been foremost amongst those countries ready to accede to terrorist demands. However, with the Bonn Economic Summit meeting agreeing to intensify efforts towards combatting terrorism, it can be expected that Japan will now harden its attitude towards terrorist ultimatums.

5.5. Many Western countries, although not openly declaring so, have demonstrated that they will not bargain with terrorists. They have developed strong counter terrorist groups and facilities and will no doubt negotiate with terrorists when the occasion arises, but purely as a tactical or delaying measure preparatory to undertaking offensive or other action. An example of this can clearly be seen in the actions of the West German Government in their preliminaries leading to events at Mogadishu.

5.6. The development of counter terrorist tactics and facilities and the general awareness of terrorists and their methods by many governments cannot have gone unnoticed by the major terrorist groups, who must now be expected to plan their activities to nullify security forces counter measures. For instance, at Mogadishu in October 1977 the German security forces stormed aboard a grounded hijacked aircraft and were able to quickly knock out the terrorists who were generally

congregated in the forward section of the aircraft. Perhaps learning from this incident, terrorist groups will now follow the example of the JRA who were in command of a hijacked JAL aircraft at Dacca in October 1977, and who took the precaution of placing sentries at stategic positions throughout the aircraft and barricading unguarded doors with passenger luggage.

5.7. In the last few years governments have shown themselves increasingly reluctant to 'accept' hijacked aircraft. At the time of the Peter Lorenz kidnapping, and after the prisoners had been freed and flown to Aden, the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen announced it would accept no other terrorist aircraft. The JRA terrorists who left Kuala Lumper in August 1975 after occupying the US Consulate, had particular difficulty in finding a haven and refuelling stops en route. Such hitherto compliant countries as Syria, Algeria, South Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, Tunisia and Cuba rejected requests from the Japanese Government. Both India and Iran refused to allow overflying and Sri Lanka only reluctantly agreed to permit the aircraft to land after a personal appeal to their Prime Minister. Even Libya, the final destination, initially refused to accept them. Despite the most careful reconnaissance and planning leading up to an incident, terrorists are unable to devote the same precision to their getaway plans; in fact they often seem to play this part of their mission largely by ear. If they wish to wrest the initiative away from terrorists, Governments have an opportunity to do so since negotiations over getaway routes are entirely in their hands.

5.8. According to Robert A. Fearey, former US coordinator for Combatting Terrorism, "... up to the beginning of 1976 an international terrorist involved in a kidnapping had an 80% chance of escaping death of capture; the terrorist had a close to even chance his demands would be granted; the average sentence for the small proportion of terrorists captured was 18 months; and in almost every case, his primary purpose of worldwide publicity was achieved". These figures may have been true throughout 1975 but there must be doubt that they still apply today. We will have to wait and see whether this "improvement" has any direct effect

on the level of incidents themselves and indeed whether this trend of increased robustness by governments is maintained. It may be significant that all "successful" military responses (with the exception of the incident in Scheveningen Gaol in October 1974) have taken place outside Western Europe and generally in the Middle East itself. Certainly in 1975 European Governments favoured policies based on negotiations without concessions but the maintenance of such policies in 1976 was never put to the test by confrontation with a 'first league' group.

5.9. It would be futile to pretend that a hard-line is more likely to lead to a satisfactory outcome than a soft line, or vice versa. In most cases where direct actionwas taken, some innocent civilian loss of life occurred. On the other hand, the South Moluccans executed hostages in cold blood in the course of prolonged and patient negotiations. In trying to balance the relative merits of "hard-line" versus "soft-line" it is probably true to say that in each individual case a policy of patient negotiation is more likely to save the lives of the hostages concerned.

6. OPTIONS OPEN TO GOVERNMENT

6.1. In dealing with an actual terrorist incident where hostages are involved the Government would be likely to find the following courses open to it and could elect:

a. to secure the release of the hostages unharmed, regardless of cost;

b. to secure the release of hostages unharmed while conceding as little as possible to the terrorists;

c. to attempt to secure the release of the hostages and to neutralize the terrorists by offensive action;

d. to capture or kill the terrorists regardless of the risk to hostages.

6.2. If a is chosen, tactical options will be limited, since the Government may be expected to accede to the terrorists' demands in full. This carries the risk that further demands will be made and the country seen as easy prey by other terrorist organisations.

6.3. If b or c are selected, a wide range of tactical options will be open, depending on the scenario. Procrastination will be needed, e.g. spinning out the negotiations, in order that the most practical course to follow may become manifest. One of the many ways to extend negotiations is for the negotiator to explain to the terrorists that he has no power to comply with certain demands and that the matter must be referred to a higher authority which will take time.

6.4. If d is adopted, it will still be necessary to play for time while the required forces are mustered and briefed irrespective of whether the incident takesplace in Auckland, Wellington or Christchurch.

6.5. The position may not be clear cut, particularly if demands are made which are outside the control of the Government, e.g. the release of prisoners held in other countries or if the hostages include diplomatic or VIPs from foreign countries. In such an event, ploys appropriate to the prevailing circumstances would need to be employed to spin out negotiations while the Government consulted other governments.

7. NEGOTIATIONS

7.1. In New Zealand the main task of negotiating with terrorists will fall to the Police who will have interpreters, intelligence and other specialist support to call upon.

7.2. Negotiations may turn on demands within the power of the New Zealand Government to grant such as the release of a terrorist in custody. The terrorists may, however, make demands which can only be met by other governments. In this event intense government to government consultation may be involved.

7.3. It is now recognised that procrastination can gain time for the security forces and that, if negotiations are sufficiently protracted, they may wear down the terrorists both physically and mentally, eventually inducing them to reduce their demands even, on occasions, to the point where they will simply accept safe passage out of the country rather than stay to die with their hostages. Procrastination has not always worked however; the West German passenger murdered by terrorists during the Dubai-Tunis VC-10 hijack of November 1974 was killed in order to pressurize the authorities whom the terrorists thought were dragging their feet. It is therefore important that in using delaying tactics the authorities should be careful to avoid overplaying their hand. Terrorists must not be allowed to become dangerously frustrated or hysterical.

8. CONTROL OF THE NEWS MEDIA

8.1. It is inevitable that the attention of the news media will be drawn rapidly to any terrorist incident in New Zealand. In incidents overseas terrorists have recognised and utilised the potential of the news media to propogate their cause and justify their actions. Such publicity could become a tool to pressure the authorities into submitting to the terrorists' demands and so save hostages' lives. The media can be, and has been, used an an active- albeit unwitting - extension of the terrorists' capabilities; it provides an up-to-date flow of information on the activities of the authorities and their response to the terrorists' demands. At Munich for instance, the terrorists were able to watch the activities of the security forces broadcast on the world's television networks; and when JRA terrorists occupied the French Embassy in The Hague in 1974 they monitored BBC news broadcasts. Obviously there is a need for tight control of information released to the press and it should be anticipated that information about an incident will emanate only from official Government sources, the Commissioner of Police and the operational commander.

9. Conclusion

9.1. If and when a terrorist incident occurs in New Zealand, the Government will have to take decisions on some or all of the questions raised above. Such decisions can only be taken in the light of the situation prevailing at the time of the incident, both domestic and international. It would clearly not be prudent for the Government to commit itself in advance to any particular course of action. It has already announced the formation of a Cabinet Committee on Terrorism, the formation of the Terrorist Intelligence Centre, and the arrangements that it has made for the Defence forces to back up the Police if this should be necessary. By expressing support for the objectives of the Bonn Declaration, it has signalled its attitude on the crucial question of aircraft hijacking. The consensus among officials is that there is no need for any further general announcement of policy at this stage.

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SECRET

CABINET OFFICE,

WELLINGTON.

13 May 1980

File - TE(80)1 refers

PRIME MINISTER

CABINET COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

The attached paper has been referred to the Cabinet Committee by the Chairman of the Officials Committee on Terrorism.

Would you wish this paper circulated for information only, or would you like a meeting of the Cabinet Committee arranged for it to be discussed?

P G Millen
Secretary of the Cabinet

RESTRICTED

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BULLETIN

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

NOVEMBER 1979

B4-79-1 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - A BRIEF ASSESSMENT (RESTRICTED)
B4-79-2 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING 1979 (RESTRICTED)
B4-79-3 AIRCRAFT HIJACKING (RESTRICTED)

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

NOVEMBER 1979

B4-79-1 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - A BRIEF ASSESSMENT

1. The 1970's will be remembered as a period of intense terrorist activity including the outrages of the Lod Airport massacre of May 1972 and the Munich incident later in the same year. As the present decade draws to a close it will be useful to briefly review the situation in respect of international terrorism.

TERRORIST GROUPS

2. Perhaps the most significant factor to emerge from any review of terrorism today is that, so far, despite the counter-terrorist efforts of many countries, none of the major terrorist groups have been eliminated or become moribund. The history of violence by the IRA and over 30 years of communist terrorist activity in Malaysia clearly indicates that terrorist organisations cannot always be entirely eradicated. Not only do groups remain intact, so too does their support infrastructure. It is, however, important to note that terrorist groups have so far failed in their long-range objective of coercing fundamental governmental policy.

3. There appears to be no lack of new recruits for the various terrorist organisations and it can be expected that when terrorists do sustain casualties - as the Baader-Meinhoff group has over recent years - there will be others willing to take their place, particularly the disaffected young who, amongst other things, doubtless expect to gain a type of self aggrendizement from being part of the terrorist mystique.

4. With well over a hundred terrorist organisations extant throughout the world, few have a history of operating outside their own national boundaries. Those that have, including the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Arab groups, and some European groups, are of particular concern, especially to those countries without indigenous terrorist organisations. Some extremely dangerous groups continue to confine their activities to their own countries. Typical of these is the Red Brigades of Italy, a group that has, so far, remained within its own country, attacking only Italian targets. Nevertheless, as international terrorist cooperation develops there is every possibility that the Red Brigades could, at some future time, join with other terrorist groups to mount trans-national attacks outside Italy.

5. The Japanese Red Army is perhaps typical of the smaller groups that have forced governments to expend resources out of scale with the magnitude of the actual threat they pose. Ever since the successful hijack of a JAL aircraft to Dacca in September 1977, the security forces of the world have been in somewhat of a "waiting for the other boot to drop" situation in respect of the JRA. This small, very professional terrorist group, all members of which are operationally experienced, was expected to make another strike during 1979. To date this has not eventuated. The JRA has indicated that in future it will act without the support of other groups and strike only at Japanese institutions and companies. This of course is of considerable relevance to those countries with resident Japanese diplomatic establishments or large Japanese commercial undertakings.

TERRORIST ACTIVITY

6. The main areas of terrorist activity continue to be Europe, the Middle East and South America. Brief comments on the activities of the three most prominent groups with a history of trans-national terrorism are:

a. Red Army Faction (RAF) (Baader-Meinhoff). This group has been badly mauled by the German security forces over recent years and many of the original members and hierarchy have been knocked out. This could account for a reduction in the number of incidents attributed to the RAF. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the group has many sympathisers and that a "second phase" of leadership is appearing.

b. The Arab Groups. Arab terrorists remain active and continue to foray abroad, particularly in Europe. In the main, their success record has not been impressive over the past two years. Highlights of their activities have been the incidents resulting from the internecine struggle between the various Arab terrorist factions.

c. The Japanese Red Army (JRA). There is no firm evidence about the exact location of the 20 or so hardcore members of this group. It is generally believed however that they continue to be based in the Middle East, near the Beirut area. A group of nine JRA members who hijacked a JAL aircraft to North Korea in 1970 are believed to have remained in that country ever since. There have been unconfirmed reports of JRA sightings in Southern Europe.

7. It is now over two years since the last incident of trans-national terrorism, in which terrorists from different national groups combined to mount an attack (Mogadishu - Oct. 77). This, together with the pattern of terrorist activity in recent years, gives encouraging indications that trans-national terrorism may be on the wane. It should be noted however that in the last decade or so less than a dozen incidents of trans-national terrorism have taken place (including Lod 1972, Munich 1972, OPEC Building 1975).

TERRORIST WEAPONS

8. No new or sophisticated weapons have appeared for general use by terrorists. Handguns, small machine guns/pistols and improvised explosive devices continue to feature prominently in the terrorist armoury. Weapons such as these are being used with ever increasing effectiveness.

9. There is evidence that terrorists do have access to advanced weaponry but conventional weapons do not present the terrorists with problems of movement and logistics, as would, for instance, the SA-7 Grail missile. It is this type of Soviet-built missile that was used to shoot down two Air Rhodesia Viscounts. A similar missile was found in the possession of Arab terrorists near Rome's Fuimicino Airport in 1973.

10. Recent incidents in Ireland in which explosive devices were used to kill Lord Mountbatten and a number of British soldiers are examples of the perfecting of terrorist techniques. Although the type of remote triggering devices used in those incidents have been referred to as sophisticated, they are really no more sophisticated than electronic controls for model aircraft.

AIRCRAFT HIJACKING

11. Ever since the late 1960's commercial air carriers worldwide have been confronted with attacks by organised terrorist groups. The murder of air crew and passengers, sabotage of aircraft, air piracy, ransom demands and the considerable disruption of services resulting from these acts did not, until recently, show signs of abating. It is now two years since the last incident of aircraft hijacking by a terrorist group; (In October 1977, a Lufthansa flight from Majorca to Frankfurt was seized by trans-national terrorists. This incident culminated in a successful counter-attack by German security forces whilst the aircraft was grounded at Mogadishu. Less than a month earlier, members of the Japanese Red Army successfully hijacked a Japanese airliner to Dacca) thus, not since the late 1960's has there been such a prolonged period free of aircraft hijacking by organised terrist groups.

12. In the earlier years of terrorist activity, terrorist groups had considerable success - and occasional setbacks - in mounting operations in which unprotected commercial aircraft and allied facilities played a prominent part. Invariably, the outcome was that terrorists achieved not only their principal objectives but maximum publicity "mileage" as well. Why then are the major terrorist groups seemingly reluctant to continue with this form of terrorism? No single factor emerges as an explanation, although some commentators have expressed the view that terrorists no longer believe that aircraft

hijacking will get them the attention that they want and therefore it does not pay off. A more plausible explanation is that counter-terrorist measures introduced by many countries of the world are making the hitherto "soft" targets of air terminals and passenger aircraft much more difficult to penetrate. The high degree of security at many air terminals must be a major contributing factor to the lull in terrorist attack against aircraft. The swift reaction by security forces at Orly Airport in May 1978 and Brussels Airport in April 1979 cannot have escaped the attention of terrorist planners.

13. Regretably, the void in terrorist hijacking has to a certain degree been filled by recent, almost epidemic-like incidents of actual or attempted hijackings by the self motivated or mentally deranged "loner". Of some consolation is the fact that incidents of this kind have not generally resulted in the turmoil, expense, damage and loss of life associated with terrorist inspired incidents of the mid-seventies.

CONCLUSION

14. In taking stock of international terrorism, after more than a decade of terrorist activity worldwide, it is clear that whilst there are some encouraging signs there are no panaceas for eradicating terrorism.

15. As lines of communication between terrorist groups are extended and strengthened the cross-fertilization of skills and techniques could bring about a resumption of trans-national terrorism. As in the past the terrorists will doubtless continue to seek the soft, unprotected target but may be less inhibited than previously if that target is located beyond their own national boundaries.

16. The recent decline in aircraft hijacking by terrorist groups must, to a large extent, be attributed to the extensive security measures instituted by many governments at major air terminals. The security screen around air terminals presents additional hazards to terrorists moving from country to country by air and this could be a contributing factor to the fall-off in trans-national terrorist activity.

17. In the absence of an effective international ban on terrorist activity, the best defence to limit and counter terrorism will continue to be timely, relevant intelligence and speedy communication of it between the counter-terrorist agencies worldwide.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

NOVEMBER 1979

B4-79-2 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING 1979

The more prominent terrorist incidents of the period 1 April - 23 November 1979 are listed below:

3 Apr 1979 FRENCH BANK BOMBED IN SPAIN

A bomb exploded at a French bank in Madrid. Damage to the bank building was extensive; no injuries were reported. In a second incident local police saw suspects running from another French bank in Madrid and found a bomb in the doorway of the building. The bomb was removed and exploded with minor damage to adjacent buildings; again there were no injuries. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorist group claimed responsibility for the two incidents in reprisal for the French Government's cooperation with Spain to return ETA members who seek safe-haven in France.

5 Apr 1979 EXPLOSION AT THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN CYPRUS

A bomb exploded at the entrance of the building housing the Israeli Embassy in Nicosia. No injuries were reported. No major damage to the Embassy offices was reported; however, windows in the building were shattered.

5 Apr 1979 BOMB DETONATED AT TOUR AGENCY IN CYPRUS

There was an explosion at the offices of a tour agency which represents Egyptair, Egypt's national airline, in Nicosia. There was property damage but no injuries were reported.

6 Apr 1979 EXPLOSION DAMAGES NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT IN FRANCE

Saboteurs detonated three plastic explosive devices at a French factory where nuclear equipment was being built. The explosion heavily damaged two research reactors which had been scheduled for shipment to Iraq within a month. Reactor components destined for Belgium and West

Germany were also damaged. There was no radioactive material at the site near Toulon on the Mediterranean coast. No injuries were reported. In a telephone call to a Paris newspaper a "French ecologist group" claimed responsibility for the incident.

15 Apr 1979 BOMB THROWN AT EGYPTIAN EMBASSY IN TURKEY

A bomb was thrown at the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara. Damage was limited to broken windows; no injuries were reported. No group has claimed responsibility.

16 Apr 1979 TERRORIST ATTACK IN BELGIAN AIRPORT

A group of Palestinian terrorists dropped handgrenades into a lounge area of the Brussels airport. An El Al plane was about to deplane 160 passengers when the attack took place in the terminal. They were captured with the aid of Israeli security agents. One of the pair was wounded in the shoot out. They carried forged Iranian passports at the time of their arrest. A number of Belgians were wounded in the grenade attack. The PLO denied involvement in the incident; a new Palestinian group calling itself Black March claimed responsibility.

19 Apr 1979 PACKAGE BOMB EXPLOSION AT EGYPTIAN POST OFFICE

A package exploded in the Cairo post office killing one and injuring four persons in the area. A post office employee was inspecting the cigar box package, which had been sent from an Arab country, in order to assess custom duties when it exploded. A group calling itself the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution claimed responsibility for the incident.

22 Apr 1979 EXPLOSION AT JEWISH CENTRE IN AUSTRIA

During the night of 22-23 April explosives were detonated at a Jewish Centre in Vienna. No injuries or damage was reported. A group calling itself the Eagles of the Revolution claimed responsibility for the incident.

23 Apr 1979 PACKAGE BOMB EXPLODES IN MOZAMBIQUE POST OFFICE

A package mailed from Ghana exploded in the post office in Maputo. The explosion injured six postal workers. As in a previous incident the package was addressed to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). (In November 1978 a letter bomb killed one person and injured three others as it was being opened in ZANU's office).

26 Apr 1979 EXPLOSIONS AT FRENCH CONSULATE AND BANK BRANCH IN SPAIN

Two bombs detonated in Seville, one at the French Consulate and another at a branch of a French bank. Damage as a result of the bombs was minor (broken windows), and no injuries were reported. The ETA claimed responsibility for the bombs in a phone call and note to local media.

30 Apr 1979 RENAULT SHOWROOM BOMBED IN SPAIN

A homemade bomb detonated outside the Renault showroom in Bilbao. No injuries were reported; however, showroom windows and windows in nearby buildings were broken. Local police believe Basque separatists were responsible for the bomb as a protest for a French crackdown on Basque refugees.

6 May 1979 EXPLOSIVES DETONATED AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN TURKEY

Two explosive devices were detonated at the international terminal of the Istanbul airport. One explosion went off inside a transit bus which transports passengers between the planes and the terminal resulting in heavy damage to the bus, but no injuries. The other explosion resulted in extensive damage to a restroom area which is accessible only to international passengers in transit or cleared for boarding and is directly over the VIP lounge area.

7 May 1979 BOMB EXPLOSION AT THE SPANISH EMBASSY IN SWITZERLAND

Just before dawn on 7 May a bomb exploded at the Spanish Embassy in Switzerland. There was damage to the building, but no injuries were reported. Several news agencies received messages from the July 8 Autonomous Group claiming they were responsible for the bombing.

18 May 1979 EXPLOSION AT THE CUBAN INTEREST SECTION IN WASHINGTON D.C.

A bomb exploded behind the three-storey building which houses the Cuban Interest Section in Washington. The explosion broke windows in nearby buildings; no injuries were reported. A man called the Associated Press and claimed Omega 7 was responsible for the incident.

13 June 1979 NUCLEAR POWER CENRE BOMBED IN SPAIN

A bomb was detonated at the site of a nuclear power centre in Lemoniz. One workman was killed. The reactors were undamaged, and damage from a fire which was ignited by the explosion was only minor. ETA has claimed responsibility for the bombing.

21 June 1979 FRENCH BUSINESSMAN KILLED IN GABON

A French citizen, the managing director of Diesel-Gabon, and his wife were killed when their car blew up in Libreville. The explosive charge detonated when the ignition was turned on. No group has claimed responsibility.

25 June 1979 ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE NATO COMMANDER IN BELGIUM

The Commander of NATO, General Alexander Haig, was the target of an assassination attempt as he was being driven to his office in Casteau. A bomb, set off by remote control caused little damage and no injuries to the occupants of his car. The security follow car was heavily damaged and three security guards in the follow car were injured. It is believed the Red Army Faction was responsible for this incident.

30 June 1979 BELGIAN TOURISTS INJURED BY EXPLOSION ON A BEACH IN SPAIN

Two Belgian tourists were seriously injured when a bomb exploded at a beach near Marbella, Spain. ETA, the Basque separatist group, has been exploding bombs to sabotage tourism in Spain; this is the first detonation which has resulted in serious injuries. The beach area was being evacuated following a telephone warning when the bomb detonated.

30 Jun 1979 EXPLOSION ON FRENCH BORDER WITH SPAIN

A bomb was detonated at the residence of the assistant prefect in Bayonne. Windows were broken in the area of the explosion but no injuries were reported. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident.

13 Jul 1979 SIEGE AT EGYPTIAN EMBASSY IN ANKARA

Four Palestinian guerillas took over the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara by gunpoint, taking 14 hostages, including the Ambassador. The guerillas belonged to the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution and finally surrendered after a 45 hour siege. One man died and another was seriously injured when they jumped from a window to escape.

14 Aug 1979 ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON

Unidentified gunmen in West Beirut wounded the Iraqi Ambassador to Lebanon, his driver and a bodyguard in a rocket-propelled grenade and machine-gun attack on the Ambassador's car. The "July 14 movement" an Iraqi guerilla group claimed responsibility for the attack.

17 Aug 1979 WEST GERMAN EMBASSY BOMBED IN LEBANON

A bomb exploded at the entrance of the FRG Embassy in Beirut. Damage was limited to broken windows and a door was destroyed, no injuries were reported. No group has claimed responsibility.

22 Aug 1979 EXPLOSION OUTSIDE TURKISH CONSULATE IN SWITZERLAND

A bomb exploded outside the Turkish Consulate in Geneva. There was only minor property damage. Three cars carrying consulate officials, including the Turkish Vice Consul, were passing in front of the building; one of the drivers' was injured as well as two pedestrians. The Armenian Secret Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the explosion.

23 Aug 1979 BOMBS IN TEL AVIV AMUSEMENT PARK

Terrorists planted three bombs in a Tel Aviv amusement park crowded with thousands of visitors but only three people were wounded when two of the devices exploded. It is not known who was responsible for this incident.

27 Aug 1979 ASSASSINATION OF LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN

Lord Mountbatten was assassinated along with his grandson and a boat-man when a bomb ripped his fishing boat apart off the west coast of the Irish Republic. The Provisional Irish Republican Army claimed responsibility. The bomb was believed to have been hidden in the boat. In Northern Ireland at the same time explosions killed 18 British soldiers.

28 Aug 1979 BELFAST MAN GUNNED DOWN

A 43 year old father of ten was shot down at the doorstep of his Belfast home soon after the outlawed Ulster Freedom Fighters announced they would be going on the offensive again, in view of recent IRA attacks.

3 Sep 1979 EXPLOSIVES THROWN AT LIBYAN EMBASSY

Explosives were thrown at the Libyan Embassy in Ankara, Turkey, shattering windows in the Embassy and in surrounding buildings. No injuries were reported and the identity of the bombers has not been determined.

12 Sep 1979 TRAIN HIJACK - BELFAST

Irish Republican guerillas hijacked a goods train and sent it driverless towards a small Northern Ireland border town where it crashed and blocked the main Dublin/Belfast line.

12 Sep 1979 CORSICAN TERRORISTS SET OFF FIVE EXPLOSIONS IN FRANCE

The Lyon central business district was rocked by a rapid series of five explosions. The bombs damaged two banks, two travel agencies and a Post Office building. No injuries were reported. The Corsican National Liberation Front (CLNC) was responsible.

19 Sep 1979 TERRORISTS ASSASSINATE SPANISH MILITARY OFFICERS IN BASQUE CITY

In the Basque part of Bilbao, three terrorists ambushed an army jeep and machine gunned the occupants. No organisation has claimed responsibility but officials presume that the terrorist organisation ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) is responsible.

23 Sep 1979 SPANISH MILITARY GOVERNOR ASSASSINATED

Basque separatists shot Lt. General Lorenzo Gonzales-Valles Sanchez, the Military Governor of Guipuzcoa Province, while he was taking a walk down a busy promenade with his wife.

29 Sep 1979 ARMENIAN BOMBS DISARMED AT TURKISH AIRPORT

Local police deactivated two bombs in the transit lounge of Esenboga Airport in Ankara, Turkey. The secret Armenian Army in Beirut, Lebanon informed the Associated Press that it was responsible for the explosions. The editor related the information to local Turkish authorities who uncovered and disarmed the bombs before they could explode.

1 Oct 1979 ARMED ATTACK ON BRITISH MILITARY IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Shots were fired at a British military landrover in Belfast shortly after the pope left Ireland. The attack was mounted from a house, the occupants of which were held hostage, until the perpetrators fled following the shooting. Two British soldiers sustained minor injuries. The PIRA claimed responsibility for the attack.

4 Oct 1979 EXPLOSION AT TURKISH AIRLINE OFFICE IN DENMARK

A bomb exploded outside the Turkish Airlines office in downtown Copenhagen. A second bomb which had not exploded was found nearby together with a note from the Armenian Secret Army for a free Armenia. Two people were injured.

27 Oct 1979 EXPLOSION AT THE CUBAN UN MISSION IN NEW YORK

A bomb exploded outside the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York City. The explosion shattered windows and caused extensive damage to the mission. Two passers by and two police officers were injured. An anti-Castro group claimed responsibility for the bombing.

13 Nov 1979 ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL WOUNDED

A machinegun and grenade attack outside the Israeli Embassy in Lisbon wounded the Ambassador and killed his Portugese bodyguard. Four hours later the Gabonese Embassy in Lisbon was evacuated following a telephoned bomb threat. It is believed that the attack was one of the consequences of the friendly reception given to PLO leader Yasser Arafat when he attended a five-day world conference of solidarity with the Arab people and the Palestine cause.

20 Nov 1979 EXPLOSIONS SHAKE THREE AIRLINE OFFICES IN PARIS

Three policemen were slighty hurt when explosions shook three airline offices in central Paris yesterday. The injured men were guarding the offices of Turkish Airlines. Also attacked were offices belonging to KLM Dutch Airlines and the West German Airline Lufthansa.

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

NOVEMBER 1979

B4-79-3 AIRCRAFT HIJACKING

Aircraft hijacking, mainly by "loners", continued throughout the second half of 1979. As in 1978, 1979 was free of aircraft hijacking activity by organised terrorist groups. A list of recorded incidents for the period 11 June 1979 to 23 November 1979 follows:

11 Jun 1979 U.S. JETLINER HIJACKED TO CUBA

A Delta Airlines jet, carrying 206 passengers and crew, was hijacked to Cuba. The lone hijacker, a former lieutenant in the Cuban Air Force, had been in the U.S. since late 1969 after flying a Cuban Mig-17 to Florida. He was arrested in Havana, where the hijacked plane landed. No injuries were reported. The jet returned to Florida with all other passengers and crew.

20 Jun 1979 AMERICAN AIRLINES JET HIJACKED

An American Airlines jet flying from New York to Chicago, was hijacked by a Serbian nationalist. The man, carrying several bags he said contained plastic explosive, released all passengers and all but three crew members in Chicago. He demanded the release of a Serbian in prison in Chicago and a flight to Peru. When the demands were not met the plane took off with the hijacker and his lawyer and returned to New York where they changed planes and continued to Shannon, Ireland. The hijacker was taken into custody by Irish authorities who returned him to the United States where he was sentenced on a 1975 charge of participating in the bombing of a Yugoslav Consul General's home and an alleged plot to bomb the Yugoslav Social Club in 1978, both in Chicago.

30 Jun 1979 UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO HIJACK EASTERN AIRLINES AIRCRAFT

An attempt was made to hijack an Eastern Airlines Flight while en route from San Juan, Puerto Rico to Miami, Florida. Approximately 1½ hours after departure a distraught man took a bottle and tried to break it, he then threatened to burn the aircraft if not taken to Cuba. A flight attendant managed to overpower him and he was taken into custody at Miami, Florida by police.

9 Jul 1979 UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF ECUADORIAN AIRCRAFT

An attempt was made to hijack a Fairchild 29 aircraft while on a domestic flight from Tulcan to Quito, Ecuador. When the aircraft was about 15 miles north of Quito a young man displayed a pistol and a stick of dynamite and ordered a stewardess to tell the pilot that there was a bomb aboard and that he should fly the aircraft to Costa Rica. The pilot continued the landing process and ordered all passengers to lie on the floor. After the plane landed, the door where the passengers were lying was opened and the passengers jumped out, the hijacker realising this fired shots, he then tried to reload his pistol and it jammed. He was overpowered by the co-pilot and taken into custody by Ecuadorian police.

25 Jul 1979 UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING ATTEMPT ON BANGLADESH AIRCRAFT

An attempt was made to hijack a Bangladesh Fokker F-27 aircraft while on a domestic flight from Jessone to Dacca, Bangladesh. Shortly after take-off the hijacker brandishing a knife (and what was later determined to be a toy pistol), went to the front of the aircraft stating that a bomb was planted in the aircraft. He demanded the plane divert to Dum Dum, Clacutta, India. The plane landed at Calcutta and after approximately 10 hours negotiation the hijacker agreed to surrender. Subsequent investigation revealed that no bomb had been planted.

5 Aug 1979 SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF A SPANISH AIRCRAFT

An Iberia International Airlines flight was hijacked shortly after landing at Puerto Del Rosario, Canary Islands after a domestic flight from Las Palmes, Canary Islands. Armed with machine guns three deserters from the Spanish Foreign Legion forced their way aboard a DC-9 aircraft indicating they wanted to go to a country that would give them political asylum. The plane eventually flew to Lisbon, Portugal. After 14 hours negotiation the aircraft departed for Geneva where the three surrendered to Swiss authorities.

16 Aug 1979 INCOMPLETE HIJACKING OF AN EASTERN AIR LINE AIRCRAFT

An attempt was made to hijack an Eastern Air Lines flight while en route from Guatemala City, Guatemala to Miami, Florida. Shortly after take-off a man told a flight attendant that he had a bomb and demanded to be flown to Cuba. During a conversation between the pilot and the hijacker the pilot overpowered the hijacker and the aircraft proceeded to Miami where the hijacker was arrested. No explosives were found.

24 Aug 1979 SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF A LIBYAN AIRCRAFT

A Libyan Arab Airlines flight was hijacked while en route on the domestic leg of a flight from Benghazi to Tripoli, Libya and then to Frankfurt, West Germany. When the aircraft was approximately mid-way between Benghazi and Tripoli, a Libyan male produced a pistol and ordered the crew to fly the aircraft to a non-Arab nation. The aircraft finally landed at Larnaca, Cyprus after being refused permission at Beirut, Lebanon and Damascus. The hijacker then surrendered and was taken into custody by the Cypriot authorities.

7 Sep 1979 SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF UNITED AIRLINES AIRCRAFT

A United Airlines flight was hijacked while en route from Portland, Oregon to Los Angeles, California. During the flight a man gave the flight attendant a note indicating that he was carrying a bomb, and demanding that the pilot report the aircraft had been hijacked and that it return to Portland. The pilot convinced the hijacker that it would be necessary to land at San Francisco to refuel. The aircraft then proceeded to Portland where the hijacker made a list of demands including instructions to pay various debts etc. A short time later the hijacker surrendered . No explosives were found.

12 Sep 1979 SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF LUFTHANSA AIRCRAFT

A Lufthansa German Airlines flight was hijacked while en route from Frankfurt to Cologne, Federal Republic of Germany. Shortly after leaving Frankfurt a male gained access to the cockpit, threatened the crew with what appeared to be a pistol and demanded to speak to the Chancellor of the FRG in the presence of news agency representatives. The aircraft landed at Cologne/Bonn airport and negotiations were intiated. The hijacker eventually surrendered after being allowed to read a statement to authorities by radio.

27 Sep 1979 SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF ALITALIA AIRCRAFT

An Alitalia aircraft was hijacked while en route from Beirut, Lebanon to Rome, Italy. During the flight three men produced pistols and demanded that the plane be flown to Havana, Cuba. The aircraft headed towards Nice, France for refueling after being initially refused permission to land at Rome. The hijackers principal demand was to bring the case of their missing religious leader, Imem Musa Sadr before the Nonaligned Movement Summit Conference being held in Havana. The Italian authorities then convinced the hijackers that they should not require that the aircraft fly to Cuba - the hijackers then demanded to be flown to Tehran, Iran where they surrendered and were taken into custody by Iranian authorities.

16 Oct 1979 SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES AIRCRAFT

A Libyan Arab Airlines aircraft was hijacked while on a domestic flight from Hon to Triploi, Libya. Three male hijackers commandeered the Fokker F-27 aircraft reportedly carrying 49 passengers and crew, using a homemade gasoline bomb and knives. They initially ordered the pilot to fly to Switzerland but finally agreed to land at Malta at about 1430 hours due to a fuel shortage. During negotiations the hijackers demanded and were told they would be allowed to hold a press conference. The hijackers surrendered to Maltese authorities and the aircraft with its other passengers and crew departed for Libya at about 1630 hours. During the press conference held on October 17, 1979, the hijackers claimed that the hijacking was undertaken to express their anger about unsettled financial problems. They chose to leave Libya by hijacking an aircraft because they did not have passports. The hijackers have been identified as Syrian nationals who had entered Libya to work about two years ago.

16 Oct 1979 SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT

A woman and her son, age 10, approached two private pilot instructors at Pierce Field, Lower Lake, California. The woman asked the pilots which one was going to fly out of Pierce Field. The pilots advised her that they were waiting to refuel and for fog clearance. The woman and her son then departed. When they returned a short time later, the woman approached one of the pilots and said "You are going to fly me out of here". According to the pilot, the woman had one hand on her purse and the flap was not fastened. He could not determine what was in the purse but he felt threatened. As he started to remove materials from his Piper Cherokee PA-28-140 aircraft with his back to the woman he heard a pistol fire. When he asked the woman why she had fired the weapon she replied "If you don't move, we will be in a hell of a mess". At approximately 1000 hours, the woman, her son and the pilot took off in the aircraft. Although they headed toward Napa, California, the woman insisted that they continue to fly. She did not give a destination. After about 35 minutes, while over the Napa Valley, the woman told the pilot to land at Napa. They landed at approximately 1107 hours. The woman and her son deplaned at Napa and were arrested shortly thereafter while still on the Napa airport. She was not armed when apprehended. Reportedly, after she fired the weapon at Pierce Field she left the weapon lying on the hood of a nearby automobile before boarding the aircraft. It was found and confiscated by the local police.

23 Nov 1979 JAPAN AIRLINES DOMESTIC FLIGHT HIJACKED

A DC-10 airliner was carrying 345 passengers and 11 crew from Osaka to Tokyo. The hijacker seized the plane and it landed at Narita Airport, Tokyo. The hijacker said he would kill a crew member if the plane was not refuelled within 10 minutes for a flight to the Soviet Union. The plane's captain overpowered the hijacker while the plane was on the ground at Narita and airport officials said the only weapon found on the hijacker was a pointed metal bottle opener.

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CABINET OFFICE

WELLINGTON

RESTRICTED

3 July 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR

Chairman
Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

Copies to:

Prime Minister
Chairman, Cabinet Committee on Civil Defence

LEAVE FROM THE HOUSE :
"PAIRS" WITH THE OPPOSITION

In situations where members of the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism would be required to meet without advance notice it was agreed by your colleagues in Cabinet yesterday that the Whips should grant immediate leave and arrange for automatic pairs with the Opposition. (Similar considerations would doubtless apply to the Cabinet Committee on Civil Defence).

It was suggested that you should ask the Whips to make suitable arrangements with the Opposition Whips.

Secretary of the Cabinet

Secretary, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

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EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

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With Compliments

(C.V. PHILLIPS)
Coordinator

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who attempted to close a security
door was shot in the stomach and fell unconscious just inside the front entrance.

2. Six employees of the bank who had just arrived for work were rounded up and, together with the man and the woman who had been brought into the bank, told to sit on the floor of a large vault. The Canadian police were alerted by a report of the shooting and the bank alarm going off. At about the same time they also received a telephone call from the Corbosian Consulate to the effect that the Corbosian Consul and his secretary had not arrived at the Consulate and there whereabouts were unknown.

3. At 0840 hours Canadian police surrounded the bank which is located on the ground floor of a three storied building in one of the main streets of Quebec. The upper floors of the building are used as a computer storage centre and normally unoccupied. Using a loud hailer the police ordered the gunmen to surrender but there was no response. The police then made telephone contact with the leader of the gunmen who said that he and his group were Solanian Independence Movement fighters. The leader said that there should be no attempt by the Police to storm the bank as bombs had been placed at vital points and the hostages would be killed. He confirmed that he held the Corbosian Consul, his secretary and six Canadian nationals as hostages. He said that he had demands to make but would only talk to someone in authority

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS
REPORT IS FICTITIOUS AND IS
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EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

SOLANIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT (SIM) TERRORISM

(Further to worldwide media coverage of the recent bank seige by SIM terrorists in Quebec, the following information has been received from the Canadian authorities).

1. At about 0830 hours on 17 April 1979, four armed men entered the bank of Corbosa in downtown Quebec, taking with them a man and a woman who had their hands tied behind their backs. The group had arrived at the front entrance of the bank in a large American car and they moved quickly from the car to the front entrance of the bank. The car then drove off at high speed. An armed guard who attempted to close a security door was shot in the stomach and fell unconscious just inside the front entrance.

2. Six employees of the bank who had just arrived for work were rounded up and, together with the man and the woman who had been brought into the bank, told to sit on the floor of a large vault. The Canadian police were alerted by a report of the shooting and the bank alarm going off. At about the same time they also received a telephone call from the Corbosian Consulate to the effect that the Corbosian Consul and his secretary had not arrived at the Consulate and there whereabouts were unknown.

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from the Canadian Government. The police said that an official from the Government would be called but that it would take at least 45 minutes to get someone; in the meantime would the gunmen agree to the wounded guard being removed to hospital? The leader said that the wounded man could be taken away, but only two men and a stretcher would be allowed to enter the bank. The wounded man was removed some minutes later without incident. Policemen who posed as hospital attendants saw only three men in the bank and later identified them as prominent SIM members living in Toronto. Two men were seen in possession of heavy calibre automatic pistols, thought to be .45 colts, and a third man carried a 9mm Sterling SMG. No explosive devices were seen.

4. Shortly before 0930 hours, a police officer telephoned the leader and said that he was a Government official with authority to negotiate. The terrorist leader then gave a list of demands which included:

a. A public announcement to be made over TV by the Canadian Government on the aims and objectives of the Solanian Independence Movement.

b. An assurance by the Canadian Government that diplomatic ties with Corbosa would cease unless moves were taken by the Corbosian Government to grant independence to the Solanian people.

c. The release of two SIM members held in a Quebec jail.

d. A long range aircraft to take the four SIM fighters and two prisoners out of Canada.

5. The Police negotiator told the SIM leader that the demands would take some considerable time to be put into effect and he would need at least until midday to present the demands to the Canadian government. The SIM leader said that he was not prepared to negotiate further and that if he did not receive an assurance by 1600 hours that all demands were completed the hostages would suffer. He then broke off telephone contact.

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REPORT IS FICTITIOUS AND IS
PREPARED FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES ONLY

Repeated attempts to make further contact with the terrorist leader met with no success.

6. Canadian police anti-terrorist forces were alerted and plans for assaulting the bank building were drawn up. Reconnaissance and plans of the building revealed a number of suitable entry points into the area where the gunmen were located. In the meantime further attempts were made to contact the gunmen so that food could be provided for the hostages. The terrorists made no attempt to answer telephone calls.

7. At 1600 hours the terrorist leader telephoned the police at the operational centre and demanded to know if all demands had been met. He was told that more time was needed to arrange, amongst other things, a suitable aircraft and crew. At this the leader said that he would commence killing the hostages at half hour intervals until he was satisfied that his demands would be met. Almost immediately a man came out of the front entrance of the bank with his hands raised and was promptly identified as the Corbosian Consul. He had taken only a few steps when he was cut down by a burst of automatic fire from the bank. Attempts to retrieve his body met with further gun fire from the bank.

8. The decision to assault the bank was made and, using an old lorry to crash through the plate glass window of the bank to create a diversion, police rushed the building. Two gunmen were killed in the ensuing gun battle with a police assault team and a third was critically injured when he detonated an explosive device near the entrance of the vault. The vault protected the hostages from the blast and a fourth terrorist, who had been guarding the hostages, then surrendered. Two policemen were slightly injured by the blast of the explosion. The seven hostages escaped unhurt.

9. Investigations into this incident by the Canadian police are continuing and the whereabouts of a Corbosian national named Jimonez CRIQUET is being sought. CRIQUET is believed to have master minded the incident and was identified as the driver of the car seen driving away from the bank. He is thought to have fled to the United States.

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TIC COMMENT

This latest incident is yet another example of the extent to which SIM terrorists will go to publicize their cause. This, together with past incidents by SIM terrorists, reveal a number of noteworthy points about the operational capabilities of the group. These include:

a. Careful planning and preparation before an incident.

b. Good command and control by leaders.

c. The use of good quality albeit, unsophisticated weapons.

d. A general determination to fight to the bitter end.

e. The use of small but efficient explosive devices.

f. A reluctance to engage in protracted negotiations.

Secretary, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

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BULLETIN

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With Compliments

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(C.J. PHILLIPS)
Coordinator

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File
18/6/79

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Mr A. Bisley, Prime Minister's Department	9
Mr J.R. Brady, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	10
Det. Chief Supt. M.T. Churches, Police Headquarters	11
Commander K.R. Moen, RNZN, Defence Headquarters	12
Mr B.J. Fletcher, External Intelligence Bureau	13
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BULLETIN

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JUNE 1979

B3-79-1 A REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT HIJACKING (RESTRICTED)

B3-79-2 CHOGRM: WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM (RESTRICTED)

B3-79-3 TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING (RESTRICTED)

B3-79-4 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1979 (RESTRICTED)

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Government Communications Security Bureau	8
Mr A. Bisley	
Mr J.R. Brady	
Det. Chief Supt. M.T. Churches	
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1 Ranger Squadron	18
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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JUNE 1979

B3-79-1 A REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT HIJACKING

1. It is now almost two years since the last incident of aircraft hijacking by an organised terrorist group. This is an encouraging trend and, given the continuation of international cooperation in combatting hijacking and the maintenance of effective security measures at air terminals, there is every possibility that the spate of terrorist hijacking experienced some years ago will not be repeated.

2. Some commentators have expressed the view that terrorist hijackings have ceased because terrorists no longer believe that aircraft hijacking will get them the attention that they want and that it has not paid off. A more plausible explanation is that terrorists are now faced with the problem of being refused permission to land with their hijacked aircraft, by almost every country in the world. Additionally they are being confronted with a high degree of defence at major air terminals. The swift reaction by security forces at Orly Airport in May 1978 and at Brussels Airport in April 1979 cannot have escaped the attention of terrorist planners who, in the past, have generally sought soft, unprotected targets.

3. The above factors will not, unfortunately, guarantee a complete cessation of aircraft hijacking by terrorist groups, nor will it alleviate the current, almost contagious spate of aircraft hijackings by mentally deranged or self motivated individuals. Two recent incidents in Australia could well have taken place in New Zealand and it is no consolation to know that the Aviation Security Service, in their security checking of passengers and baggage on flights out of New Zealand, continue to impound knives, axes, tools, small arms ammunition, shotgun cartridges, inflammable liquids and gases and a variety of other potentially dangerous objects and weapons.

4. Recorded incidents of aircraft hijacking for the first half of 1979 are listed as follows:

13 Jan 1979 INCOMPLETE HIJACK OF TUNIS AIR AIRCRAFT

A Tunis Air aircraft on route from Frankfurt to Djerba, Tunisia, was hijacked by Tunisian extremists demanding the release of two Tunisian political prisoners. After being refused permission to land on Malta, the aircraft was flown to Libya where the passengers were freed and the hijackers surrendered.

16 Jan 1979 INCOMPLETE HIJACK OF MIDDLE EAST AIRCRAFT

A Middle East Airlines aircraft was hijacked shortly after leaving Beirut for Amman, Jordan, by six Lebanese Muslim extremists. After being denied permission to land in Cyprus the aircraft returned to Beirut. The passengers were then freed and the hijackers surrendered following a press conference promoting their cause.

27 Jan 1979 INCOMPLETE HIJACK OF UNITED AIRLINES AIRCRAFT

A United Airlines 747 was hijacked by an emotionally unstable 49 year old woman while en-route from New York to Los Angeles. The woman claimed to have nitroglycerine but was overpowered 6½ hours after landing in New York by an F.B.I. agent.

27 Feb 1979 UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF SOVIET AIRLINER

Three members of Ananda Marga attempted to hijack a Moscow-bound Soviet aircraft shortly before a routine stopover in Stockholm . The three carried molotov cocktails which they were to use to self-immolate as a protest against Soviet treatment of Ananda Marga. They were overpowered and taken into custody by Swedish police.

8 Mar 1979 SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF NICARAGUAN AIRCRAFT

Three Sandinista National Liberation Front guerillas seized a small Nicaraguan charter aircraft and forced the pilot to fly to Costa Rica where they surrendered to the authorities. Apparently the guerillas intended to fly to Venezuela and sell the aircraft to buy arms but were foiled by lack of fuel.

16 Mar 1979 INCOMPLETE HIJACKING OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES AIRCRAFT

A Continental Airlines aircraft flying from Los Angeles to Miami was hijacked by a male passenger after a stopover at Phoenix. After the hijacker demanded $200,000 and passage to Cuba the aircraft landed at Tucsan airport where all the passengers were released and the crew escaped. The hijacker was, then overpowered and taken into custody.

4 Apr 1979 ATTEMPTED HIJACKING OF PAN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT

A male armed with a knife and a home-made bomb took a New Zealand women hostage and boarded an empty Pan Am 747 at Sydney airport. After a brief struggle the hostage was freed by police and the hijacker fatally shot when he attempted to light the bomb. Apparently the hijacker - an Italian - felt he had been mistreated in Australia.

9 Jun 1979 INCOMPLETE HIJACK OF TAA AIRLINER

A Trans Australian Airlines aircraft was hijacked from Coolangatta (Queensland) to Brisbane by an emotionally disturbed male armed with a shotgun. After releasing the passengers at Brisbane Airport, the hijacker was distracted by several of the hostesses and overpowered by others in the crew.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JUNE 1979

B3-79-2 CHOGRM: WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM
SINGAPORE 14-16 FEBRUARY 1979

1. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHOGRM) in Sydney in February 1978, a decision was made to establish a working group on terrorism with the object of exploring greater cooperation among member countries in combatting international terrorism.

2. The working group on terrorism met in Singapore in February 1979 and delegates from the following countries were in attendance:

Australia	Papua New Guinea
New Zealand	Sri Lanka
Bangladesh	Singapore
Fiji	Tonga
India	Western Samoa
Nauru	Malaysia

Observers from Hong Kong and the Commonwealth Secretariat were also present. The New Zealand delegation consisted of representatives from the Prime Minister's Department, Police, Defence, Terrorist Intelligence Centre and the New Zealand High Commission in Singapore.

3. A number of working papers were considered at the meeting and there was a useful exchange of ideas. Some of the more tangible results of the meeting were exchanges of contact point details between the counter-terrorist agencies of participating countries, an offer by Australia to provide assistance to other countries in counter-terrorist training and an undertaking by New Zealand to notify other countries of courses and training exercises in New Zealand in which they may wish to participate or observe.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JUNE 1979

B3-79-3 TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING: 28 - 29 JUNE 1979

1. The last strike by the Japanese Red Army (JRA) was the Japan Airlines aircraft hijack to Dacca in September 1977. Since that time, with no clear indication of the next move by the JRA, something of a cliff-hanger situation has developed, with many security forces around the world waiting for the next strike by this terrorist group.

2. There have been many alerts since early 1978 and, as a matter of course, anniversaries of JRA incidents, e.g. the Lod massacre, have called for extra vigilance.

3. With a declared policy of concentrating their attention on Japanese institutions and companies the JRA can be expected to view any disruption of the forthcoming Tokyo Economic Summit Meeting as a tour de force, bringing with it world - and Japanese public - attention and perhaps the means of reviving flagging morale within JRA ranks.

4. A JRA incident aimed at the meeting, directly or indirectly, in or out of Japan, will present the Japanese Government with an extremely embarrassing situation. JRA action against the institutions of any of the countries attending the meeting, including Canada and the EEC nations, will be no less effective in causing the Japanese Government maximum discomfort.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JUNE 1979

B3-79-4 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1979

The more prominent terrorist incidents for the period 1 January - 31 March 1979 are listed below:

13 Jan 1979 ETA LEADER CRITICALLY WOUNDED IN FRANCE

An ETA leader was shot down by unknown assailants in a town in the French Basque Provinces. Jose Manuel Pagoaga, thought to be the treasurer for a branch of ETA, was shot by attackers using a shot-gun fired from a van.

16 Jan 1979 MEXICAN EMBASSY OCCUPIED IN EL SALVADOR

Leftist youths occupied the Mexican Embassy, the Organisation of American States building and the Red Cross offices in San Salvador. The group, the United Popular Action Front, held six Mexicans and about 150 Salvadorans hostage in the Embassy. They demanded the release of political prisoners. They released all their hostages after being assured of political asylum in Mexico.

22 Jan 1979 FATAH LEADER KILLED IN BOMB ATTACK IN LEBANON

A bomb exploded killing nine people, including the Fatah security chief and his four bodyguards, and injuring several others. Ali Hassan Salamah, chief of Fatah "Special Operations", was driving away from his Beirut home when the remote controlled bomb detonated. He is believed to have been the leader of the BSO team which killed 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich on 5 September 1972.

12 Feb 1979 AIR RHODESIA PLANE CRASHES IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

A Rhodesian airliner crashed shortly after taking off from Kariba. There were no survivors among the 59 persons, mostly tourists, on the plane. It appeared the plane was hit by a ground-to-air missile. The guerillas are known to have missiles and used one to down a plane in the same area in September 1978.

13 Feb 1979 EXPLOSION AT CAIRO SHERATON HOTEL

A bomb exploded in the Cairo Sheraton Hotel injuring seven people. The bomb exploded in a first floor lavatory. Authorities arrested several "Palestinians and Jordanians" who were in the hotel when the bomb went off. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident.

14 Feb 1979 U.S. AMBASSADOR KIDNAPPED AND KILLED IN AFGHANISTAN

The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan was kidnapped while he was riding in his official car. It was stopped by a group of Muslim opponents of the Government. He was held hostage in a hotel room while the kidnappers demanded the Afghan Government release three persons recently arrested. Police shot their way into the hotel room in an attempt to rescue the Ambassador and he was killed in the crossfire between the kidnappers and police.

7 Mar 1979 BOMB EXPLOSION ON TOURIST BUS IN ISRAEL

A bomb detonated in the luggage compartment of a tourist bus near Jerusalem at Allenby Bridge over the Jordan river. Twelve persons were injured.

22 Mar 1979 BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE NETHERLANDS ASSASSINATED

The British Ambassador was shot and killed outside his home in The Hague by unknown gunmen. The Ambassador was leaving his home for the Embassy when the attack occurred. A butler, a Dutch citizen, was also shot and died later of his wounds. Local police had no clues to the identity of the attackers but speculation is that the IRA was involved.

23 Mar 1979 PLO DETONATES A BOMB IN ISRAEL

A bomb exploded at a taxi stand in downtown Jerusalem. Shrapnel sprayed the area resulting in minor property damage to several shops and the killing of one person and injury to about 12 others. Among the injured were a Canadian woman and a German man (both received minor wounds). The Palestine Liberation Organisation claimed responsibility for the bombing as part of a campaign to counter the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt.

25 Mar 1979 BOMBS DETONATED IN THE UNITED STATES BY ANTI-CASTRO GROUP

Three bombs exploded, one at Kennedy International Airport and two in New Jersey. The explosions resulted in property damage and injury to four persons. In a telephone call to AP a group describing itself as an anti-Castro terrorist group, Omega-7, claimed responsibility for the bombings. These acts were targeted against organisations it considers sympathetic to Cuban President Fidel Castro ; offices of the New Jersey Cuban Refuge program, a pharmacy which sends medical supplies to Cuba, and TWA in New York which until a few months ago flew charter tourist flights to Cuba.

27 Mar 1979 JEWISH FACILITIES BOMBED IN FRANCE

A restaurant of a Jewish student centre and a Jewish-owned perfume shop were bombed in Paris. More than 30 students, mostly French and Israeli, were injured, some seriously. In a telephone call to the news media a group calling itself the "Autonomous Intervention Collective Against the Zionist Presence in France and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace" claimed responsibility.

CABINET OFFICE

Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

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TE (79) 5
Copy No 7
19 June 1979

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE : AIR MOVEMENT INSTRUCTIONS

Attached for your information is a copy of the Air Movement Instructions for Exercise Lawmen Three. Please note that on Thursday 28 June:

proceeding north

Aircraft 1 (Andover) departs Government Hangar Wellington 0810 hours with:

Rt Hon B E Talboys
Hon D A Highet

Aircraft 2 (Andover) departs Government Hangar Wellington 0840 hours with:

Hon D MacIntyre
Hon T F Gill

returning south

Aircraft 1 (Andover) departs Whenuapai 1640 hours with:

Rt Hon B E Talboys
Hon D A Highet

Aircraft 2 (Andover) departs Whenuapai 1650 hours with:

Rt Hon R D Muldoon
Hon D MacIntyre
Hon T F Gill

(Signed) P G Millen

COPIES TO:

✓ Cabinet Committee on Terrorism
8 Hon D MacIntyre
9 Mr K J Marshall (Cabinet Office)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
RESTRICTED

All correspondence should be addressed to:
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE,
PRIVATE BAG, WELLINGTON, N.Z.
Telephone 726 499

In reply please quote:
Def 22/1/13

DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
WELLINGTON, N.Z.

18 June 1979

See Distribution List

EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE

AIR MOVEMENT INSTRUCTIONS

References: A. Def 22/1/13 dated 4 April 1979 (Exercise Instruction)

B. NZ Def Air 433 Air 9/6/111/6 of 120030Z Jun 79

1. RNZAF Aircraft travel arrangements for Exercise LAWMEN THREE are shown below. Passengers are requested to advise any changes direct to Squadron Leader Wooller, Staff Officer Movements (Air) telephone 726 499 extension 828 as soon as possible.

2. 24 June

Christchurch/Wellington/Hamilton.

Movement of 23 ATS personnel to arrive Hamilton by 1530 hours.
(Police to arrange road passenger transport and reception at all locations.)

3. 26 June

Christchurch/Whenuapai.

159 Army personnel from 2/1 RNZIR in two flights.
(Army to arrange road transport and reception.)

4. 28 June

(a) Aircraft 1 (Andover)

(i) Depart Government Hangar, Wellington 0810 hours Thursday ~~Wednesday~~, 28 June. Arrive Whenuapai 1000 hours 28 June.

(ii) Depart Whenuapai 1640 hours. Arrive Government Hangar, Wellington 1830 hours, 28 June.

(iii) Passengers

Rt Hon B. E. Talboys
Hon D. A. Highet
Wing Cdr J. B. Clements
Cdr Win
Lt Col Torrance
Lt Col Lawes
Lt Col Jenkin
Lt Col Willson
Lt Col Mann
Col Hamilton (North only)
Col A.J.A. Cooper
Col Jones (South only)
Maj Munro (South only)
Maj Howell
Insp Cuneen (North only)
Mr P. Jones
Mr L. Cross
Mr T. Phillips
Mr P. Ward (Police)
Maj Tupou (Tonga)
Mr H. H. Tongan (Tonga)
Col Buadromo (Fiji)
Mr Mooney (Australia)
Ambassador Quainton (USA) (North only)
Supt Khan (Cook Is)
Mr Ingram (Cook Is)
Mr Olssen (Nauru)
Supt Davies (North only)
Gp Capt B. J. O'Connor
Un-named foreign observers (Approx 4)

(b) Aircraft 2 (Andover)

(i) Depart Government Hangar, Wellington, 0840 hours, ~~Wednesday~~, 28 June. Arrive Whenuapai 1030 hours. Thursday

(ii) Depart Whenuapai 1650 hours. Arrive Government Hangar, Wellington 1840 hours.

(iii) Passengers

Rt Hon R. D. Muldoon (South only)
Hon D. MacIntyre
Air Cdr Hon T. F. Gill
Mr K. J. Marshall
Mr B. V. Galvin
Commissioner R. J. Walton (North only)
Air Marshal Sir Richard Bolt (North only)
Mr C.B.G. McLean
Mr F. H. Corner
Mr Molyneaux
Mr V. E. Jaynes
Major General R. H. Holloway
Major General B. M. Poananga
Air Cdre D. E. Jamieson
Cdre R. H. Humby
Air Cdre I. M. Gillard
Brig J. L. Smith
Col R. T. Taylor
Deputy Commissioner K. O. Thompson (North only)

5. 29 June

(a) C130 (Hercules) (Whenuapai/Wellington/Christchurch)

(i) Depart Whenuapai 1430 hours. Arrive Wellington 1555 hours. Depart Wellington 1630 hours. Arrive Christchurch 1725 hours.

(ii) Passengers

Air Marshal Sir Richard Bolt (to be confirmed)
Commissioner R. J. Walton
Deputy Commissioner K. O. Thompson
Chief Supt M. Churches
Lt Col T. D. Macfarlane
Insp Cuneen
Maj E. Manuera
Mr P. Ward
Mr J. Phillips
Insp Munro
Supt P. Gentry
Det Insp E. Mitten
Mr D. Hughes (Police)

Col Hamilton
Insp Mooney
Insp Farrow
Maj M. Farland
Sqn Ldr Hopper
23 members Police Anti-Terrorist Squad
Approx 10 further names to be advised

(b) C130 (Hercules)

Whenuapai/Christchurch

Return 159 members to 2/1 RNZIR to Christchurch ex LAWMEN THREE.

(Timing to be advised)

Domestic Transport

6. Wellington-based service personnel requiring domestic transport to and from the Government Hangar should advise pick-up points and times direct to WO1 Sushames (DSTP) extension 647.

Dress

7. Dress for Service personnel is uniform.

(D. J. Cheney)
Commodore, RNZN
for Secretary of Defence

Distribution: (Please distribute 1 per passenger)

Cabinet Committee on Terrorism (9)
(Attention: Mr P. Millen)
Officials Committee on Terrorism (8)
TIC (2)
EIB (2)
Police National HQ (12)
(Attention: Chief Supt M. Churches)
Mr L. Cross (Immigration) (2)
Navy Staff (2)
Army GS (12)
Air Staff (3)
DCDS
DOT
DDI
Col Cooper
Col Jones
MA to CDS
Sqn Ldr Hopper
Maj Munro
Foreign Observers (20)
Maj Farland
SO Mov (Air) (2)
DSTP (2)
DD Ops
Def Ops 3
Spare (10)

file 139/3

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CABINET OFFICE

Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

Copy No 7
19 June 1979

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE

EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE

The attached further paper from the Terrorist Intelligence Centre should be associated with TE (79) 3 - Exercise Lawmen Three : Instructions. It is self-explanatory.

Officials have been sent copies separately.

(Signed) P G Millen

COPIES TO:

5	Cabinet Committee on Terrorism	
5	Hon D MacIntyre	
6	Hon H C Templeton	
9	Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department)	
10	Commissioner of Police)	
11	Director of Security)	
12	Secretary of Defence)	
13	Chief of Defence Staff)	No attachment
14	Secretary of Foreign Affairs)	
15	Secretary for Civil Defence)	
16	Director, EIB)	

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PREPARED FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES ONLY

EXERCISE LAMMEN THREE

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

SOLANIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT (SIM) TERRORISM

(Further to worldwide media coverage of the recent bank seige by SIM terrorists in Quebec, the following information has been received from the Canadian authorities).

1. At about 0830 hours on 17 April 1979, four armed men entered the bank of Corbosa in downtown Quebec, taking with them a man and a woman who had their hands tied behind their backs. The group had arrived at the front entrance of the bank in a large American car and they moved quickly from the car to the front entrance of the bank. The car then drove off at high speed. An armed guard who attempted to close a security door was shot in the stomach and fell unconscious just inside the front entrance.

2. Six employees of the bank who had just arrived for work were rounded up and, together with the man and the woman who had been brought into the bank, told to sit on the floor of a large vault. The Canadian police were alerted by a report of the shooting and the bank alarm going off. At about the same time they also received a telephone call from the Corbosian Consulate to the effect that the Corbosian Consul and his secretary had not arrived at the Consulate and there whereabouts were unknown.

3. At 0840 hours Canadian police surrounded the bank which is located on the ground floor of a three storied building in one of the main streets of Quebec. The upper floors of the building are used as a computer storage centre and normally unoccupied. Using a loud hailer the police ordered the gunmen to surrender but there was no response. The police then made telephone contact with the leader of the gunmen who said that he and his group were Solanian Independence Movement fighters. The leader said that there should be no attempt by the Police to storm the bank as bombs had been placed at vital points and the hostages would be killed. He confirmed that he held the Corbosian Consul, his secretary and six Canadian nationals as hostages. He said that he had demands to make but would only talk to someone in authority

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from the Canadian Government. The police said that an official from the Government would be called but that it would take at least 45 minutes to get someone; in the meantime would the gunmen agree to the wounded guard being removed to hospital? The leader said that the wounded man could be taken away, but only two men and a stretcher would be allowed to enter the bank. The wounded man was removed some minutes later without incident. Policemen who posed as hospital attendants saw only three men in the bank and later identified them as prominent SIM members living in Toronto. Two men were seen in possession of heavy calibre automatic pistols, throught to be .45 colts, and a third man carried a 9mm Sterling SMG. No explosive devices were seen.

4. Shortly before 0930 hours, a police officer telephoned the leader and said that he was a Government official with authority to negotiate. The terrorist leader then gave a list of demands which included:

a. A public announcement to be made over TV by the Canadian Government on the aims and objectives of the Solanian Independence Movement.

b. An assurance by the Canadian Government that diplomatic ties with Corbosa would cease unless moves were taken by the Corbosian Government to grant independence to the Solanian people.

c. The release of two SIM members held in a Quebec jail.

d. A long range aircraft to take the four SIM fighters and two prisoners out of Canada.

5. The Police negotiator told the SIM leader that the demands would take some considerable time to be put into effect and he would need at least until midday to present the demands to the Canadian government. The SIM leader said that he was not prepared to negotiate further and that if he did not receive an assurance by 1600 hours that all demands were completed the hostages would suffer. He then broke off telephone contact.

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Repeated attempts to make further contact with the terrorist leader met with no success.

6. Canadian police anti-terrorist forces were alerted and plans for assaulting the bank building were drawn up. Reconnaissance and plans of the building revealed a number of suitable entry points into the area where the gunmen were located. In the meantime further attempts were made to contact the gunmen so that food could be provided for the hostages. The terrorists made no attempt to answer telephone calls.

7. At 1600 hours the terrorist leader telephoned the police at the operational centre and demanded to know if all demands had been met. He was told that more time was needed to arrange, amongst other things, a suitable aircraft and crew. At this the leader said that he would commence killing the hostages at half hour intervals until he was satisfied that his demands would be met. Almost immediately a man came out of the front entrance of the bank with his hands raised and was promptly identified as the Corbosian Consul. He had taken only a few steps when he was cut down by a burst of automatic fire from the bank. Attempts to retrieve his body met with further gun fire from the bank.

8. The decision to assault the bank was made and, using an old lorry to crash through the plate glass window of the bank to create a diversion, police rushed the building. Two gunmen were killed in the ensuing gun battle with a police assault team and a third was critically injured when he detonated an explosive device near the entrance of the vault. The vault protected the hostages from the blast and a fourth terrorist, who had been guarding the hostages, then surrendered. Two policemen were slightly injured by the blast of the explosion. The seven hostages escaped unhurt.

9. Investigations into this incident by the Canadian police are continuing and the whereabouts of a Corbosian national named Jimonez CRIQUET is being sought. CRIQUET is believed to have master minded the incident and was identified as the driver of the car seen driving away from the bank. He is thought to have fled to the United States.

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TIC COMMENT

This latest incident is yet another example of the extent to which SIM terrorists will go to publicize their cause. This, together with past incidents by SIM terrorists, reveal a number of noteworthy points about the operational capabilities of the group. These include:

a. Careful planning and preparation before an incident.

b. Good command and control by leaders.

c. The use of good quality albeit, unsophisticated weapons.

d. A general determination to fight to the bitter end.

e. The use of small but efficient explosive devices.

f. A reluctance to engage in protracted negotiations.

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CABINET OFFICE

Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

Copy No 7
6 June 1979

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE

The attached paper from the Terrorist Intelligence Centre should be associated with TE (79) 3 - Exercise Lawmen Three : Instructions. It is self self-explanatory.

Officials have been sent copies separately.

(Signed) P G Millen

COPIES TO:

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14	Chief of Defence Staff	
15	Secretary of Foreign Affairs	
16	Director of Civil Defence	
17	Director, EIB	

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EXERCISE LANCMEN THREE

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

CORBOSA AND THE SOLANIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT (SIM)

1. With a surface area roughly the size of Tasmania, the Republic of Corbosa is situated on the Western border of Bolivia between Peru and Chile and has a Pacific coast line of approximately 250 miles. The population of Corbosa in 1976 was estimated to be about 1½ million.

2. Following independence from Spain in the 19th century the economy of Corbosa was dominated by Britain, which provided the development capital and technical skills for the rich Northern mining district and the coastal farming and agricultural area. At the turn of this century several hundred thousand migrants, mostly from Spain and Portugal, settled in the Northern mining province of Solan, joining the descendants of the original Spanish settlers who had been traditionally involved in mining. Other settlers arrived from the old Ottoman Empire and these, together with the original Indian inhabitants and former Negro slaves, now make up the major proportion of the Corbosian population in the large Southern province. The seat of government, Cortez, is situated in the Southern province.

3. From about the time of the first world war the vast majority of the wealth of Corbosa has been derived from the huge deposits of copper, tin and silver in the Northern province of Solan. Mining in this area has always been in the control of the ethnic Spanish and Portugese, who have remained aloof from the ethnically mixed inhabitants of the larger Southern province of the country. People of the Solan province, whilst cherishing their independence as Corbosian nationals, have always had strong links with Spain. The political influence of Spain, particularly during the Franco regime, has, until recent years, inhibited the central government of Corbosa from moving towards the integration of people from the Southern province into Solan and a breaking up of the Spanish/Portugese hold on Corbosian mining interests.

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4. Following the rise to power of the Allende government in neighbouring Chile in 1970, the Corbosian government steered towards Marxism and took more positive steps to break up the mining monopolies. The degree of autonomy achieved by the Solan province was abrogated and this, together with other draconian measures by the central government, resulted in widespread mining strikes and clashes between Solanian miners and government forces. With the death of Franco in 1975, internal violence increased in Corbosa and many Solanians fled overseas to escape what they considered to be a harsh regime. It is estimated that about 17000 Solanians left Corbosa between 1975 and 1976. A number of countries agreed to accept the Solanian refugees including Spain, Portugal, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain and the U.S.A.

5. The largest group of Solanian refugees, about 5000, settled in Canada and in Toronto at the beginning of 1977 the Solanian United Front (SUF) was formed. Chapters of this organisation quickly sprang up in all other countries which had hosted Solanian refugees. The SUF announced that its aim was to protest against the repressive rule of the Corbosian Government and to seek a separate Solanian state and support of the United Nations. The SUF said that it would protest peacefully and would not embarrass host countries. Considerable financial support for the SUF was provided by right-wing factions in Spain and Portugal.

6. In December 1977, four Solanian refugees were arrested in Toronto for attempting to set fire to the office of the Corbosian Consulate. This was the first of a number of subsequent terrorist type attacks by a previously unknown group calling itself the Solanian Independence Movement (SIM). The SUF disavowed all knowledge of SIM and whilst there is no information to indicate involvement of the SUF there can be no doubt that the actions of SIM are secretly applauded by the SUF.

7. Terrorist activities by SIM to date have been world-wide and are listed below:

Canada	Dec 1977	Attempted burning of Corbosian Consulate in Toronto.

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Spain	Jan 1978	Murder of Corbosian Ambassador to Spain. Car bomb used.
USA	Jan 1978	Fire-bombing of Corbosa trade mission in Chicago. 1 SIM member killed in a gunfight with police.
Australia	Apr 1978	Attempted hi-jacking of an internal flight between Brisbane and Perth. Two terrorists overpowered.
Canada	Jun 1978	Hand grenade attack on Corbosian trade mission to Canada - 4 killed, 2 wounded.
Paris	Jul 1978	Murder of Corbosion Government official in Paris. Car bomb used.
USA	Jul 1978	Successful hijacking of Pan-Am flight from Washington. Aircraft directed to Spain where 5 hijackers - all men - were arrested and later jailed. One passenger on this flight was murdered when he offered resistance.
London	Sep 1978	A powerful bomb exploded in the basement of the home of the Corbosion Ambassador in London. 10 people killed including Ambassador.
Australia	Nov 1978	Visiting Corbosion trade unionist shot and killed in Melbourne. Suspect SIM member being sought by police.

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New Zealand	Dec 1978	Corbosion stabbed and killed during a Solanian protest rally in Wellington. Three Solanian refugees - later identified as members of SIM - arrested and gaoled for the murder.
Corbosa	Jan 1979	Main fuel oil depot destroyed in bomb attack on Corbosion Govt fuel installation .
Spain	Feb 1979	Two Spanish policemen killed in an unsuccessful attack on the Corbosion Embassy. One SIM member killed and one wounded and captured.

8. SIM terrorists have shown themselves to be fanatically opposed to the Corbosion government and whilst their terrorist actions have not indicated any degree of sophistication they have nevertheless shown determination in carrying out their attacks, with little thought of self-preservation. Forensic examination of the explosive devices used by SIM has revealed that conventional explosives and switching and timing devices have been used but that the devices have been assembled in a professional manner, no doubt reflecting the expertise of mining engineers within the group. Other weapons recovered from the group have been an assortment of sporting guns and second world war weapons. There is no intelligence to indicate that SIM is allied with any other terrorist group or that they have access to more sophisticated weapons.

SUF IN NEW ZEALAND

9. At the last census, the number of Corbosions in New Zealand was 2,850, of which 2,230 were listed as refugees from Solan province. Almost all Solanians in New Zealand are either members of the SUF or are sympathetic to its cause. In general, most Corbosions have proved to be law abiding and the activities of the SUF have given no cause for concern. It is a registered organisation involved in the cultural well-being of the Solanians

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in this country. Whilst there is an SUF presence in Wellington and Christchurch, nearly all Solanians live in the Auckland area. The leading light of the SUF in New Zealand is JOSE ROMEROS, who is considered to have a moderating influence on Solanians in this country. He has constantly denied any assocation with, or support for, SIM.

SIM IN NEW ZEALAND

10. Although it was suspected as early as mid 1978 that there could be an SIM element within the SUF in New Zealand, it was not until December 1978, when a Corbosion was stabbed to death in Wellington, that the existance of a small group was verified. The three men arrested - and later gaoled - for the Wellington murder were identified as:

RAMON DESILVA	Carpenter
ANTON SANTOS	Hospital Assistant
CARLOS ROMARO	Mechanic

All three admitted to being members of SIM and when police searched the house of DESILVA in Auckland a quantity of commerical explosive was found in a basement cupboard, together with an unlicensed sawn-off shot-gun and high powered .22 rifle. At the house of ROMARO police found a small printing press and hundreds of pamphlets calling on the Australian and New Zealand Governments to stop trading with Corbosa.

11. From subsequent investigations the strength of SIM in New Zealand is assessed at about 50, of which about 35 have been positively identified. Only about 20 of those identified are considered to have a propensity for violence. There are strong indications that SIM members in New Zealand are closely affiliated to SIM in Australia and there has been regular trans-Tasman travel by SIM members of both countries. The following four Corbosions, who live in Auckland, are from Solan province and are considered to be prominent in SIM activities in New Zealand:

Aguirre JAEN	Chef	Gonzolo ALCARAZ	Electronic Technician
Salvador RIANO	Arms Dealer	Alberta EL MOLAR	Driver

Secretary, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

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EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE

IGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

File this
on present please

ENDENCE MOVEMENT (SIM)

With Compliments

6/6/79

(C.J. PHILLIPS)
Coordinator

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er of Bolivia between Peru and
pproximately 250 miles. The popula-
o be about 1½ million.

in the 19th century the economy
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3. From about the time of the first world war the vast majority of the wealth of Corbosa has been derived from the huge deposits of copper, tin and silver in the Northern province of Solan. Mining in this area has always been in the control of the ethnic Spanish and Portugese, who have remained aloof from the ethnically mixed inhabitants of the larger Southern province of the country. People of the Solan province, whilst cherishing their independence as Corbosian nationals, have always had strong links with Spain. The political influence of Spain, particularly during the Franco regime, has, until recent years, inhibited the central government of Corbosa from moving towards the integration of people from the Southern province into Solan and a breaking up of the Spanish/Portugese hold on Corbosian mining interests.

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REPORT IS FICTITIOUS AND IS
PREPARED FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES ONLY

EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

CORBOSA AND THE SOLANIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT (SIM)

1. With a surface area roughly the size of Tasmania, the Republic of Corbosa is situated on the Western border of Bolivia between Peru and Chile and has a Pacific coast line of approximately 250 miles. The population of Corbosa in 1976 was estimated to be about 1½ million.

2. Following independence from Spain in the 19th century the economy of Corbosa was dominated by Britain, which provided the development capital and technical skills for the rich Northern mining district and the coastal farming and agricultural area. At the turn of this century several hundred thousand migrants, mostly from Spain and Portugal, settled in the Northern mining province of Solan, joining the descendants of the original Spanish settlers who had been traditionally involved in mining. Other settlers arrived from the old Ottoman Empire and these, together with the original Indian inhabitants and former Negro slaves, now make up the major proportion of the Corbosian population in the large Southern province. The seat of government, Cortez, is situated in the Southern province.

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4. Following the rise to power of the Allende government in neighbouring Chile in 1970, the Corbosian government steered towards Marxism and took more positive steps to break up the mining monopolies. The degree of autonomy achieved by the Solan province was abrogated and this, together with other draconian measures by the central government, resulted in widespread mining strikes and clashes between Solanian miners and government forces. With the death of Franco in 1975, internal violence increased in Corbosa and many Solanians fled overseas to escape what they considered to be a harsh regime. It is estimated that about 17000 Solanians left Corbosa between 1975 and 1976. A number of countries agreed to accept the Solanian refugees including Spain, Portugal, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain and the U.S.A.

5. The largest group of Solanian refugees, about 5000, settled in Canada and in Toronto at the beginning of 1977 the Solanian United Front (SUF) was formed. Chapters of this organisation quickly sprang up in all other countries which had hosted Solanian refugees. The SUF announced that its aim was to protest against the repressive rule of the Corbosian Government and to seek a separate Solanian state and support of the United Nations. The SUF said that it would protest peacefully and would not embarrass host countries. Considerable financial support for the SUF was provided by right-wing factions in Spain and Portugal.

6. In December 1977, four Solanian refugees were arrested in Toronto for attempting to set fire to the office of the Corbosian Consulate. This was the first of a number of subsequent terrorist type attacks by a previously unknown group calling itself the Solanian Independence Movement (SIM). The SUF disavowed all knowledge of SIM and whilst there is no information to indicate involvement of the SUF there can be no doubt that the actions of SIM are secretly applauded by the SUF.

7. Terrorist activities by SIM to date have been world-wide and are listed below:

Canada	Dec 1977	Attempted burning of Corbosian Consulate in Toronto.

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PREPARED FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES ONLY

Spain	Jan 1978	Murder of Corbosian Ambassador to Spain. Car bomb used.
USA	Jan 1978	Fire-bombing of Corbosa trade mission in Chicago. 1 SIM member killed in a gunfight with police.
Australia	Apr 1978	Attempted hi-jacking of an internal flight between Brisbane and Perth. Two terrorists overpowered.
Canada	Jun 1978	Hand grenade attack on Corbosian trade mission to Canada - 4 killed, 2 wounded.
Paris	Jul 1978	Murder of Corbosion Government official in Paris. Car bomb used.
USA	Jul 1978	Successful hijacking of Pan-Am flight from Washington. Aircraft directed to Spain where 5 hijackers - all men - were arrested and later jailed. One passenger on this flight was murdered when he offered resistance.
London	Sep 1978	A powerful bomb exploded in the basement of the home of the Corbosion Ambassador in London. 10 people killed including Ambassador.
Australia	Nov 1978	Visiting Corbosion trade unionist shot and killed in Melbourne. Suspect SIM member being sought by police.

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New Zealand	Dec 1978	Corbosion stabbed and killed during a Solanian protest rally in Wellington. Three Solanian refugees - later identified as members of SIM - arrested and gaoled for the murder.
Corbosa	Jan 1979	Main fuel oil depot destroyed in bomb attack on Corbosion Govt fuel installation .
Spain	Feb 1979	Two Spanish policemen killed in an unsuccessful attack on the Corbosion Embassy. One SIM member killed and one wounded and captured.

8. SIM terrorists have shown themselves to be fanatically opposed to the Corbosion government and whilst their terrorist actions have not indicated any degree of sophistication they have nevertheless shown determination in carrying out their attacks, with little thought of self-preservation. Forensic examination of the explosive devices used by SIM has revealed that conventional explosives and switching and timing devices have been used but that the devices have been assembled in a professional manner, no doubt reflecting the expertise of mining engineers within the group. Other weapons recovered from the group have been an assortment of sporting guns and second world war weapons. There is no intelligence to indicate that SIM is allied with any other terrorist group or that they have access to more sophisticated weapons.

SUF IN NEW ZEALAND

9. At the last census, the number of Corbosions in New Zealand was 2,850, of which 2,230 were listed as refugees from Solan province. Almost all Solanians in New Zealand are either members of the SUF or are sympathetic to its cause. In general, most Corbosions have proved to be law abiding and the activities of the SUF have given no cause for concern. It is a registered organisation involved in the cultural well-being of the Solanians

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in this country. Whilst there is an SUF presence in Wellington and Christchurch, nearly all Solanians live in the Auckland area. The leading light of the SUF in New Zealand is JOSE ROMEROS, who is considered to have a moderating influence on Solanians in this country. He has constantly denied any assocation with, or support for, SIM.

SIM IN NEW ZEALAND

10. Although it was suspected as early as mid 1978 that there could be an SIM element within the SUF in New Zealand, it was not until December 1978, when a Corbosion was stabbed to death in Wellington, that the existance of a small group was verified. The three men arrested - and later gaoled - for the Wellington murder were identified as:

RAMON DESILVA	Carpenter
ANTON SANTOS	Hospital Assistant
CARLOS ROMARO	Mechanic

All three admitted to being members of SIM and when police searched the house of DESILVA in Auckland a quantity of commerical explosive was found in a basement cupboard, together with an unlicensed sawn-off shot-gun and high powered .22 rifle. At the house of ROMARO police found a small printing press and hundreds of pamphlets calling on the Australian and New Zealand Governments to stop trading with Corbosa.

11. From subsequent investigations the strength of SIM in New Zealand is assessed at about 50, of which about 35 have been positively identified. Only about 20 of those identified are considered to have a propensity for violence. There are strong indications that SIM members in New Zealand are closely affiliated to SIM in Australia and there has been regular trans-Tasman travel by SIM members of both countries. The following four Corbosions, who live in Auckland, are from Solan province and are considered to be prominent in SIM activities in New Zealand:

Aguirre JAEN	Chef	Gonzolo ALCARAZ	Electronic Technician
Salvador RIANO	Arms Dealer	Alberta EL MOLAR	Driver

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CABINET OFFICE

Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

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TE (79) 4
Copy No 7
23 May 1979

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE : FURTHER INFORMATION

In the attached memorandum the Chairman of the Committee invites members:

a to attend a meeting of the Committee on Wednesday 27 June 1977, at noon, to be held in the office of the Hon T F Gill in connection with Exercise Lawmen Three - TE (79) 3 refers;

b to travel to Auckland on Thursday 28 June leaving Wellington at 9.30 am in order to observe the field operations.

The Rt Hon R D Muldoon and the Rt Hon B E Talboys will not be available to attend the meeting on 27 June and deputies have been added to the Committee in accordance with its terms of reference to ensure that four Ministers will be present.

Should any of the four Ministers who have confirmed their intention to be present find they cannot attend would their Private Secretaries please inform me immediately so that other deputies can be appointed.

Would Private Secretaries let me know in due course whether their Ministers wish to observe the exercise in Auckland on 28 June so that travel arrangements can be finalised.

Copies of TE (79) 3 are being sent to Messrs MacIntyre and Templeton.

(Signed) P G Millen

COPIES TO:

Cabinet Committee on Terrorism
8 Hon D MacIntyre
9 Hon H C Templeton
16 Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department
11 Commissioner of Police
14 Director of Security
12 Secretary of Defence
13 Chief of Defence Staff
15 Secretary of Foreign Affairs
16 Director of Civil Defence
17 Director, EIB

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Prime Minister
Wellington
New Zealand

18 May 1979

CABINET COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

You will recall that the Secretary of the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism circulated for your information a copy of the instructions for anti-terrorist exercise Lawmen 3 which is to be conducted by the Commissioner of Police and the Chief of Defence Staff between 27-29 June. The exercise is designed to practise all elements and agencies likely to be involved in a counter-terrorist operation.

You will have seen from the instructions that there are to be two areas of activity. The "incident" will take place in Auckland and that is where the operational staff will be deployed. Government and Police/Defence policy control staff and agencies will, however, play their roles in Wellington in accordance with normal operational procedures. The Cabinet Committee will in the terms of the exercise be expected to meet on 27 June, when the incident occurs. It has also been invited to travel to Auckland on 28 June so that Ministers can also observe what happens in the field. A flight has been arranged for Ministers and Officials, leaving at 9.30 am that morning.

In accordance with the understandings reached at the CHOGRM Working Group on Terrorism which was held in Singapore in February, several Forum countries and Malaysia and Singapore have been invited to send observers. We are also inviting the French and American Embassies to do so.

I regard this exercise as an important part of our preparations not only for the operational personnel but also for Ministers for whom it will provide an opportunity to see at first hand the sorts of problems with which we might be confronted in a crisis. I hope, therefore, that you will be available for a meeting on 27 June and that you will also be able to travel to Auckland on 28 June.

Chairman
Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

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139/3.

11 April 1979

Chief of Defence Staff
Commissioner of Police

CABINET COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

Would you please note that the minimum number of copies required for distribution to Ministers with respect to documents circulated to the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism is currently 7, i e 4 for Ministers, 1 for the Secretary and 2 for file.

(Sgd.) P. C. MILLIN

Secretary of the Cabinet

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CABINET OFFICE

Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

TE (79) 3
Copy No 7
6 April 1979

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE : INSTRUCTIONS

Attached for the information of the Cabinet Committee is a copy of the instructions for Exercise Lawmen Three, to be conducted by the Commissioner of Police and the Chief of Defence Staff.

Officials have been sent copies of this document separately.

(Signed) P G Millen

COPIES TO:

1 Cabinet Committee on Terrorism
6 Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department)
9 Commissioner of Police)
10 Director of Security)
11 Secretary of Defence) No attachment
12 Chief of Defence Staff)
13 Secretary of Foreign Affairs)
14 Director of Civil Defence)
15 Director, EIB)

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1650/167

Def 22/1/13

New Zealand Police
National Headquarters
General Building
Waring Taylor Street
WELLINGTON.

Telephone 723 000

Ministry of Defence
Defence Headquarters
Departmental Building
Stout Street
WELLINGTON.

Telephone 726 499

4 April 1979

See Distribution List

EXERCISE LAWMEN THREE : INSTRUCTIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Exercise 'LAWMEN THREE' is a tactical exercise designed to practise all elements and agencies likely to be involved in a Counter-Terrorist Operation.

2. The exercise proposes to involve the Cabinet Committee, Officials Committee, Police National HQ Policy and Coordinating Centre, Defence and Single Service Command Posts, Police Operations Command and Forward Command and equivalent Armed Forces supporting headquarters, units and all intelligence agencies.

3. The exercise will be conducted over the period 25-29 June 1979. The 'incident' will be centred in Auckland where appropriate Police/Defence operational command and control headquarters and units will be deployed as requested by Police. In addition, Government and Police/Defence policy control staffs and agencies will be activated in Wellington in accordance with established organizational procedures.

4. The exercise will be umpired at all levels and, where necessary, some higher controls will be deployed to represent higher authorities.

AIM

5. To exercise all elements of the Counter-Terrorist Organization in a building-hostage terrorist incident.

EXERCISE CONCEPT

6. The command and control arrangements are to be in accordance with the procedures contained in the Joint Police/Defence Memorandum to the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism which was approved on 1 March 1978. These procedures are detailed in a recently approved Defence Council paper, 'Ministry of

/Defence

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Defence Support to the Police in Combating Terrorism'.

7. Exercise Objectives. The objectives of Exercise LAWMEN THREE are as follows:

a. to familiarize members of the Cabinet Committee and Officials Committee with the Police/Armed Forces Counter-Terrorist organization and methods of tactical operation and to practise them in the decision-making process involved in a typical Counter-Terrorist operation;

b. to evolve practical staff operating procedures especially between the higher headquarters levels of Single Service CPs, Defence CP, Police National HQ Policy and Coordination Centre, the Officials Committee and the Cabinet Committee;

c. to examine Service command and control problems in the provision of Armed Forces assistance from more than one Service and to confirm existing single service standard operating procedures;

d. to examine combined Police/Armed Forces command and control problems with respect to Armed Forces tactical support and assault elements being assigned to Police commanders for tactical direction; and

e. to examine the effectiveness of existing specialist equipment used by assault elements and to recommend modifications or improvements where necessary.

8. Lessons. The principal lessons to be brought out during the exercise are as follows:

a. the importance of good activation instructions to ensure early warning is passed quickly to all concerned;

b. the importance of obtaining intelligence information from all available sources and the need to maintain a speedy two-way flow of information;

c. the importance of secure communications at all levels;

d. the importance of the news media and the need to establish official liaison with media representatives at appropriate levels;

/e. the

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e. the importance of physical and operational security during a Counter-Terrorist operation;

f. the importance of close co-operation between Police and Armed Forces tactical elements especially in the Operation and Forward Command areas; and

g. the correct utilization of all resources available to the Operation Commander.

EXERCISE CONTROL

9. Exercise Appointments.

a. Combined Exercise Directors.

(1) Commissioner R. J. Walton, Commissioner of Police.

(2) Air Marshal R. B. Bolt, Chief of Defence Staff.

b. Combined Exercise Co-ordinators.

(1) Detective Chief Superintendent M. Churches, Director: Crime, Police National Headquarters.

(2) Lt Col T. D. MacFarlane, Defence Operations, Defence Headquarters.

c. Umpires.

(1) Manning lists and instructions for umpires will be issued separately.

(2) Annex A shows the outline umpire requirement. Defence addressees are invited to provide the names of umpires to DOT by 20 April 1979.

(3) Umpires from police and other organizations will be arranged by the Police Exercise Co-ordinator.

(4) Separate umpire briefings will be held as follows:

(a) In Auckland (for 'Incident' umpires Serials 6-17 Annex A) - 3 May 79.

(b) In Wellington (for umpires Serials 1-5 Annex A) - 10 May 79.

Details of timings and locations will be issued directly to individual umpires before the nominated dates.

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/(5) Umpire

(5) Umpire Ranks. (Defence)

(a) For Wellington locations - Lt Col/Maj equivalent.

(b) For Auckland locations - Maj/Capt equivalent.

d. Controls.

(1) Separate detailed instructions will be issued to controllers in due course.

(2) Annex B shows the outline control organization.

10. Exercise Participants.

a. Cabinet Committee on Terrorism.

b. Officials Committee on Terrorism.

c. News Media representatives *(subject to later confirmation)*

d. Police Policy and Co-ordination Centre and all supporting elements including Intelligence Cell.

e. Police Operation and Forward Commands.

f. Defence and Single Service Command Posts (CPs) as appropriate.

g. Police and Defence Public Relations agencies.

h. Defence Communications Network (DCN) elements as appropriate.

i. Armed Forces Commander (AFC) as appointed by CDS.

j. Police Perimeter elements.

k. Technical Support Unit (TSU).

l. Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) and Armed Offenders Squad (AOS).

m. Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT).

n. Investigation Group.

o. Single Service elements as requested by Police and approved by CDS. Elements could include:

(1) Logistic and Administrative support from bases and camps.

(2) Defence Tactical Support Elements including:

/Component

Component HQ;

Cordon Troops;

IED/Demolition Teams; and

RNZAF Transport and helicopter support;

RNZAF Air Staff Officers (ASO).

(3) CTT.

(4) In addition, any single Service and Defence HQ staff/unit could be required to respond to a real or 'exercise' tasking or request. The extent of such involvement will be controlled by Exercise Directing Staff.

Communications

11. General. To ensure that exercise traffic is not misdirected onto operational circuits, all exercise messages are to be prefixed 'Exercise LAWMEN III'. A genuine message which is to be sent by exercising personnel is to be prefixed 'NODUF LAWMEN III'.

12. Security. The highest standards of communication security should be observed. Police and Defence radio nets in the Auckland area will be monitored throughout the exercise.

13. Police. Normal operational nets and operating instructions for counter-terrorist operations are to be used. Police will provide all the required equipments and operating instructions.

14. Defence.

a. Participant headquarters/units are to provide communications facilities in accordance with established SOPs or regulations.

b. Controllers/Umpires.

(1) Wellington Location. Existing Defence/Post Office facilities will suffice.

(2) Auckland Location. Army General Staff is responsible to provide man-pack communications equipment for umpires/controllers in accordance with diagram at Annex C.

/Observers

Observers

15. It is intended that members of the Cabinet and Officials Committees will be flown by RNZAF aircraft to Auckland on Day 2 of the exercise to observe the field organization and operations in action.

16. Spare seating in the above aircraft will be available to Police and single Service/Branch staffs wishing to travel with the party. Nominations should be made to Exercise Co-ordinators by 18 May 79.

17. There is a possibility that some foreign observers may be invited to the exercise.

Exercise Briefings/Debriefs

18. Briefings for Umpires/Controllers will be issued separately. Apart from this Instruction, participant headquarters/units will not receive any further instructions prior to the exercise. Where necessary, Umpires/Controllers will issue advice or instructions once the exercise commences.

19. Debriefs. Exercise debriefs for the Auckland elements only will be held shortly after the exercise play period concludes. Details of timings and locations will be advised later.

News Media

20. For the purpose of the exercise Police/Defence media liaison organizations are to be established at both the Auckland and Wellington locations.

21. The exercise media liaison organization is to be briefed by the Exercise Directors prior to the exercise commencing. For general guidance however it is intended that:

a. A pre-exercise release will be made.

b. The news media may be invited to participate in the exercise as players.

22. In the event that media participation is approved, it is intended that the news media participants be given progressive news reports throughout the exercise on the same basis and from the same sources as they would be given information during an operation. These latter reports would not be used for publication but merely to acquaint both the news media and the counter-terrorist organization with security problems associated with the handling of news releases during a counter-terrorist operation.

/Reports

Reports and Returns

23. Departmental Reports. Individual Department reports (including player and Umpire/Controller reports) are to be submitted through normal command channels in accordance with standard operating instruction by 16 July 1979.

24. Combined Report. Based on the separate departmental reports, a combined exercise report is to be prepared by the exercise co-ordinating staff. This report is to be submitted to the Exercise Directors by 27 July 1979.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

25. Wellington Participants.

a. Rations will not be provided from Defence resources.

b. Where necessary Police and Defence personnel may purchase meals on an individual claim-back basis without receipts as follows:

Breakfast - up to $3.15

Lunch - up to $1.95

Dinner - up to $3.15

Receipts are to be produced for meal costs over and above the above rates.

c. Transport. Defence personnel may use taxis only when public transport is unavailable.

26. Auckland Participants - Rations and Quarters

a. Umpires/controllers as arranged by the nearest Service establishment.

b. Participant personnel as arranged at the time by the exercise operation commander.

(R. J. WALTON)
Commissioner of Police

(R. B. BOLT)
Air Marshal
Chief of Defence Staff

Annexes: A. Umpire Requirements

B. Control Organization

C. Communication Diagram) Auckland location
Umpires Controllers)

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AS(Pol)	(1)
AS(Fin)	(1)
AS(Admin)	(1)
TIC	(10)
EIB	(1)
DOT	(1)
DDI	(2)
DDC	(2)
DRP	(1)
DPD	(1)
DPR	(2)
DD(Ops)	(1)
DD(Trg) (For Defence CP)	(1)
AD Coord	(1)
MA to CDS	(1)
Umpires	(32)
Controllers	(15)
Observers	(20)
Spare	(20)
TOTAL	150

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ANNEX A TO
DEF 22/1/13
DATED 4 Apr 79.

UMPIRE REQUIREMENTS

Serial	Player HQ/Unit	Location	No Required	Source of Umpire
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	Officials Committee	Wellington	2	Police (1) ACDS Pers Br (1)
2	Police Policy and Coordination Centre (incl PR/News Media)	Wellington	5	Police (2) DPR(1) ACDS(Pol) (1) ACDS(Sp) (1)
3	TIC, PTIU, EIB, Def Int	Wellington	2	Police (1) SIS (1)
4	Defence CP (Incl ACDS(Pol) Branch and DCU	Wellington	2	ACDS(Pers) Br (1) Air Staff (1)
5	Single Service CPs	Wellington	As required	Single Service
6	Operation Command (Incl AFC and News Media)	Auckland	6	Police (2) DPR(1) Army (2) RNZAF (1)
7	Forward Command	Auckland	4	Police (2) Army (2)
8	TSU	Auckland	1	Police
9	Perimeter Control	Auckland	1	Police
10	ATS	Auckland	2	Police
11	Hostage Negotiation Team	Auckland	1	Police
12	Base Operation HQ	Auckland	1	Police
13	IED/Demolition Team	Auckland	1	Army
14	CTT	Auckland	2	Army
15	Cordon Troops	Auckland	1	Army
16	Terrorists/Hostages	Auckland	1	Police
17	Investigation Section	Auckland	1	Police

Annex B to
Def 22/1/13
Dated 4 Apr 79

CONTROL ORGANIZATION

1. Higher Controllers - Located at Auckland

Chief Superintendent M. Churches (also Chief Umpire - Auckland)

Lt Col Macfarlane

One officer - Maj equivalent rank to be nominated by local service establishment

One officer - Lt Cdr rank to be nominated by RNZN

One police officer

Clerks (2) - RNZAF

These controllers will represent all miscellaneous civilian and local Government agencies in the Auckland area.

2. Higher Controls - Located on 4th floor, Police National HQ Wellington. (CIB Office)

One senior police officer (also Chief Umpire - Wellington)

One Col equivalent - to be nominated by ACDS(Pol)

One senior official - to be nominated by MFA

One Maj equivalent - to be nominated by ACDS(Pers)

Two clerks - to be nominated by ACDS(Per)

These controllers will represent all miscellaneous civilian and Government agencies, and, if necessary, Foreign Embassies/High Commissions as appropriate.

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ANNEX C TO
DEF 22/1/13
DATED 4 APR 79

COMMUNICATION DIAGRAM
UMPIRES/CONTROLLERS - AUCKLAND LOCATION



Notes:

1. Manpack sets (AN/PRC 77 type) would be adequate.

2. Equipment and Signals Operating Instruction (SOI) should be available at Papakura Camp for uplifting on 26 June 1979.

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Secretary,
Cabiret Committee on Terrorism

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Copy No: 6

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BULLETIN

ELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TIVITY BULLETIN

CH 1979

With Compliments

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Department of Labour	14
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Mr J.R. Brady	16
Det. Chief Supt. M.T. Churches	17
Commander K.R. Moen, RNZN	18
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Mr P.D. Jones	
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Controller - Aviation Security	
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BULLETIN

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

MARCH 1979

B2-79-1 INTERNATIONAL SCENE (RESTRICTED)

B2-79-2 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF 1978 (RESTRICTED)

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

MARCH 1979

B2-79-1 INTERNATIONAL SCENE

1. There was no appreciable let-up in world-wide terrorist activity during the first quarter of 1979, with bombings and shootings predominating. Noteworthy during this period was the attempted in-flight sabotage of a Soviet passenger aircraft, travelling between Oslo and Stockholm, by members of the Ananda Marga movement, who are alleged to have tried to set fire to the aircraft by sprinkling petrol on the floor. This is the first recorded incident of Ananda Marga involvement in criminal activity involving aircraft and - if the history of irrational and unpredictable behaviour by members of this group is anything to go by - unlikely to be the last.

2. As to be expected, the aftermath of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will, in the short term, bring fears of immediate terrorist retaliatory attacks against U.S., Egyptian and Israeli representation and establishments worldwide. In the long term, Egypt could be subjected to terrorist activity within its national boundaries of the kind now experienced by Israel. The treaty notwithstanding, YASER ARAFAT, head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, in a speech in Damascus on 17 January, called 1979 "a year of fire and brimstone".

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

MARCH 1979

B2-79-2 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF 1978

The more prominent terrorist incidents for the period 1 October - 30 December 1978 are listed below:

2 Oct 1978 BOMB EXPLOSION AT CUBAN EMBASSY IN ITALY

A bomb exploded in front of the Cuban Embassy to the Vatican in Rome. An anonymous caller claimed that the bombing was done to protest the repressive government of Nicaragua's Somoza. The Nicaraguan Embassy, previously housed in the same building as the Cuban Embassy, had moved to another location about six months ago. It is believed the bomb was placed at the wrong location. No damage or injuries were reported.

3 Oct 1978 NICARAGUAN AIRLINES OFFICE FIRE BOMBED IN EL SALVADOR

The Nicaraguan Airlines office in El Salvador was the target of fire bombs. Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) members broke windows in the airline's offices and threw incendiary bombs into the building. The resultant fire was confined to the airline office with damage of US $3000 to $4000. No injuries were reported.

9 Oct 1978 EXTREMIST GROUP HOLDS HOSTAGES IN THE NETHERLANDS

Ten members of the Dutch extremist group "Red Resistance Front" occupied the Amsterdam offices of Amnesty International. They held two hostages and said they were demanding better treatment for three West German Baader-Meinhoff terrorists being held in Dutch jails. The group ended its 14 hour occupation after failing to obtain support for the jailed terrorists. There were no injuries reported during the incident.

10 Oct 1978 GUNMEN ATTACK IRAQI CONSULATE IN IRAN

Six gunmen attacked the Iraqi Consulate in Khorramshahr. Three of the attackers tried to set the building afire and three others shot at the security guards. One of the guards was killed and one of the attackers was wounded. Three gunmen escaped on foot while the other three fled in a van.

15 Oct 1978 BOMBS DISCOVERED NEAR JEWISH ESTABLISHMENT IN EAST GERMANY

A bomb was found outside a Jewish restaurant in West Berlin. A passerby found the bomb and, not realizing what it was, took it to his home. He became suspicious of it later, set it outside and then called police. While local police were closing off the area, the bomb detonated damaging two cars and breaking windows in nearby buildings. The second bomb was located under a car parked in front of the Jewish Cultural Centre and synagogue. The latter device was disarmed safely.

21 Oct 1978 VW SHOWROOM BOMBED IN ITALY

A VW showroom in Italy was the target of a bomb which caused minor property damage. An anonymous telephone caller stated the attack, one of several, was carried out by the German Red Army Faction in honour of Italian RAF comrades. No injuries were reported.

22 Oct 1978 PHILIPS WAREHOUSE TARGET OF MOLOTOV COCKTAIL IN BELGIUM.

A Molotov cocktail was thrown through the window of a Philips warehouse in Brussels. The fire was confined to the warehouse belonging to the Dutch controlled multinational electronic corporation. Damage was estimated at US$100,000. No injuries were reported.

25 Oct 1978 GUATEMALAN CONSULATE BOMBED IN EL SALVADOR

A bomb exploded at the Guatemalan Consulate in Chalchuapa in western Al Salvador. The explosion caused extensive damage to the building and killed a watchman who was in the area. The Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) claimed credit for the attack.

27 Oct 1978 EXPLOSION AT ARGENTINE CONSULATE IN CHILE

An explosion at the Argentine Consulate in Santiago resulted in broken windows. No injuries were reported. A bomb had been placed in a rubbish bin in front of the Consulate. Analysis of the fragments of the device showed it to be the same type previously used by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). No group claimed responsibility.

1 Nov 1978 DUTCH CUSTOMS OFFICIAL KILLED IN BORDER SHOOTOUT

A Dutch customs officer was killed and two other wounded during an exchange of gunfire with two apparent West German terrorists on the West German-Dutch border. The two, a man and a woman, were crossing from West Germany and fled in a stolen baker's van.

17 Nov 1978 HOSTAGE TAKEN AT ARGENTINE EMBASSY IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

A Dominican Air Force private took a secretary (a Dominican national) hostage at the Argentine Embassy in Santo Domingo. He demanded ransom of US$100,000, safe conduct to Mexico or Uruguay, and to have Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) leaders involved in the negotiating process. Local authorities were able to disarm the perpetrator and secure the release of the secretary. No injuries resulted and the kidnapper is in military custody.

17 Nov 1978 BOMB DETONATED AT RESTAURANT IN EL SALVADOR

A bomb made from four sticks of dynamite exploded at a McDonald's restaurant in San Salvador. No injuries were reported and damage to the building was minimal. The Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) claimed responsibility for the incident.

18 Nov 1978 BOMBS DETONATED AT COCA-COLA PLANT IN GREECE

Two bombs went off at the Coca-Cola plant near Thessaloniki. A third bomb failed to detonate. Damage to two trucks and the building is estimated at approximately US$6000. No injuries were reported. The Revolutionary People's Strugglers claimed responsibility for the incident in a manifesto dated 19 November.

19 Nov 1978 EXPLOSION ON TOURIST BUS IN ISRAEL

A bomb exploded on a bus carrying tourists returning from an outing to the Dead Sea area. The bomb had apparently been placed on a package shelf of the bus and when the bomb exploded the back of the vehicle was ripped apart. Four persons died and over 30 were injured. No Americans were involved but passengers from Great Britain, Sweden, Canada and Belgium were on the bus. From Beirut, Lebanon, an Al Fatah spokesman claimed responsibility for the bombing of the bus on the first anniversary of Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine also claimed responsibility.

24 Nov 1978 DUTCH BUSINESSMEN KIDNAPPED IN EL SALVADOR

The General Manager of Philips of El Salvador was kidnapped shortly after he left his office in downtown El Salvador. He was grabbed by armed men who drove off with him in his car. The Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) claimed responsibility for the kidnapping. He was released unharmed on 30 December after his company reportedly paid a ransom of US$4 million and broadcast the groups manifesto.

24 Nov 1978 ATTEMPTED ARSON AT THE EGYPTIAN CONSULATE IN CALIFORNIA

A flammable liquid was thrown at the front entrance of the Egyptian Consulate. The resultant fire scorched the wooden doors, broke windows and damaged tiles and carpet at the entrance. No injuries were reported. An unidentified man telephoned the Associated Press, said he was a member of the Jewish Defence League (JDL) and claimed responsibility for the incident. A JDL spokesman later disavowed the groups involvement.

25 Nov 1978 EXPLOSION AT GERMAN COMPANY's WAREHOUSE IN EL SALVADOR

A bomb exploded in the warehouse of the German owned Bayer Company. The facility had been a storehouse for insecticides and fertilizers. No injuries were reported. The Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) claimed responsibility for the bombing and resultant fire.

30 Nov 1978 BRITISH BANKERS KIDNAPPED IN EL SALVADOR

The British manager and assistant manager of the San Salvador Branch of the Bank of London and South America were kidnapped as they left their office. The Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) demanded release of political prisoners, a ransom and publication of a manifesto in exchange for the release of the two UK citizens.

30 Nov 1978 EXPLOSION AT IBM WAREHOUSE IN ITALY

A bomb detonated outside a warehouse of the International Business Machines Company in Bologna. Damage to the building was confined to one wall and broken windows. No injuries were reported. A group calling itself the Proleterian Squad claimed responsibility for the bombing.

6 Dec 1978 EGYPTIAN UN MISSION COUNSELLOR'S CAR FIREBOMBED IN NEW YORK

A car belonging to a member of the Egyptian UN Mission was the target of a firebomb. The vehicle, parked in front of his residence at the time, was heavily damaged. No injuries were reported. An anonymous caller to the press claimed the New Jewish Defence League was responsible for the bombing.

6 Dec 1978 EXPLOSION AT THE TURKISH CONSULATE IN SWITZERLAND

A time bomb which had been placed at the front entrance of the Turkish Consulate in Geneva exploded. Windows were broken and the elevator was damaged; no injuries were reported. No group claimed responsibility.

7 Dec 1978 JAPANESE BUSINESSMAN KIDNAPPED IN EL SALVADOR

A Japanese executive of the Synthetics Industry of Central America (INSINCA), representing the Japanese firm Tore Textile, was kidnapped in El Salvador. The kidnappers blocked the executive's car front and rear and then drove off with him. The Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) issued demands for money, release of political prisoners and publication of its manifesto in return for the release of the executive.

17 Dec 1978 BOMB EXPLOSION ON BUS IN ISRAEL

A bomb exploded on a bus as it travelled through Jerusalem. More than 20 people were injured including five US citizens. All the injured were treated at the local hospital and released. In addition to damage to the bus several houses in the vicinity where the explosion occurred were slightly damaged. The PLO claimed responsibility for the incident.

17 Dec 1978 TURKISH AIRLINE OFFICE BOMBED IN SWITZERLAND

An explosion at the Turkish airline office in Geneva shattered the windows of the building where the office is located. No injuries were reported. In a phone call to the AFP office an Armenian organisation claimed responsibility for the incident.

29 Dec 1978 EXPLOSION AT CUBAN UN MISSION IN NEW YORK

An explosion caused extensive damage at the Cuban Mission to the UN. A second bomb shattered glass at a Lincoln Centre theatre where Cuban artists had performed earlier in the evening. No injuries were reported in either incident. A man called the news services and claimed Omega Seven, an anti-Castro group, was responsible for the two explosions.

Secretary, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

1979

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Zealand since mid 1978 are worthy of
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3. The change in sect leadership in September 1978 had been expected to bring about a resurgence of Ananda Marga activity in New Zealand, together with a more spirited effort to attract and initiate new recruits. In the event, the new leader, and present incumbent, proved to lack any real drive or administrative ability. He has been the cause of dissatisfaction within certain elements of the movement and is currently awaiting deportation to Australia after completing a prison sentence imposed for obtaining a New Zealand passport by illegal means.

4. Membership in New Zealand remains at about 80, of which 20 can be regarded as long time, hard core members. In some smaller centres membership has fallen away, leaving only a single cadre member.

5. There is no intelligence to indicate that the sect in New Zealand has in its possession, or has access to, arms or explosives. Nevertheless, margiis have demonstrated that they have little compunction about breaking the law and are quite capable of staging a terrorist type incident without the use of conventional weapons or explosives; this was clearly demonstrated when a group of margiis recently attempted to set fire to a passenger aircraft travelling between Oslo and Stockholm. A "Threat Assessment : New Zealand Air Carriers, Terminals and Installations" produced by the NZSIS in April 1978, indicated that it was not beyond imagination to expect that adherents of Ananda Marga might attempt to take command of an aircraft. New Zealand air carriers, particularly internal flights, therefore remain vulnerable to the vagaries not only of New Zealand margiis but itinerant margiis, especially from Australia.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

ANANDA MARGA IN NEW ZEALAND
A REAPPRAISAL

MARCH 1979

1. The June 1978 NZSIS paper on Ananda Marga provided brief background notes on this controversial religious sect, together with a more detailed review of the organisation's activities and its adherents in New Zealand. Since that time, sect members throughout the world have come to prominence with sporadic acts of violence and self-immolation. Despite the release of the Ananda Marga spiritual leader from an Indian gaol in late 1978 (his imprisonment was the original cause celebre of the movement) there has been no indication that individuals or groups within the sect will, in future, refrain from criminal activities to protest real or imagined grievances.

2. Events within the sect in New Zealand since mid 1978 are worthy of comment and these are shown in chronological order at Annex A. Notable amongst these have been the change of sect leadership in New Zealand and the prosecution of two margiis for obtaining New Zealand passports by illegal means.

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6. There appears to be a lack of cohesion within the New Zealand movement at present which is likely to persist until a new leader is appointed. With more dynamic leadership or the emergence of a "ginger" group within the sect, further Ananda Marga incidents can be expected in New Zealand.

7. Unpredictability of action and the sometimes irrational behaviour of many margiis call for continued attention by the Police Terrorist Intelligence Unit and NZSIS to the activities of Ananda Marga and its adherents in New Zealand.

Annex A to
"Ananda Marga
in New Zealand
A Reappraisal
March 1979"

ANANDA MARGA

SUMMARY OF EVENTS OF INTEREST TO NEW ZEALAND

MAY 1978 TO FEBRUARY 1979 INCLUSIVE.

May 1978

Michael Luke BRANDON @ ABHIIK, (formerly known as Jason Holman ALEXANDER, born John HOFFMAN in the USA) the Spiritual Director of the Ananda Marga Australasian Sectorial Office in Sydney, left Australia for Thailand on 15 May 1978. On arrival at Bangkok he sought the assistance of the Australian High Commission to see the three Ananda Marga members who were arrested in February 1978 and charged with the possession of explosives. The present New Zealand leader, Timothy Thomas Hilton JONES @ DADA KUSHAL, was one of those arrested in this incident.

June 1978

Paul Shawn ALISTER @ NARADA MUNI, Ross Anthony DUNN @ VISHDEMETRI and Timothy Edward ANDERSON @ GOVINDA were arrested in Sydney on 16 June 1978 for making an attempt on the life of Robert John CAMERON, a leading figure of the Australian right-wing National Alliance.

On 22 June seven New Zealand sect members staged a demonstration in Wellington to protest against the Sydney arrests. The demonstration started at Civic Square and culminated with a march on the Australian High Commission in Hobson Street where a letter, claiming that the three had been arrested as the result of a frame-up, was presented. The protest aroused little public interest and was conducted in an orderly manner.

July 1978

The July 1978 edition of the Ananda Marga PRANAM magazine published in Australia carried an article alerting members on how to identify people trying to infiltrate Ananda Marga. This was seen as a follow-up to the attempt on the life of Robert John CAMERON when sect members involved were arrested as the result of information provided by a police informant.

In July the Wellington unit moved out of its accommodation at 91 Britomart Street, Berhampore and into new premises at 96 Austin Street, Mount Victoria.

August 1978

On 28 August, Lawrence Richard HAYNES @ DADA VACASPATI, the New Zealand Ananda Marga leader, flew from Wellington to Sydney to attend a retreat which was held in Sydney from 2 - 7 September 1978. As an Australian citizen, HAYNES was allowed to enter Australia. However,on 30 August David George HAMMOND @ DIVYAMURTI, a New Zealand margii travelling under the name of David George GODSON tried to enter Australia to attend the same retreat. He was identified as a margii on arrival at Sydney Airport and was refused entry to Australia. HAMMOND was charged and convicted in the Wellington Magistrates Court on 19 August for twice making false and misleading declarations whilst leaving and entering New Zealand. He was fined $100 and ordered to pay $40 solicitors fees.

September 1978

In early September, information was received indicating that HAYNES would not be returning to New Zealand and that he would be replaced by another Acarya (Spiritual leader). This news was unexpected as HAYNES appeared to have had complete control over the New Zealand membership, although it was known that some margiis had considered him far too moderate and easy going. News of this change in leadership proved correct, for on 13 September an Australian based Acarya, Timothy Thomas Hilton JONES @ DADA KUSHAL, arrived in Wellington to replace HAYNES. JONES, an Australian by birth, was one of the 3 margiis arrested in Bangkok on 16.2.78 and held in custody until August before being sentenced to 6 months imprisonment for the illegal possession of 1.25kg of plastic explosives. After taking into account the time served awaiting trial the three were ordered to leave Thailand. JONES and another Australian involved, Caroline Lee SPARK, left Thailand for Australia on 17 August. On arrival in Australia JONES and SPARK were made to surrender their passports. The other person involved in this incident, Miss Sarah CHILD, an American, is believed to have travelled to Sweden.

In newspaper articles announcing his presence as the new Ananda Marga leader in New Zealand, JONES claimed that he had been framed in Thailand and was innocent of all charges made against him. Shortly after his arrival JONES distributed a GAEA (Guard Against Enemy Action) circular to New Zealand sect members instructing them to report any approaches made to them by members of the NZSIS or the Police and to avoid contact with either of these organisations.

October 1978

On the evening of 12 October, margiis from the Wellington unit painted slogans on the inside of the walls surrounding the Australian High Commission. The slogans related to the persecution of Ananda Marga in Australia and called for the return of Michael Luke BRANDON's passport which had been confiscated by the Australian authorities on 9 August 1978. However, only one member, David George HAMMOND, was arrested and charged for this offence. HAMMOND was subsequently convicted for committing wilful damage and fined $100. Also about this time similar Ananda Marga slogans were painted on properties in Hastings, Christchurch and Auckland.

During October Ananda Marga adherents in Paremoremo Prison near Auckland made an application for special diets to be provided for sect members and requested that an Acarya be permitted entry to the Prison to hold meditation services. The Prison authorities rejected these requests and decreed that sect members could only have meetings with an Acarya on a one to one basis, and that they could hold group meditation sessions on Friday nights only with no visiting sect members being permitted to attend. As a consequence representations have been made to the Human Rights Commission about this alleged discrimination against the sect.

In October, Auckland margii Enton Eugene SCHNADERBECK @ ABHIMANYU purchased a 15 - 20 acre property near Orewa, North of Auckland. The property, which cost $23,500, is away from the main highway, has swampy ground near its access road, and has a track leading up a slope to a level area on which a house is to be built. It is understood that SCHNADERBECK paid $10,000 in cash for this property with the owner leaving $13,500 to be paid off over 3 years. It is anticipated that it will be used by the sect for future retreats and other Ananda Marga activities.

November 1978

Over the weekend 17 - 19 November a retreat was held at a Marae (Maori meeting place) at Waipiro Bay, approximately 70 miles north of Gisborne. A total of 19 sect members attended, including two senior margiis from Australia - Michael Luke BRANDON and Veronica Judy FOGG, who is understood to be currently in charge of the Ananda Marga Women's Welfare Department in the Australasian sector.

Also in November NZSIS received information that David John FIELD @ NATARAJ and Timothy Thomas Hilton JONES had obtained New Zealand passports in false names. The subsequent outcome was that JONES and FIELD were arrested by the New Zealand Police and convicted on 31.1.79. JONES was sentenced to one months jail with a recommendation being made to the Minister of Immigration that he be deported on completion of his sentence. FIELD was sentenced to 6 months periodic detention. JONES was released from custody on 21 February 1979 and has been ordered to leave the country within 28 days.

January 1979

The Director of the Australasian Sectorial Office, Michael Luke BRANDON, paid a brief visit to New Zealand where, in the company of the New Zealand Regional Secretary, Timothy Thomas Hilton JONES, he approached immigration authorities for an indication of the New Zealand Government's likely views on the proposed visit to New Zealand by P.R. SARKAR @ BABA the Ananda Marga spiritual leader in India. BRANDON and JONES claimed that SARKAR had been completely cleared of all criminal charges, had been issued with a passport by the Indian Government, and was now free to travel overseas. These claims have not been confirmed by the Indian authorities and it is unlikely that SARKAR will be allowed to leave India, let alone visit New Zealand. However, should BABA visit New Zealand an influx of margiis from overseas could well be expected, particularly from Australia.

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CABINET OFFICE

Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

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6 March 1979

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH REGIONAL WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM - SINGAPORE, 14-16 FEBRUARY 1979 : REPORT OF NEW ZEALAND DELEGATION

Attached for the information of the Cabinet Committee and Officials is the report of the New Zealand delegation which attended the meeting of the Commonwealth Regional Working Group on Terrorism at Singapore, 14-16 ~~May~~ February.

(Signed) P G Millen

COPIES TO

Cabinet Committee on Terrorism
6 Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department
8 Commissioner of Police
9 Director of Security
10 Secretary of Defence
11 Chief of Defence Staff
12 Secretary of Foreign Affairs
13 [Secretary for Civil Defence] Director of Civil Defence
14 Director, EIB

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5 March 1979

The Prime Minister
Members of Cabinet Committee on Terrorism
Members of Officials Committee on Terrorism

MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH REGIONAL WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM : SINGAPORE : 14-16 FEBRUARY 1979

1. A delegation from New Zealand attended the above conference. The delegation, agreed to by Cabinet (CM 79/3/16 of 5 February 1979) consisted of:

Mr B. Galvin, Head of Prime Minister's Department (Leader)

Mr R. J. Walton, Commissioner of Police

Mr M. T. Churches, Director : Crime and O.C., Anti-Terrorist Squad, N.Z. Police

Mr J. Phillips, Terrorist Intelligence Centre, S.I.S.

Mr D. McFarlane, Lieutenant Colonel, Ministry of Defence.

2. A copy of the official report on the conference and the press statement issued at the conclusion is attached hereto as Appendix A.

3. Five working papers were considered at the conference:

(a) Regional co-operation on intelligence (Singapore);

(b) Safeguarding V.I.P.s and strengthening efforts to combat terrorism (India);

(c) Airport security and preventing and detecting movements of terrorists (Bangladesh);

(d) Promoting, training and discussion of counter terrorist exercises (Australia);

(e) Sharing operational and planning experiences in handling incidents of terrorism (Malaysia).

Copies are available from Police Headquarters, if desired, as are copies of the papers prepared for the New Zealand delegation as a basis of speaking to each working paper.

4. Delegates representing twelve countries attended the conference. Representatives from Hong Kong attended as observers along with a consultant on CHOGRM from the Commonwealth Secretariat.

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5. During the discussion on intelligence, the Singapore Chairman was most insistent in gaining approval for the Singapore proposal to establish a Regional Co-ordination Centre for intelligence on terrorism. The majority of countries were of the view that such a Centre would be inclined to slow down the communication channels and there would be the difficulty of deciding the actual requirements of each country with their differing situations.

It was agreed that the initial requirement was to improve communication networks and establish contact points. To this end a schedule was prepared providing this information.

6. The discussions are summarised in the official report on the conference, Appendix A. Generally it was considered the conference could have been more effective and beneficial by dividing the delegates into working groups on the three main echelons in terrorist operations, i.e. Policy, Intelligence and Operations and Training, but this was not practicable owing to the composition of some delegations. Nevertheless the conference discussions, particularly those during breaks and at social occasions, were of considerable advantage in evaluating the steps taken in New Zealand and future requirements to counter terrorism.

Alternatively the conference could have been limited to a narrower range of countries, e.g. the Forum group. This would have allowed for a more detailed exchange between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and the Island nations on the other on what their needs were and how Australia and ourselves could help satisfy them.

7. It is quite apparent that the steps taken in New Zealand are equal to those in any country represented at the conference. It would not be unfair to say that we contributed as much to the conference as we gained. The interest and requests for the New Zealand organisation chart for dealing with terrorist incidents clearly indicated that in most countries little or no effort has been made to establish a structure to deal with such operations.

8. Several countries expressed considerable interest in obtaining explosive detector dogs and handler training from New Zealand who have the necessary animals and expertise in this field. Requests were also made for training and demonstration in some South Pacific Islands through visits of a section of the Police Anti Terrorist Squad and supporting specialists. This aid is available and the conference was informed that requests for such assistance should be made on a Government to Government basis. We also offered to notify other countries of any courses or training exercises we were undertaking with a view to accepting participants or, where appropriate, observers.

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9. The conference made a visit to Singapore International Airport to review security arrangements. There are two Committees involved in the airport operations, one chaired by Civil Aviation for airline co-ordination and the domestic running of the complex and a second for security, chaired by the Director of C.I.D., Singapore Police, the equivalent of our Director : Crime, N.Z. Police. Two hundred regular police and a similar number of full time auxiliary police are assigned to the airport for security duties. They do not search outgoing passengers or baggage which requirement is fulfilled by airline security staff with the police in attendance.

Having regard to prevailing factors and the traffic flow New Zealand does not lose in comparison with Singapore in respect to airport security although the perimeter fence in Singapore is more adequate than exists here at our international airports.

10. The official conclusions and recommendations arisong from the conference are set out in paragraph 33 of the Conference Report, Appendix A.

11. The recommendation regarding a co-ordinating centre has been dealt with in this paper and those in respect to intelligence are covered by the dissemination of the communication schedule. The remaining recommendations will be discussed at the next meeting of the Officials Committee on Terrorism.

12. In event of one of the participating countries experiencing a terrorist incident in the future it was considered the greatest advantage would be gained by holding in the country concerned, as soon as possible after the incident was resolved, an inquest into the operation so that all countries could benefit from the experience. As there is no substitute for experience it is considered New Zealand should fully participate in such reviews.

13. In considering further regional conference it is considered more benefit would be gained by calling together theexperts in the three separate echelons, as outlined in paragraph 6 of this paper, for a separate study of each topic, as the overview of the entire requirement does not allow the in-depth study necessary in order to be of maximum benefit. An alternative would be to confine participation to a narrower range of countries with a greater degree of mutual interest.

14. It is considered that one of the main gains from the conference, apart from the establishing of contacts, would be the improved flow of intelligence and information about operational methods and experiences.

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15. Whilst in Singapore members of the delegation took advantage of the opportunity to visit their counterparts in the Singapore Government agencies and considerable gain was derived from these discussions.

(B. V. Galvin)
Prime Minister's Department

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Appdx "A"

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REPORT OF THE

MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH

REGIONAL WORKING GROUP

ON TERRORISM

SINGAPORE

14 - 16 FEBRUARY 1979

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ANNEXURES

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CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH REGIONAL WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM, SINGAPORE, 14 - 16 FEBRUARY 1979

I. INTRODUCTION

The Meeting of the Commonwealth Regional Working Group on Terrorism was convened in Singapore on 14 - 16 February 1979.

2. Delegations from 12 countries attended the Meeting. Mr Rex Koelmeyer, the CHOGRM Consultant, Commonwealth Secretariat was present. Hong Kong was represented by two observers. The list of delegates and observers appears at ANNEX I.

II. OPENING ADDRESS

3. The Singapore Minister for Home Affairs, Mr Chua Sian Chin opened the Meeting. He said that although terrorism had always been used to attain political objectives, international terrorism was a modern phenomenon. Developments in international mass travel had given terrorists the opportunity to move around the world rapidly and inconspicuously. Improved mass communications had given them almost instantaneous access to a world-wide audience. In addition, explosives and weapons including sophisticated weapons such as heat-seeking ground-to-air missiles were readily available to them. The indications were that it was not a passing phenomenon but one which was likely to continue and grow. The Meeting was therefore not only important but also timely.

4. The Minister emphasised that international terrorism must be combated and not be allowed to proliferate. However, to succeed in doing so, all governments the world over, who were responsible for maintaining law and order must have the political will to shoulder their responsibility and, if necessary, to take unpleasant action to defeat international terrorism.

5. There was an urgent need for members to pool their resources and efforts and enlarge and upgrade their co-operation within the region as well as on a world-wide basis. The Minister urged member countries to go on the offensive to gather more international support against international terrorism. The text of the Minister's speech is at Annex II.

III. ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN AND VICE-CHAIRMAN

6. Mr Lim Chye Heng, Leader of the Singapore Delegation and Mr William Robertson, Leader of the Australian Delegation, were unanimously elected Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively.

IV. OPENING REMARKS OF THE CHAIRMAN

7. The Chairman suggested the following guidelines for the Working Group on Terrorism Meeting, in line with the desire expressed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting held in Sydney in February 1978:

(i) To suggest additional measures of co-operation within member countries in the region on the combating of international terrorism and to propose a concrete course of action in this regard.

(ii) To explore means by which the collective instruments of member countries against trans-border terrorism could be made more effective.

3. The Chairman said that the Meeting should arrive at some concrete arrangements which would enable member countries, singly and collectively, to deal with terrorists and terrorist activities more effectively - through prompt exchange of information and experience.

He noted that international terrorists had safe sanctuaries in certain countries to operate from. It was therefore important that the bilateral co-operation that already existed between the countries in the region be further improved.

9. The Chairman pointed out that each participating country would have to streamline or centralise the dissemination of information on terrorism within its own territory and ensure that the exchange of such information between countries was conducted through the communication channels of their respective security services. He added that quite often information connected with potential hijacking was passed through airlines and various other agencies. This resulted in the information going one full circle before reaching the security services concerned causing confusion and delay and giving the impression of self-confirmation.

V. ADOPTION OF AGENDA

10. The Meeting adopted the Agenda which appears as ANNEX III.

VI. BUSINESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

11. The Meeting agreed that a representative from each delegation which presented working papers would form a drafting committee to prepare the record for consideration by the Meeting.

VII. REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM THROUGH THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE AND STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY LIAISON

12. The Meeting discussed the Working Paper presented by Singapore (ANNEX IV).

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13. The Meeting examined the proposal to set up a regional co-ordinating centre for the processing and dissemination of information on terrorists and terrorist activities. It was generally felt that the setting up of such a co-ordinating centre would be desirable in the long run. Several practical difficulties were seen in its quick establishment as it presupposed the existence of fast and efficient communications among all member countries. In addition it raised problems of finance, location and other resources.

14. It was suggested that improving existing means of exchanging information among member countries would be a useful first step, while the feasibility of a co-ordinating centre was being studied. Each country could nominate one official agency in that country to receive and disseminate all intelligence on terrorism. There should be one established channel of communication among the designated agencies of member countries.

15. The Meeting agreed that

(i) The concept of a regional co-ordinating centre appeared desirable and its feasibility merited further study.

(ii) As an immediate measure, member countries should establish or improve communications among themselves in order to facilitate speedy exchange of information.

(iii) Each member country should consider the nomination of a single agency to receive and disseminate information on terrorism.

VIII. SAFEGUARDING OF INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS AND STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM

16. The Meeting considered the working paper presented by India (ANNEX V).

17. The Meeting discussed ways and means to implement the various measures of strengthening international efforts to combat terrorism. It was agreed that member governments which had not already done so should consider acceding to the three ICAO Conventions (Tokyo, The Hague and Montreal) and the 1973 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including diplomatic agents.

18. It was agreed that there should be close co-operation and regular consultations between diplomatic missions and the governmental agencies of the host countries to ensure the highest standards of security for VIPs and diplomats.

19. Member countries were invited by the Australian delegation to study the security system set up in Australia for the protection of the diplomatic community.

20. It was suggested that knowledge on anti-hijacking, counter-terrorism and related subjects be exchanged among member countries.

IX. IMPROVEMENT OF AIRPORT SECURITY AND MEASURES FOR PREVENTING AND DETECTING MOVEMENTS OF TERRORISTS

21. The Meeting considered the working paper presented by Bangladesh (ANNEX VI).

22. The Meeting discussed the proposal for a regional co-ordinating cell to meet periodically and share information on the prevention of hijacking incidents. This would supplement the existing ICAO and IATA machinery.

23. The Meeting agreed that the security measures outlined by Bangladesh could usefully be adopted by member countries that were building new airports. Attention was drawn to the need for a contingency plan to deal with hijacked aircraft landing at an airport.

24. The Meeting recognised the need to integrate aviation security measures with passenger facilitation.

25. The Meeting agreed on the need to strengthen immigration controls through improved technical facilities and circulation of information relating to suspect passports.

X. PROMOTING TRAINING AND DISCUSSION AMONG REGIONAL OFFICIALS ON COUNTER-TERRORIST EXERCISES

26. The Meeting considered the working paper presented by Australia (ANNEX VII).

27. The Australian delegation informed the Meeting of training courses held in Australia in which member countries were invited to participate. Members were also invited to observe exercises in counter-terrorism. It also offered to conduct an exercise to test the liaison communication channel agreed upon earlier by the Meeting.

28. The New Zealand delegation extended a similar invitation, particularly to South Pacific countries.

29. The Meeting welcomed the Australian and New Zealand offers of training opportunities. As some of the smaller member countries might not be able to send their representatives abroad to attend such courses, members agreed to consider providing specialists to those countries to conduct courses.

XI. SHARING OF OPERATIONAL AND PLANNING EXPERIENCES IN HANDLING INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM

30. The Meeting considered the working paper presented by Malaysia (ANNEX VIII).

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31. The paper explained how Malaysia handled a particular terrorist incident in 1975 and the lessons learned. It und rlined the need for a special anti-terrorist squad to deal with such incidents and for the training of personnel in negotiations with terrorists.

32. The Meeting agreed on the need for member countries to review any particular member country's experience in dealing with terrorist incidents. Where a meeting was not feasible, interested member countries could visit the country concerned to obtain a briefing from the relevant authorities. As the handling of the mass media was an important issue, they felt that the sharing of experience and ideas on this topic could be valuable.

XII. CONCLUSIONS AND R.COMMENDATIONS

33. The Meeting agreed that there were a number of additional measures for increasing co-operation among member countries to combat international terrorism. The following specific measures were recommended:

(i) The concept of a regional co-ordinating centre appeared desirable and its feasibility merited further study. (para 15(i))

(ii) As an immediate measure member countries should establish or improve communication links among themselves in order to facilitate speedy exchange of information. (para 15(ii))

(iii) Each member country should consider the nomination of a single agency to receive and disseminate information on terrorism. (para 15(iii))

(iv) There should be close co-operation and regular consultations between diplomatic missions and the governmental agencies of the host countries to ensure the safety of VIPs and diplomats. (paras 18 and 19)

(v) Knowledge on anti-hijacking, counter-terrorism and related subjects be exchanged among member countries. (para 20)

(vi) The need to strengthen immigration controls. (para 25)

(vii) The need to upgrade training, sharing of training facilities and observing exercises. (paras 27 - 29)

(viii) Sharing of operational experiences. (para 32).

XIII. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

34. The Meeting considered and adopted the Report of the Commonwealth Regional Working Group on Terrorism.

XIV. PRESS STATEMENT

35. The Meeting approved a Press Statement which appears at ANNEX IX.

ANNEX IX

PRESS STATEMENT

The Working Group on Terrorism established by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHOGRM) in Sydney in February 1978 to explore greater co-operation among member countries in combating international terrorism, held its Meeting in Singapore from 14 - 16 February 1979.

2. The Conference was opened by the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr Chua Sian Chin. Fifty delegates from Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Malaysia, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga and Western Samoa, attended the Meeting which was chaired by Singapore's Director of Internal Security Department, Mr Lim Chye Heng. Also present were observers from Hong Kong and Special Consultant of the Commonwealth Secretariat on CHOGRM, Mr Rex Koelmeyer.

3. The Meeting discussed practical ways to improve existing co-operation between member countries and agreed to make a number of recommendations to combat international terrorism. The delegates agreed to take immediate steps to improve liaison for the speedy exchange of information on international terrorism and other related matters.

Singapore
16.2.79

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Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

SECRET

CM 79/3/16

Prime Minister

Seen

Records



Copies to:

Minister in Charge of the NZ Security Intelligence Service
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Police
Minister of Defence
Secretary to the Treasury
Controller and Auditor-General
Chairman, State Services Commission

CHOGRM WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM MEETING,
SINGAPORE : NEW ZEALAND REPRESENTATION

At the meeting on 5 February 1979 Cabinet:

a approved the acceptance of the Singapore Government's invitation to New Zealand to send a delegation to the meeting of the CHOGRM Working Group on Terrorism, 14-16 February, at Singapore;

b agreed that the Government be represented by a delegation comprising:

Mr B V Galvin	Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department and Chairman, Officials Committee on Terrorism (leader)
Commissioner R J Walton	Commissioner of Police and member Officials Committee on Terrorism
Det Chief Supt M T Churches	Director of Crime, New Zealand Police
The Co-ordinator	Terrorist Intelligence Centre, NZ Security Intelligence Service
Lt Col T D Macfarlane	Directorate of Operations, Training and Co-ordination, Defence Headquarters;

c noted that an officer of the New Zealand High Commission, Singapore may also join the delegation as appropriate;

d authorised the expenditure of $10,400 for this purpose charged to Votes as follows:

Vote: Prime Minister's Department	$5,000
Vote: Ministry of Defence	$1,400
Vote: Police Department	$2,000
Vote: NZ Security Intelligence Service	$2,000.

CS (79) 59 refers.

Secretary of the Cabinet

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This paper is the property of the New Zealand Government. As it includes material for Cabinet consideration it must be handled with particular care, in accordance with the security classification assigned to it. The contents may be disclosed only to persons having a duty to receive the information.

16

CABINET

CS (79) 59
Copy No 22
2 February 1979

CHOGRM WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM MEETING,
SINGAPORE : NEW ZEALAND REPRESENTATION

In the attached memorandum the Prime Minister recommends that Cabinet:

a approve the acceptance of the Singapore Government's invitation to New Zealand to send a delegation to the meeting of the CHOGRM Working Group on Terrorism, 14-16 February, at Singapore;

b agree that the Government be represented by a delegation comprising:

Mr B V Galvin	Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department and Chairman, Officials Committee on Terrorism (leader)
Commissioner R J Walton	Commissioner of Police and member Officials Committee on Terrorism
Det Chief Supt M T Churches	Director of Crime, New Zealand Police
Co-Ordinator	Terrorist Intelligence Centre, NZ Security Intelligence Service
Lt Col T D Macfarlane	Directorate of Operations, Training and Co-ordination, Defence Headquarters;

c note that an officer of the New Zealand High Commission, Singapore may also join the delegation as appropriate;

d authorise the expenditure of $10,400 for this purpose charged to Votes as follows:

Vote: Prime Minister's Department	$5,000
Vote: Ministry of Defence	$1,400
Vote: Police Department	$2,000
Vote: NZ Security Intelligence Service	$2,000.

A Treasury report will be available in time for the meeting of Cabinet on 5 February.

No press statement will be made before the delegation's departure but following the conclusion of the meeting it may become appropriate to issue one.

(Signed) P G Millen

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PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

1 February 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET

CHOGRM WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM MEETING,
SINGAPORE : NEW ZEALAND REPRESENTATION

Proposal

1 It is proposed that New Zealand should accept the invitation of the Singapore Government to send five senior officials concerned with anti-terrorism to Singapore to attend the first meeting of the CHOGRM Working Group on Terrorism to be held on 14-16 February. The Officials Committee on Terrorism has proposed the following delegation and I have accepted their nominations.: The proposed delegation comprises :

Mr B V Galvin	Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department and Chairman, Officials Committee on Terrorism (leader)
Commissioner R J Walton	Commissioner of Police and member Officials Committee on Terrorism
Det Chief Supt M T Churches	Director of Crime, New Zealand Police
Coordinator, Terrorist Intelligence Centre, NZ Security Intelligence Service	
Lt Col T D Macfarlane	Directorate of Operations, Training and Coordination, Defence Headquarters

An official from the New Zealand High Commission, Singapore may also join the delegation as appropriate.

Background

2 At the regional Heads of Government conference of the Asian and Pacific Commonwealth countries (CHOGRM) held in Sydney in February 1978 it was agreed (and reported in the conference's communique) that an ad hoc working group should be established to assist collaboration against terrorism between CHOGRM countries and internationally. The Singapore Government undertook to coordinate the working

SECRET

group's activities and has invited member countries to send senior officials to its first meeting. It is not known at this stage whether any further meetings are planned. Australia has already indicated that it is likely to send a delegation of senior officials to this meeting and other CHOGRM members are expected to do likewise.

3 The substantive agenda topics which are set out below are all of relevance to New Zealand and it is believed that the opportunity for the exchange of views on anti-terrorist methods and techniques could be of benefit to our own efforts in this context. The key agenda items are :

a Exchange of intelligence and strengthening security liaison to combat and prevent terrorism;

b Sharing operational and planning experience in handling terrorism incidents;

c Imposing airport security and measures to prevent or detect movement of terrorists;

d Promoting training and discussion among regional officials on counter-terrorist exercises; and

e Safeguarding of internationally protected persons and strengthening international efforts to combat terrorism.

Financial Implications

4 The estimated cost of the travel, accommodation and allowances of the proposed delegation is $10,400. If approved it would be charged as follows :

Vote Prime Minister's Department	$5000	(two members of delegation)
Vote Defence	$1400	
Vote Police	$2000	
Vote SIS	$2000	
	$10400	

Treasury Report

5

Press Statement

6 No press statement is considered necessary before the proposed delegation's departure, but in the light of circumstances at the meeting it may be appropriate to issue one following its conclusion.

Recommendation

7 It is recommended that Cabinet :

a approve the acceptance of the Singapore Government's invitation to New Zealand to send a delegation to the meeting of the CHOGRM Working Group on Terrorism, 14-16 February, at Singapore;

b approve the delegation as nominated above;

c authorise the expenditure of $10,400 for this purpose charged to Votes as follows :

Vote Prime Minister's Department	$5000
Vote Ministry of Defence	$1400
Vote Police Department	$2000
Vote NZ Security Intelligence Service	$2000

R D Muldoon
Prime Minister

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JRM:KAB

1430

2 February 1979

The Minister of Finance

CHOGRM : WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM, SINGAPORE : NEW ZEALAND REPRESENTATION

1. It is understood that the Prime Minister will be seeking Cabinet's approval to the attendance of a delegation of five officers at the first meeting of an an hoc working group to be held in Singapore on 14-16 February, to assist collaboration against terrorism among Asian and Pacific Commonwealth countries and internationally. The group was established at the regional Heads of Government conference held in Sydney in February 1978, and the Singapore Government has undertaken to co-ordinate the working group's activities.

2. We have discussed with the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department (as Chairman of the Officials Committee on Terrorism) the relevance of the agenda to New Zealand and also the need for five officials to attend. We do not question the importance of an exchange of views at this time on anti-terrorist methods and techniques. We are also satisfied that a case has been made for the attendance of the following officials:

Mr B.V. Galvin, Chairman, Officials Committee on Terrorism

Messrs R.J. Walton and M.T. Churches, Commissioner of Police and Director of Crime

Co-ordinator, Terrorist Intelligence Centre, SIS

Lt Col. T.D. Macfarlane, Directorate of Operations Training and Co-ordination, Defence Headquarters

3. The estimated cost of the proposed delegation is $[illegible], to be [illegible]

Vote Prime Minister's Department	$ 5,000	(two members of delegation)
Vote Defence	1,400	
Vote Police	2,000	
Vote SIS	2,000	
	$10,400	

Although no provision has been made in travel programmes, we understand that departments other than Police will be able to absorb the proposed expenditure. Police should endeavour to make savings elsewhere in the Vote.

4. It is recommended that Cabinet approve the attendance of the delegation set out in paragraph 2 above at the first meeting of the CHOGRM working group on terrorism at an estimated cost of $10,400 to be charged in accordance with paragraph 3 above.

Secretary to the Treasury

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Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

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TE (79)/Add 1
Copy No 7
31 January 1979

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

STATE OF PREPAREDNESS FOR COUNTER TERRORIST OPERATIONS AS AT 31 OCTOBER 1978 : FURTHER INFORMATION ON ARMED FORCES SUPPORT FOR THE POLICE

Attached for the information of the Cabinet Committee is a report from the Chief of Defence Staff to the Chairman of the Officials Committee providing further information on the strength and state of readiness of the Armed Forces in support of the Police in a counter terrorist operation. This information was sought by the Prime Minister and supplements reports circulated to the Committee on 24 January under TE (79) 1.

(Signed) P G Millen

COPIES TO

Cabinet Committee on Terrorism
6 Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department
8 Director of Security
9 Commissioner of Police
10 Secretary of Defence
11 Secretary of Foreign Affairs
12 Secretary for Civil Defence
13 Director, EIB
14 Chief of Defence Staff

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

All correspondence should be addressed:
Chief of Defence Staff,
Defence Headquarters,
Private Bag, Wellington.
Telephone: 49 800.

In reply please quote:

23/1/1

DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
WELLINGTON, N.Z.

31 January 1979

Mr B. V. Galvin
Chairman
Official Committee on Terrorism

1. You will recall that, on 25 January 1979 you advised that the Prime Minister sought further information on the strength and state of readiness of the Armed Forces elements in support of the Police in a Counter-Terrorist Operation.

2. Attached at Annex A is a short supplement to the details given in the updated general report previously submitted on 1 December 1978.

(R. B. BOLT)
Air Marshal
Chief of Defence Staff

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ANNEX A

STATE OF PREPAREDNESS AND STRENGTHS OF ARMED FORCES ELEMENTS FOR COUNTER TERRORIST OPERATIONS

Tactical Operations

1. Within 1 NZ SAS Squadron at Papakura comprising some 70 operational 'sabre troops', the Army has prepared a highly specialised 22 man assault team (CTT). In addition a further 10 men have been trained as a reinforcement back-up. The balance of the SAS force can also be regarded as a back-up in certain operational circumstances. The CTT planning elements are continuously at 2 hours notice to move while the balance are at 6 hours notice.

2. The CTT has developed a full capability for possible terrorist assault operations in a typical building/hostage situation. An aircraft assault capability is currently limited by the lack of certain equipments, eg, special explosives devices but will be more fully developed as these become available within the next two months. Assault capabilities against any type of target will be further enhanced by the provision of additional personal communications devices, also expected shortly.

3. Regular training and preparation in co-operation with police counterparts, and the collection and collation of data on potential types of target, are proceeding satisfactorily. Exercise activity programmed for this year includes two periods of Police Anti-terrorist Squad training at Burnham Camp, familiarisation training at potential terrorist target locations and a major combined Police/Defence exercise at a Defence base in the Auckland area in June. The latter exercise (Lauman III) is designed to practise all operational and control elements likely to be involved in a CT incident and will culminate in a simulated assault against a building.

Tactical Support

4.	Category	Type	Source
a.	Armed Personnel	eg, for cordon and guard duties	Can be provided by any Service source in emergency, but most likely from Army. For these tasks, a force of up to 120 men can be supplied quickly to relieve or reinforce the initial Police teams.

/b. Bomb Disposal

	Category	Type	Source
b.	Bomb Disposal	To handle improvised explosive devices (IED)	Army has four IED teams on continuous 24 hours stand-by at Ngaruawahia, Waiouru, Wellington and Burnham. The Ngaruawahia team will be relocated in Auckland from May 1979.
c.	Demolition Team	For specialist demolition	Army has a team of six specialists at 12 hours notice.
d.	Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs)	eg, Tactical transport of Police and/or CTT	Army has two APCs in each of North and South Islands at 12 hours notice.
e.	Tactical Air Transport	eg, Move Police Anti-Terrorist (ATS) and CTT	RNZAF is continuously ready to provide priority air-lift for up to 120 Police/Defence personnel. The SAR standby Andover aircraft at Ohakea, which is always at 2 hours notice, may well be used in an initial emergency lift.
		Helicopters for tactical positioning of Police/Defence elements.	RNZAF helicopters are available at 2 hours notice at Auckland and Christchurch.

Logistic Support

5. The administrative and logistic facilities of the three Services will be provided as required in support of Counter-Terrorist operations. No special plans have been developed for this phase but it is considered that existing resources and the geographical spread of the various camps and bases throughout NZ will allow an acceptable reaction time in providing support to the Police anywhere in NZ. Examples of support in this category are:

	Category	Type	Primary Source
a.	Administrative Transport	Surface Transport Sea Transport Air Transport	Army RNZN RNZAF
b.	Communications	Field radios and telephones.	Army/RNZAF

/c. Rations

	Category	Type	Primary Source
c.	Rations	Fresh and/or canned.	Nearest Service source
d.	Accommodation	Tented or permanent.	
e.	Special Clothing	eg, Wet weather clothing.	
f.	Medical	Field Ambulances Medical Personnel Base Hospital Facilities	

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Prime Minister's Department,
Parliament Buildings,
Wellington.

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TE (79) 1
Copy No 6
24 January 1979

CABINET

COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

PROGRESS REPORTS ON STATE OF PREPAREDNESS
FOR COUNTER TERRORIST OPERATIONS AS AT
31 OCTOBER 1978

In the attached memorandum the Chairman of the Officials Committee on Terrorism recommends that the Cabinet Committee note reports from Defence and Police updated to 31 October 1978 outlining the preparations undertaken in developing our capabilities for counter terrorist operations. These reports are for information only.

(Signed) P G Millen

COPIES TO

Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

7	Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department	This cover sheet only as copies of the reports were circulated to officials by the Chairman of the Officials Committee on 7/12/78
8	Director of Security	
9	Commissioner of Police	
10	Secretary of Defence	
11	Chief of Defence Staff	
12	Secretary of Foreign Affairs	
13	Secretary for Civil Defence	
14	Director, EIB	

CONFIDENTIAL

December 1978

Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

1. The Officials Committee on Terrorism recently received and considered reports by the Commissioner of Police and the Chief of Defence Staff on the development of their respective force capabilities for counter-terrorist operations. It was the view of the Officials Committee that Ministers would wish to be informed of the progress made and on plans for further development.

2. The two reports, updated to reflect the position as at 31 October 1978, are attached at Annexes A and B.

3. I recommend that the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism note the reports.

(B. V. Galvin)
Chairman
Officials Committee

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Police National Headquarters
WELLINGTON

Defence Headquarters
WELLINGTON

1 December 1978

The Chairman
Officials Committee

PROGRESS REPORTS ON STATE OF PREPAREDNESS

FOR COUNTER TERRORIST OPERATIONS

AS AT 31 OCTOBER 1978

1. You will recall that at the last meeting of the Officials Committee held on 11 September 1978, the Committee noted the reports of Police and Defence outlining the preparations undertaken as at 1 June 1978 in developing our capabilities for counter-terrorist operations, and recommended that the reports be referred to the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism for the information of Ministers.

2. The two reports, updated to reflect the position as at 31 October 1978 are attached.

R. J. Walton.

(R. J. WALTON)
Commissioner of Police

(R. B. BOLT)
Air Marshal
Chief of Defence Staff

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CONFIDENTIAL Our Reference: ANNEX A

NEW ZEALAND POLICE
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

GENERAL BUILDINGS, WARING TAYLOR STREET,
WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

CABLES: MOMEN WELLINGTON
TELEX: POLICEHQ NZ 3550
PRIVATE BAG, WELLINGTON
TELEPHONE: 723 000

THE STATE OF POLICE CAPABILITIES IN COUNTER-TERRORIST MEASURES AS AT 31 OCTOBER 1978

INTRODUCTION

1. After the initial training course which commenced 18 July 1977 the Police Anti Terrorist Squad became operational on the 1 August 1977. The following is a summary of Police capabilities and preparation to counter terrorism as at 31 October 1978.

ARMED OFFENDER SQUADS/SECTIONS

2. Armed Offender Squads and Sections are positioned throughout New Zealand in the following locations:

Squad	Section
Auckland (2)	Whangarei
Hamilton	Rotorua
Napier	Gisborne
Wellington (2)	New Plymouth
Christchurch and a Section	Wanganui
Dunedin	Palmerston North
	Nelson
	Greymouth
	Timaru
	Invercargill

3. A Squad consists of 10 plus an Officer in Charge. A Section consists of 6 plus an N.C.O. in charge. There are a total of 171 members who now perform this duty, and their training continues at a high level with emphasis on patience and tact. The North Island Squads and Sections recently completed a Refresher Course at Auckland.

4. Armed Offender Squads/Sections are trained for the express purpose of carrying out forward operations against Armed Offenders. As such they have a limited capability in responding to a terrorist situation. In normal circumstances these personnel would be the first to attend and would contain the situation until the arrival of the Anti Terrorist Squad. Their training includes the theory of terrorism and the basic tactics used, both by the Police and by the terrorist.

ANTI TERRORIST SQUAD

5. The Squad comprises 28 specially selected members from the Armed Offenders Squads. The members were chosen for their expertise in dealing with armed and dangerous offenders. Squad members do not act in a full time role. They carry out normal Police duties and are assembled as and when the need arises.

Command of the Squad is vested in two officers, both of Police National Headquarters. Both officers are long standing members of Armed Offender Squads and are also involved in the supervision of the Police Intelligence Sections, Airport Police and Hostage Negotiators.

6. Monthly training is carried out in each centre and each second month all members train jointly. Training is designed to cover all aspects of tactics involved in dealing with terrorism. Members have now developed an expertise in these areas but further training is required. An example of the training is the rappelling sessions where members have rappelled from buildings and also from helicopters at a height of over 100 feet.

7. The Squad is equipped with sophisticated equipment which includes:

Body armour
.357 Magnum revolvers
Parker Hale sniper rifles
Shotguns
Submachine guns
Radios
Rappelling equipment
Specially adapted station wagon
Night viewing equipment

8. Other equipment has been ordered, and delivery is expected in the near future. This equipment includes new respirators for both Armed Offender Squads and the Anti Terrorist Squad, and 7 of the American 180 rifle system. Research is being carried out into new body armour for the squad, and an order is expected to be placed at an early date.

9. Four selected members of the A.T.S. attended a Snipers Course conducted by the Army at Waiouru. A further course is being arranged by the Police, again with Defence assistance.

10. Joint training has been conducted with Defence as indicated in Appendix A. This training has covered a very wide range including operational training, exercises in command and signals, Counter Terrorist Seminars, and lectures from overseas experts who have been involved operationally with terrorists. Discussions are currently being held with Defence to finalise a similar type of joint training for 1979/80.

11. At this stage the Anti Terrorist Squad is capable of effectively dealing with a terrorist incident other than a major incident.

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION TEAMS

12. Twenty-Five Hostage Negotiators have been trained and have been now used in the operational field. The members who were selected for their maturity and their ability to resolve a crisis situation, train monthly with the Anti Terrorist Squad and the Armed Offender Squads. Training is on-going and a further Refresher Course is to be held early in the new year.

13. It must be pointed out that the New Zealand Police has an outstanding record for resolving crisis situations by negotiators. Hundreds of situations have been resolved by Armed Offender Squad members using this technique.

DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION SQUAD

14. The Squad which is based at Wellington operates over a 24 hour period. Command is vested in a uniform Inspector who is assisted by a Sergeant. A total of 12 Constables are assigned to the Squad. In addition, the four Constables stationed at Government House and the regular Constable at Parliament are supervised by the Inspector. The primary function of the Squad is to afford protection to diplomats, Ministers of the Crown and selected V.I.Ps, including their homes and accommodation. To achieve some measure of protection, a Departmental pistol and 20 rounds are carried in the Squad vehicle.

15. Additional staff are to be allocated to this Squad. Where intelligence or conditions indicate, the strength of the Squad is increased to provide the necessary coverage. Squad members have established a good relationship with the various diplomatic missions in Wellington and are well oriented in the layout of the premises.

AIRPORT POLICE

16. Forty-Five specially selected and trained members are stationed at New Zealand's three international airports. The prime task of the members if the prevention of terrorism. Each of the airports has a computer terminal installed for checking of passengers. This is an inestimable value as a message switching and command channel from National Headquarters.

17. Members of the Airport Police have been trained to carry out the initial action in a terrorist situation at an airport. Their training has been such that their response will be to contain rather than carry out precipitate action which might aggravate the situation. The members' training, plus experience, ensures that any incident will be capably and efficiently dealt with.

POLICE TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

18. This unit which is part of the National Headquarters Criminal Intelligence Section, has now been in operation for some time. The unit is permanently staffed by a Sergeant and two Constables. The unit is responsible for the collection, analysis

and dissemination of intelligence relating to terrorism and criminal extremists in New Zealand as required by and affecting Police operations. The unit is responsible for liaison with other intelligence agencies who provide and receive information on this subject. Each District Criminal Intelligence Section in the main areas maintains a regular flow of information to the unit.

19. The unit's duties include:

(a) Study of effective means of countering terrorist activity likely to be required by the Police and the Anti Terrorist Squad.

(b) Maintaining of records on:

(i) International terrorists.

(ii) Domestic criminal extremists and those having the propensity to commit acts of terrorism or other unlawful pursuits.

(iii) International and domestic extremists and terrorist organisations, modus operandi and objectives for study by the Anti Terrorist Squad and the Hostage Negotiators.

(c) Collection, evaluation and dissemination of material on terrorist weapons, tactics etc. for Anti Terrorist Squad counter measures.

(d) Preparation prior to the arrival of V.I.P.'s of security risk lists giving details of people who may constitute a threat to the visitor(s).

(e) Preparation of papers on threat assessment relating to national and visiting V.I.P.'s and special operations.

20. The unit is fully operational and capable of supplying information on all known terrorist groups as required for Police operations.

NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTRE

21. This centre which forms part of the Police Terrorist Intelligence Unit is fully operational. Within the centre is kept detailed information in respect of bombing, attempted bombings and bomb hoaxes. Special attention has been given to improvised explosive devices, (I.E.D.'s) and the member in charge of the centre has undergone training in this field. The information gathered is evaluated and through this and the modus operandi of the offender, information will be disseminated to the Officer in Charge of a bombing investigation. This is one method by which overseas Police agencies have been able to identify the users of I.E.D.'s.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT

22. The above unit has been formed to co-ordinate, evaluate and manage the various equipment required to be used in support of field forces in terrorist and conventional Police operations. Various items have been or are in the process of being obtained.

INTERPRETERS

23. A list of persons qualified in various languages has been prepared by Police and supplied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The requirement has mainly been restricted to the following languages:

(a) German

(b) Arabic

(c) Japanese

(d) Serbo Croat

24. The interpreters concerned are spread throughout both islands and there should be qualified interpreters available within a short period of time no matter where a terrorist incident took place.

STATE OF READINESS

25. The Police units are considered to be at a high level of efficiency which stems from their operations experience in the general policing of armed offenders situations. It is also considered that arising from joint operations with Defence in other fields and training to date in counter terrorism action a combined operation in the terrorist area would be accomplished successfully even at this early stage of familiarisation and establishment of procedures. All members of the Police are conscious of the threat and would respond well. Further training will be given to general staff on an on-going basis.

APPENDIX "A"

ANTI TERRORIST SQUAD TRAINING

(Other than District Training)

1978

29 - 30 May	"Exercise Lawman One" Command and signals exercise at Wellington.
21 - 24 July	"Exercise Lawman Two" Training weekend and joint exercise involving Police A.T.S. and Defence C.C.T, at Burnham Camp, Christchurch.
18 August	Attendance at "Exercise Bellbird" Canberra of the Deputy Commissioner. This was an exercise in activating the Commonwealth Crisis Policy Centre.
21 - 22 September	Counter Terrorist Seminar for senior officers in command of a terrorist incident, at Police Headquarters, Wellington. Defence participation.
3 October	Address at Wellington by Colonel L.P. Bergsma of the Netherlands Police on terrorist incidents in that country. Defence participation.
17 October	Participation in discussions arranged by Defence with Lt. Colonel Wilkes, British Army on counter-terrorist operations and training.
23 - 27 October	Attendance at the Counter Terrorist Symposium, Canberra of the Detective Chief Inspector, Second in Charge of the Anti-Terrorist Squad.
12 - 18 November	A.T.S. training with North Island Armed Offenders Refresher Course at Whangaparaoa, Auckland.

ANNEX B

THE STATE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE PREPARATION TO SUPPORT POLICE COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS AS AT 31 OCTOBER 1978

Background

1. On 1 March 1978 the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism approved (1) a standard procedure by which Armed Forces support would be requested and authorized.

2. To implement the Cabinet decisions, the Ministry of Defence is required to attain a counter-terrorist capability which will permit elements of the Armed Forces to:

a. provide administrative and combat support to the Police; and

b. undertake certain assault operations.

Concept of Defence Support

3. The Armed Forces may be called upon to provide assistance to Police in a counter-terrorist situation under one or more of the following categories:

a. Logistic Operations. This is probably the most usual area of Defence support in which Service units and individuals provide administrative and logistic services such as:

transport;
rations;
accommodation; and
special clothing, stores, equipment and vehicles.

b. Tactical Support Operations. In these operations selected personnel with suitable specialist equipment carry out tasks in support of Police operations such as:

cordon duties;
security duties, including the guarding of vital points;
traffic control duties;
air and surface transport of personnel at or near the scene;
specialist activities such as demolition and bomb disposal; and
reconnaissance and surveillance.

/c. Tactical

Note: (1) TE(78) M1 Part 1

c. Tactical Operations. In this role, specially trained Armed Forces elements carry out assault against terrorists.

Progress Made

4. General. The following activities have been carried out by the Ministry of Defence in furtherance of the Cabinet Committee's policy on counter-terrorism:

a. There have been a series of co-ordinating and planning meetings with Police.

b. Operational commands within the Army and RNZAF have designated appropriate counter-terrorist forces.

c. The Police and the Ministry of Defence have prepared a joint training schedule for the 1978/79 year. (Appendix 1.)
(Further discussions will commence shortly to plan the joint training schedule for 1979/80.)

d. Procurement has commenced of specialized equipment required by the Army Counter-Terrorist Team (CTT) in carrying out the assault task.

e. The Ministry has participated in a Police seminar on anti-terrorist operations held at Police National Headquarters.

f. The commander of the UK Army counter-terrorist effort visited New Zealand for talks with Defence and Police personnel on counter-terrorist operations and training.

g. Defence personnel attended lectures by Colonel Bergsma, Dutch Police, on the Moluccan terrorist incidents in Holland.

5. Exercises. Two joint Defence/Police Exercises have been held, on 30 May in Wellington and 22/23 July at Wigram. The first, (LAWMEN ONE), was a command and signals exercise designed to practise headquarters staffs at the national, regional and scene levels. The second, (LAWMEN TWO), was designed to test deployment, command and control and administrative procedures at the regional and scene levels in a building-hostage situation. In summary, the exercises indicated that:

a. with minor adjustments, the Police and Ministry of Defence command and control organization established for counter-terrorist operations appears to be appropriate for the task;

/b. joint

b. joint operating procedures are generally well established and known, although some refinement will be required;

c. The main communications systems are suitable for operations in built-up areas, although some specialist tactical communications equipment and speech secure devices will probably need to be procured;

d. further joint training exercises will be required on a continuing basis in order to refine and develop procedures and maintain expertise at a satisfactory level.

Matters Requiring Further Attention

6. Specialist Equipment. Initial preparations have concentrated on preparing forces for the assault in a building-hostage situation. Future training will continue to build up the more complex techniques required in an aircraft-hostage situation and, later, the capability for handling off-shore incidents. The effectiveness of the CTT in all these situations will be severely limited until certain specialist equipment is acquired - the first deliveries are expected in early 1979.

7. Training Facilities. A highly desirable facility for both Police and CTT training is a Close Quarter Battle (CQB) training building and possibilities for its provision are under investigation.

Summary

8. The state of Ministry of Defence preparations to support Police counter-terrorist operations as at 31 October 1978 is summarized as follows:

a. Administrative coordination between Police and Defence has reached a satisfactory workable standard. Continued joint exercises and liaison will help to improve the situation.

b. Given the limitations imposed by the lack of specialized equipment, a reasonable assault capability in a building-hostage situation has been achieved.

c. Procurement action to acquire specialised equipment has commenced. Subsequent delivery of this equipment together with further training should give an acceptable aircraft assault capability early next year.

/d. A satisfactory

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d. A satisfactory joint training programme has been carried out with the Police during the 1978/79 year. Joint planning for the 1979/80 year is to commence shortly.

e. Training and equipment procurement programmes are being implemented to ensure progressive improvement to the capability state of Ministry of Defence counter-terrorist elements.

Appendix 1. Joint Police/Defence Training Programme for the 1978/79 Training Team.

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APPENDIX 1

JOINT POLICE/DEFENCE TRAINING PROGRAMME 1978/79

Serial (a)	Dates (b)	Location (b)	Remarks (c)
1	29-30 May 1978	Wellington	Command and Signals Exercise. (Ex LAWMEN 1)
2	21-24 July 1978	Christchurch/ Burnham Camp	A training weekend culminating in a joint tactical training exercise involving Police and Defence elements from Operation Command level and below. (Ex LAWMEN 2)
3	21-22 September 1978	Wellington	Police Seminar Police National HQ (Defence participation).
4	17 October	Wellington	Discussions with Lt Col Wilkes, British Army, on counter-terrorist operations and training (Police participation).
5	12-18 November 1978	Whangaparaoa	Defence to provide transport and administrative support to the Police ATS.

Secretary, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

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BULLETIN

T E R R O R I S T I N T E L L I G E N C E C E N T R E

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JANUARY 1979

B1-79-1 TERRORISM IN 1978 (RESTRICTED)

B1-79-2 OUTLOOK FOR 1979 (RESTRICTED)

B1-79-3 AIRCRAFT HIJACKING IN 1978 (RESTRICTED)

B1-79-4 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1978 (RESTRICTED)

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TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JANUARY 1979

B1-79-1 TERRORISM IN 1978*

1. The year 1978 passed without a single incident of terrorism by transnational terrorists(1) or aircraft hijacking by an organised terrorist group. Nevertheless, terrorist type incidents continued unabated worldwide throughout the year and the more notable of these included the shootout at Orly Airport, the murder of Aldo Moro and the attack on an El Al Airline bus in London.

2. No new pattern of terrorist attack emerged during the year nor has the use of sophisticated weapons by terrorists been reported. The mercury poisoning of oranges in Europe in January was an isolated incident (attributed to the Arab Revolutionary Palestinian Commando) and the spate of letter bombing in September (attributed to Palestinian extremists) was short-lived.

3. The Red Brigades. The Red Brigades of Italy sprang to prominence in 1978 with the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro. With a large membership this terrorist group has continued its campaign of assassination of professional and public figures mainly involved in law enforcement and the legal field. There is yet no real evidence that the Italian terrorists have operated outside Italy but their future involvement in transnational terrorist operations cannot be discounted.

* It is the aim of TIC Bulletins to present information on terrorist activity with direct or possible implications for New Zealand and its interests. In this respect therefore, the activities of nationalist-separatist groups such as the IRA and the Basque ETA - whose activities are hardly ever likely to directly involve New Zealand - are not discussed.

(1) Transnational terrorist incidents are defined as those in which participating terrorists are drawn from two or more terrorist organisations, for example: the LAJU Ferry incident in Singapore (JRA and PFLP) and the OPEC incident in Vienna when "CARLOS" led a team of two German and three Palestinian terrorists.

4. The Japanese Red Army. It is difficult to fully explain the inactivity of the Japanese Red Army (JRA) since their last major incident (Dacca, September 1977). A comparatively small group, the hard core of which have all been identified, they are known to many of the security forces of the world. Movement, particularly by air, must therefore present considerable difficulties for members of the JRA and this could possibly go part of the way in explaining their inactivity. There is no intelligence to suggest that the JRA are any less dangerous than they have ever been or that they have abandoned their aims of world wide revolution; their inaction can thus be regarded as ominous and another JRA strike, somewhere in the world, only a matter of time.

5. Arab Terrorist Groups. Forays by Arab extremists continued throughout 1978 in a number of countries including Britain, France and Pakistan. Fortuitously, the more serious of incidents centered around the internecine struggle between Iraqi and Palestinian liberation organisations, resulting in a greater number of casualties amongst Arab extremists than amongst innocent people. However, all incidents by Arab terrorists illustrate the wide ranging capabilities of this group, their use of false travel documentation and the difficulties encountered by worldwide security forces in identifying the large numbers involved.

6. Red Army Faction (RAF). This German terrorist organisation - with origins in the Baader-Meinhoff group - was under extreme pressure from West German and European security forces in 1978 and did not emerge to participate in any major terrorist incident. Original members of the organisation are now almost entirely eliminated but new blood has been reported within its ranks, presenting a continuing problem for the West German authorities and a source of transnational terrorist manpower.

7. A sour note to international cooperation in the fight against terrorism was sounded by the Yugoslav Government in November, with their refusal to extradite four West German terrorists to face a number of terrorist-related charges. The four terrorists have now left Yugoslavia and their whereabouts unknown.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JANUARY 1979

B1-79-2 OUTLOOK FOR 1979

1. To date, no major terrorist group has been eliminated or become moribund. Whilst increased vigilance and counter measures by world security forces have resulted in the elimination of a number of terrorists and their support bases, terrorist groups continue to obtain training facilities, weapons, false travel documentation and safe support bases. None of the groups appear to be any less dedicated to their nationalist-separatist or worldwide revolutionary causes and there is little doubt that terrorist activity will continue throughout 1979, although continuing security force activity and preparedness will perhaps result in a reduction in the number of incidents. With many operationally experienced terrorists now extremely cautious and planning conscious, 1979 could well see a major incident of the magnitude of Munich or the Dacca hijacking.

2. Implications for New Zealand. World events in 1978 gave no indication that New Zealand will be any less susceptible to terrorism in 1979. Certainly there is no current intelligence to suggest that New Zealand interests at home or abroad or foreign diplomatic establishments in New Zealand can expect immunity from terrorist activity.

3. In 1978 the New Zealand Government instituted a number of precautionary measures to counter terrorism; these included the formation of an Anti - Terrorist Squad within the New Zealand Police (a Diplomatic Protection Squad was formed in 1977), an increase in the strength of the Airport Security Service, the provision for Defence Department support to the Police, and the establishment of the Terrorist Intelligence Centre. It is hoped that these steps, all of which have had media coverage, will go part of the way in serving as a deterrent to possible terrorist incursions into New Zealand. Whilst many countries have taken precautions to oppose terrorism, few are better prepared to deal with terrorist incidents than New Zealand.

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JANUARY 1979

B1-79-3 AIRCRAFT HIJACKING IN 1978

1. Recorded incidents of aircraft hijacking for the second half of 1978 are listed below. As in the first half of 1978, not one of the incidents was a result of organised terrorist activity.

30 Jun 1978 SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT

A General Aviation Piper aircraft was hijacked by three prisoners being transported from Pueblo to Greely, Colorado. After landing in a field near Colorado Springs the hijackers handcuffed the pilot to the aircraft and escaped.

6 Aug 1978 UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF KLM AIRCRAFT

A KLM DC9 en route to Madrid from Amsterdam was hijacked by a man armed with a toy pistol, a spray can which he claimed to be a bomb and a bottle said to contain dangerous chemicals. The man demanded to be taken to Algiers but whilst the aircraft was over the Mediterranean he was over-powered and later taken into custody. He has been identified as a Dutch student with a history of mental problems.

25 Aug 1978 INCOMPLETE HIJACK OF TWA AIRCRAFT

A TWA aircraft was hijacked on a flight from New York to Geneva. A mysterious person wearing a disguise presented a hijack note to a stewardess and directed her to take it immediately to the pilot. The demands included the release of a varied assort-ment of prisoners. After waiting on the ground in Geneva for some ten hours with no hijacker evident, all passengers and crew deplaned safely. No weapons or explosive devices were found on the plane, and the hijacker has yet to be identified.

30 Aug 1978 SUCCESSFUL HIJACK OF POLISH AIRLINES AIRCRAFT

A Polish aircraft was hijacked to West Berlin. An East German waiter, accompanied by his East German girlfriend and her daughter, threatened a stewardess and demanded that the flight land in West Berlin. The plane landed at Tempelhof Airport. No injuries were reported among the 62 passengers. The hijacker was taken into custody.

30 Sep 1978 INCOMPLETE HIJACK OF FINNISH AIRCRAFT

A Finnair aircraft was hijacked after taking off from Oulu in Northern Finland. An armed Finnish citizen demanded an unknown amount of ransom and received US $206,000. During three landings in Helsinki, hostage passengers were exchanged for the ransom. The hijacker directed the plane's crew to fly to Amsterdam, where it was refueled and from there it departed in a northerly direction, finally landing in Helsinki where the hijacker agreed to surrender if he were permitted to spend 24 hours at home. Police arrested him in his home and recovered the ransom.

22 Oct 1978 UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF TAP PORTUGESE AIRCRAFT

A B277 TAP Portugese Airliner, enroute to Madeira from Lisbon, was hijacked by one male passenger. The hijacker demanded to be taken to Morocco and indicated that he had two pistols hidden in a plastic bag. He was later overpowered by the Captain of the aircraft and taken into custody in Madeira. The pistols were found to be plastic toys.

Early Nov 1978 UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT

An allegedly armed male passenger attempted to hijack a domestic flight between Krashodar and Baku. The attempt was reportedly foiled by security guards who killed the hijacker when he put up resistance.

23 Nov 1978 UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES AIRCRAFT

A hijacker rammed his vehicle through an airport gate at Dane County Regional Airport, Wisconsin and drove to a ramp where a North Central aircraft was emplaning passengers. The hijacker boarded the aircraft carrying a small knife and a white bag which he alleged contained a bomb. The aircraft crew and passengers later vacated the aircraft leaving the hijacker, who had demanded to be taken to Mexico, alone in the cockpit. He was later arrested and is currently undergoing psychiatric treatment.

21 Dec 1978 HIJACK OF INDIAN AIRCRAFT

Two male Indians, armed only with toy pistols and a cricket ball, surrendered after releasing passengers of an aircraft they hijacked. (Further details awaited.)

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BULLETIN

JANUARY 1979

B1-79-4 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1978

1. The more prominent terrorist incidents for the period 1 July - 30 September 1978 are listed below:

9 Jul 1978 IRAQI NATIONAL ASSASSINATED IN ENGLAND

The former Prime Minister of Iraq was shot twice in the head and died later in a hospital in London. A doorman at a nearby hotel,a chauffeur and a taxi driver jointly apprehended an Iraqi gunman. Police later arrested a second Iraqi national at Heathrow Airport as he was about the leave the country.

23 Jul 1978 EXPLOSION AT THE U.S.EMBASSY IN COLOMBIA

A small bomb exploded against the wall of the parking area at the U.S.Embassy compound in Bogota. Minor damage to the base of the wall resulted. No injuries were reported. Local news media received anonymous phone calls claiming the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) was responsible.

24 Jul 1978 EXPLOSION AT GUATEMALAN EMBASSY IN EL SALVADOR

During the early morning hours of 24 July an explosive device detonated near the Guatemalan Embassy in San Salvador. The mine-type device had been placed just over the wall separating the Embassy and the street. No injuries were reported; however, extensive property damage to the Embassy (including the Ambassador's office) resulted. It is suspected the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) was responsible for the incident.

28 Jul 1978 GRENADE ATTACK ON IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND

A grenade was thrown under the car of the Iraqi Ambassador as it waited to take him to the airport. The Ambassador was not hurt, but a passing motorist was slightly injured and the Ambassador's limousine was destroyed. The woman FATAH Terrorist who threw the grenade under the car was captured and is being held in London, together with a man also believed to be a FATAH Terrorist. Another man, thought to have been involved in the attack, escaped.

31 Jul 1978 IRAQI EMBASSY IN FRANCE ATTACKED

Two armed men shot their way into the Iraqi Embassy in Paris. They told guards they had an appointment, pulled out sub-machine guns and opened fire. One of the pair suddenly fled while the other seized nine hostages and demanded the release of a woman being held in London in(connection with an attempt on the Iraqi Ambassador there)and use of an aircraft. During negotiations the terrorist released a wounded guard. He later surrendered to the French Police; as he was being taken from the building, Iraqi Embassy personnel shot and wounded him and killed one policeman. One of the Iraqis was also killed in the exchange of fire and three other persons were wounded.

2 Aug 1978 IRAQI CONSULATE GENERAL IN PAKISTAN ATTACKED

Two FATAH gunmen attacked the Iraqi Consulate in Karachi. One of the terrorists was wounded and the other killed. An Iraqi Embassy employee and a Pakistani Constable were also wounded.

3 Aug 1978 PLO OFFICE IN FRANCE TARGET OF TERRORIST ATTACK

Two PLO representatives were killed in an armed attack on the PLO office in Paris. Two terrorists shot their way into the offices; one was captured immediately by Arab League employees who also have offices in the building. The second terrorist made his way to the third floor and shot the Chief of the PLO office at point-blank range. He then detonated a grenade, fatally wounding an aide. In addition to the two officials who were killed, two Jordanians and a Tunisian were wounded. The perpetrator was captured as he tried to escape. In anonymous phone calls, two groups "Black June and September" and the "Rejection Front of Stateless Palestinian Arabs" claimed responsibility for the attack. The two terrorists are being held by French authorities.

5 Aug 1978 PLO OFFICE IN PAKISTAN ATTACKED

Two armed terrorists shot their way into the PLO office in Islamabad. The terrorists used machine guns to force entry into the office where they killed a Pakistani policeman and three Palestinians. The PLO Chief hid in his office while the gunmen looked for him unsuccessfully. As they left the building, they threw hand grenades. A call to a French news agency claimed the "Black June and September" group was responsible.

17 Aug 1978 CROATIANS HOLD HOSTAGES IN THE WEST GERMAN CONSULATE IN THE U.S.

Two armed Croatians entered the West German Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, pulled guns and took eight people hostage. The pair demanded the release of Croatian leader Stjepan Bilandzic from detention in Cologne, and assurances that the FRG would not permit his extradition to Yugoslavia. Two hostages were released unharmed after a couple of hours. After ten hours of negotiating and a telephone conversation between the terrorists at the Chicago Consulate and Bilandzic in Germany, the duo surrendered to authorities after releasing the remaining hostages unharmed.

17 Aug 1978 IRAQI EMBASSY EMPLOYEE KILLED IN TRIPOLI

An Iraqi national employed at the Iraqi Embassy in Tripoli was shot and killed as he got out of his car in front of the Embassy. Libyan authorities immediately arrested the assassin, a Palestinian, thought to be a member of FATAH, and carrying a Jordanian passport.

18 Aug 1978 EXPLOSIONS AT BRITISH BASES IN FRG

On the evening of 18-19 August several bombs were detonated at British Army bases within a 20-mile radius of the British Rhine Army Headquarters. All the bombs detonated within minutes of each other. The blasts caused structural damage at the bases, and one person was injured. The I.R.A. is thought to be responsible.

20 Aug 1978 ISRAELI AIRLINE CREW ATTACKED BY ARABS IN ENGLAND

Arab terrorists attacked an El Al Airline crew as it arrived at the Europa Hotel in London. The three terrorists threw hand grenades and fired automatic weapons at the bus which was bringing the crew to the hotel. One Israeli stewardess and one of the gunmen were killed and nine other people were injured. A second terrorist was chased and captured by police and a third escaped. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/Special Operations telephoned Reuter claiming responsibility for the attack.

8 Sept 1978 EXPLOSION AT THE CUBAN U.N.MISSION

A time bomb detonated in the entrance of the Cuban Mission to the UN in New York City. A two-foot crater was left in the sidewalk, windows were broken and several cars damaged. Three persons were injured including a policeman and a Mission guard. An anonymous telephone call to UPI claimed Omega 7, a right-wing Cuban exile terrorist group, was responsible for the bombing.

8 Sept 1978 LETTER BOMB RECEIVED AT IRAQI EMBASSY IN WEST GERMANY

An employee at the Iraqi Embassy in Bonn opened a letter bomb which failed to detonate. A fully active explosive charge, in an airmail letter, was rendered safe by the local police. The letter had been mailed on 14 August from Italy. As with the following incidents on 11 Sept and 13 Sept, PLO-FATAH are believed to be responsible for the letter bombs.

11 Sept 1978 LETTER BOMB MAILED TO IRAQI EMBASSY IN ENGLAND

A letter bomb addressed to the Iraqi Embassy in London was intercepted before it was delivered by the postal service. The letter bomb was mailed from Rome, Italy.

13 Sept 1978 LETTER BOMB RECEIVED AT IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION IN THE U.S.

The Iraqi Interests Section in Washington, D.C., received and opened a letter bomb. The bomb did not detonate and was rendered safe by a bomb unit of the local police. The letter was postmarked Rome, Italy.

16 Sept 1978 NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR ASSASSINATED IN GUATEMATA

The Nicaraguan Ambassador was shot several times in the back, and was in a critical condition in Guatemala City. According to press reports, the Guatemalan Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) claimed responsibility for the shooting. The Ambassador died on 29 September 1978.

17 Sept 1978 VIETNAMESE EMBASSY TARGET OF GRENADE ATTACK IN FRANCE

Hand grenades were thrown over the fence surrounding the Vietnamese Embassy in Paris. There were no injuries or damage, and no group has claimed responsibility.

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